sage prévaille sur celui des plus sages, parceque ceux-ci se trouvent en plus petit nombre, et que les premiers même puissent obliger les autres à faire, contre leur propre sentiment, quelque chose de mal concerté. J'avoue qu'en matière de verités speculatives il faut peser les voix, et non pas les compter; et que souvent même l'approbation de la multitude est regardée avec raison comme une marque d'erreur. Mais on ne sauroit appliquer cette maxime à la décision des affaires, qui sont entre les mains d'une assemblée, dont les membres ont tous un droit égal. En effet, qui décidera laquelle des deux opinions est la plus conforme aux règles de la prudence? Ce ne seront pas les parties mêmes: car aucune ne voudra recevoir l'autre pour juge en sa propre cause. Et y a-t-il quelcun qui ne se croie pas plus éclairé et plus habile que les autres? . . . Il n'y a guère moyen non plus de s'en remettre au jugement d'un tiers: car on peut aisément contester sur l'habileté ou sur l'intégrité de l'arbitre; et alors voilà une nouvelle dispute, pour la décision de laquelle il faudroit un autre arbitre, et ainsi de suite."-Droit de la Nature et des Gens, trad. de Barbeyrac, VII. 2, § 15. See also Grot. de Imp. Summ. Pot. circa Sacra, cap. 4, § 6; Bayle, Euvres, tom. III. p. 194. CHAPTER VIII. ON THE RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE, AND TO THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. § 1. In the preceding chapter, we have considered the bearing of the principle of authority upon the action of a political body, and have shown how its mode of decision, though contravening that principle formally, is, in practice, brought more or less into conformity with it, and that the legal method of counting the votes is counteracted by many moral influences. It is proposed now to pursue the same subject further, and to inquire how far this principle serves as a basis for other political arrangements-and whether a similar conflict of forces. may not be discerned in other departments of civil government. The question as to the principle of special fitness, and its opposition to the principle of a simple arithmetical majority, is not confined to the action of political bodies, but it extends to some of the fundamental considerations affecting the structure and composition of a government, and the collocation of the sovereign power. In former chapters, we have contrasted the small number of the competent judges on each subject-the guides to opinion who constitute authority-with the large majority who are uninformed and inexperienced in the matter, and unfit to guide others by their judgment. Now, the opposition between these two classes has always been recognised with respect to fitness for exercising the powers of government. The antithesis, in its various forms, more or less distinctly conceived, of— The few wise, and the many foolish; The few learned, and the many ignorant; The few philosophers, and the many anti-thinkers; The few professional, and the many non-professional,* has been the foundation of all the arguments and instincts in favour of aristocratic as against democratic rule, so far as they have not had an interested origin, and have not arisen from a desire of retaining political privileges for a class to which the individual himself belonged. On this principle, the words, ἀγαθοί, ἄριστοι, καλοικαγαθοί, ἐπιεικεῖς, ἐσθλοί, σοφοί, βέλτιστοι, χρηστοί, boni, optimi, optimates, were used by the Greeks and Romans to signify the governing few, while the majority, or mere people, were called κakoi, πovηpoi, duλoí, mali cives, &c. By degrees, the former words lost their primitive moral acceptation, and came to signify merely the oligarchical class. In like manner, the term ȧpioтokparía,§ which originally, as used by Plato and Aristotle, signified the government of the best citizens, has come to mean the *Or idiurai, according to the Greek phrase. The word layman, Xaïkós, though properly opposed to a clergyman, is in English sometimes used in the general sense of non-professional. † Compare Lord Brougham's chapter on the Natural Aristocracy.-Pol. Phil. vol. II. c. 4. ‡ See Welcker's Pref. to Theognis, § 9-17; Grote, Hist. of Greece, vol. III. p. 62. Pindar, Pyth. II. 160, calls the Few (as distinguished both from the One and the Many) oi oopoí. § See Mr. Stanley on aptoroкparía, Classical Museum, vol. IV. p. 286. government of the Few, in a sense equivalent to oligarchy. Expressions similar to those just mentioned occur in more modern times, as the German boni homines* and probi homines, or gude männer, the Italian buonuomini, the French prudhommes, and the Witena-gemot of the Saxons, as applied to magistrates and governing persons. The councils of old men in antiquity, (Bovλn уεрóvτwv in Homer, the gerusia of Sparta, the senate of Rome,†) and the seniors and aldermen of the Germanic nations, had likewise the same meaning; inasmuch as wisdom, the fruit of experience, was considered the attribute of old age, and the peculiar characteristic of aged councillors. On the other hand, many words which denoted originally a low class in society have, by a reverse process, acquired in modern times a moral signification; thus villain, rogue, rascal, scoundrel, cattivo, chetif, and caitiff, from captivus, have been transferred from baseness of social condition to baseness of conduct. It was upon the view just stated, that the opinions of the Socratic school of philosophers concerning government were mainly founded. They looked upon government as an art, which was to be exercised by the ablest and most virtuous men in the State for the general benefit, in the same manner that a ship was steered by * On the German boni homines,-Grimm D. Rechts alterthümer, p. 294. + Bovλn yεpóvτwv among the Greeks, Iliad II. 53; among the Trojans, III. 149-52. Sallust, Bell. Cat. c. 6, says of the Roman senate: "Delecti, quibus corpus annis infirmum, ingenium sapientiâ validum erat, reipublicæ consultabant. Hi vel ætate vel curæ similitudine Patres appellabantur. Compare Bodin. De Rep. III. c. 1. See Grimm, ib. pp. 266, 268. the best pilot for the sake of all the crew. Thus, Xenophon, in his tract upon the Athenian State, completely identifies the aristocratic and popular parties respectively with the good and bad in a moral sense: “In every country (he says) the best portion of the citizens is hostile to the democracy; for among the best citizens there is the least dishonesty and irregularity of conduct, and the greatest strictness of principle, while among the people there is the greatest want of intelligence and of good conduct, and the least virtue."* In another passage, he remarks that the people wish to be governed by a person of bad character and without education, but well-disposed to them, rather than by a person of good character and education, but hostile to them.† Elsewhere, he considers government in the light of a craft, for which nothing more than dexterity and management are requisite. In the introduction to his Cyropædia, he contrasts the proneness of men to revolt against their rulers with the obedience of horses to their grooms, and of cattle and sheep to their herdsmen; whence he infers, that man is the most difficult of all animals to govern; but, on considering the example of Cyrus, he thinks that the government of men is not an impossible, or even a difficult task, provided it be performed with skill. So Plato founded his aristocracy, or Perfect State, not on the family, or wealth, but on the intelligence of the ruling body.§ Aristotle says that "aristocracy is the government of the best men absolutely, tried by the standard of moral virtue, and not by some arbitrary standard of excellence." *De. Rep. Ath. c. 1. § 1-9, 14-15. See particularly § 5. + § 7. † ἄν τις ἐπισταμένως τοῦτο πράσσῃ. Ι. 1, 3. § See Ritter, Gesch. der Phil. vol. II. pp. 444-6. |