seriously infringed by the elimination of the women* and children; and in the European States, the number of adult males exercising political franchises is reduced by various qualifications of property, residence, taxation, &c. In all these cases, the exclusion is made on the ground of unfitness for exercising the powers of government. The principle of fitness is further practically recognised by popular constituencies, as well as by popular representative assemblies, in the manner pointed out in the last chapter. The system of party, as has already been remarked, is one of the most potent means by which the principle of authority is rendered predominant over numbers, and the votes of the majority are brought under the control of a few persons. In almost all free States, the community-so far as it takes an active concern in public affairs is divided into two or more parties, each provided with chiefs or leaders, who guide their policy, and each recognising some common doctrine or principle of * Mr. Bayley, in his work on the Rationale of Political Representation, discusses at length the question of the exclusion of women from the elective franchise, (pp. 236-42.) He discards at once the argument, that their interest is involved in that of the male sex; since, as he truly states, the interest (or at least the supposed interest) of men and women is often not identical. He might have added, that if the interests of men and women are identical, there is no apparent reason why the women should not govern, and the men be excluded from the franchise. Mr. Bayley is a good deal embarrassed by this question; and after showing an inclination to the qualified admission of women, he ends by deciding the question, with reference to England, on special grounds. Women, he remarks, in boroughs, not being in general householders, would not be entitled to vote; and the franchise might be conferred on widows and single women, keeping houses of the requisite value. With respect to the admission of women into a supreme legislative assembly, he says nothing. action. In the ancient republics, these parties were founded on the distinction between the aristocratic and democratic interests, that distinction being differently determined at different historical periods-at one time, a few noble families against the rest of the citizensat another, the rich indiscriminately against the middle class and the poor. In the Italian republics, the celebrated party division of Guelfs and Ghibellines was derived from the conflict between the Emperor and the Pope; afterwards other party distinctions, as that of the Neri and Bianchi at Florence, were founded on incidents peculiar to each State. The party distinctions of modern times, beginning in England with the Civil War, and pervading both State and Church, are too well known to require more than a reference to them. It has been perceived from an early time, that organization is as necessary for success in political as in military affairs; and that any political cause or principle is more likely to prevail, if its adherents, sinking minor points of dif ference, act together under a common leader.* The interest of persons desirous of establishing certain political principles, has thus led them to merge their own individuality in the body, and to defer spontaneously to the principle of authority. We are now looking at political party on its favorable side; but the benefits which it tends to produce, by reducing to unity the discordant actions of a multitude, and by substituting the ascendancy of qualified leaders for the unchecked operation of the numerical principle, * Livy describes the plebeians, in their secession to the Mons Sacer, after the affair of Virginia, as unable to answer the messengers of the senate, not because they had nothing to say, but because they had no leader (III. 50). Upon which event, Machiavel remarks: "La qual cosa dimostra appunto la inutilità d'una moltitudine senza capo."-Disc. I. 44. See above, c. 7, § 12. are subject to serious deductions on account of the abuses to which it is liable. These abuses are so serious, as often to outweigh the advantages which would otherwise spring from the system. They may, for the most part, be referred to two heads: viz., 1st, the choice of bad leaders, and, 2nd, the hatred of the opposite party; on both which subjects we shall make some remarks lower down, in connexion with the abuses to which the principle of authority is incident.* A leader of a political party, or a person in whom the people have confidence, and for whom they entertain respect, may, if he be inclined, often sooth them, and incline them to reasonable counsels when in a state of excitement; according to the well-known description of Virgil: Ac veluti magno in populo cum sæpe coorta est Ille regit dictis animos, et pectora mulcet. (Æn. I. 148.†) Similar in its nature to the system of political party, (as subordinating the minds of many to a few, and turning them to a common object), is the system of association within a State for a definite political purpose. Associations of this sort have been often formed in free States, and have been attended with important effects. It has been, for some time past, a constant practice in this country to form associations for accomplishing certain public ends, and agitating certain political questions, whether connected with the reform of the law, the education of the people, pauperism, emigration, health, trade, or other subjects of general interest. In the United * Below, c. 10, § 7. + See Machiavel, Disc. I. 54, who refers to some historical examples. States, numerous associations have likewise been formed for similar purposes. By associations of this sort, * the political influence and energies of large numbers are collected into a single focus, and brought to bear on a common point. They likewise call public attention forcibly to the policy or measure which they are desirous of promoting; and they are often the means of throwing much light upon it, by bringing into existence, and training up, a set of persons who devote a large part of their time and thoughts to its illustration.† The influence of such associations is further increased by their preparation and diffusion of printed works, and their connexion with the newspaper press, of which more will be said presently. The whole of this influence is necessarily set in motion and directed by a few minds, whom the body of the members of the association follow as their leaders for this limited object. Generally it may be affirmed that, in proportion as the mass of the people are in a reasonable and well-disposed * M. de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie en Amérique, tom. III. p. 231, appears to think that the United States are the only country in which the principle of political associations is extensively used: "Il n'y a qu'une nation sur la terre (he says) où l'on use chaque jour de la liberté illimitée de s'associer dans les vues politiques." But this assertion is equally true of England. + Tocqueville, ib. tom. II. p. 31: "Une association consiste seulement dans l'adhésion publique que donnent un certain nombre d'individus à telles ou telles doctrines, et dans l'engagement qu'ils contractent de concourir d'une certaine façon à les faire prévaloir. . Quand une opinion est représentée par une association, elle est obligée de prendre une forme plus nette et plus précise. Elle compte ses partisans et les compromet dans sa cause. Ceux-ci apprennent eux-mêmes à se connaître les uns les autres, et leur ardeur s'accroît de leur nombre. L'association réunit en faisceau les efforts des esprits divergens, et les pousse avec vigueur vers un seul but clairement indiqué par elle." See below, ch. 9, § 20. state of mind, they will make a good choice of their political leader; that they will watch his conduct and scrutinize his motives with an enlightened jealousy, but will, to a considerable extent, defer to his judgment, if his general behaviour should show him to be worthy of confidence. § 4. The numerical principle is further controlled by the principle of special fitness, through the agency of the representative system of government. In the small city republics of antiquity, every citizen could, with little or no difficulty, attend the general assembly, the ecclesia or comitia, and the popular courts of justice. There was, therefore, in these minute and simply organized commonwealths, no physical impediment to a direct personal exercise, by each citizen, of his share of the sovereign power. When, however, the dominion of Rome was extended to the whole of Italy, and the Italian allies had fought their way to the rights of citizenship, it was found that the old system of government was no longer applicable, and the Roman world submitted to a monarchical regimen. Since the middle age, a partition of the governing powers was, to a certain extent, recognised in the European States under a royal chief; and the power of granting supplies or aids to the crown, and, to some extent, of concurring in the enactment of laws, was generally admitted to reside in the estates of the realm-the clergy, nobles, and commons. Hence arose naturally the expedient of deputing delegates from these bodies, or from the more numerous of them-the Commons to represent the entire estate in negotiating with the Crown.* * The principles of representative government are stated in Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. III. p. 33. |