§ 14. For a government, although it cannot regulate opinion as it can fix the rates of the public taxes, the forms of judicial procedure, or the scale of legal punishments, can yet exercise a considerable influence upon its movements and direction. Without undertaking to pronounce definitively a precise judgment upon disputed questions of speculation, or to enforce that judgment by its legal and coercive powers, a government possesses a moral authority, by which it can stamp a character of public approbation upon certain acts and certain opinions. It is placed on a high and conspicuous eminence; its voice will be heard far and wide; many people will incline to imitate its tendencies; and its judgments, on subjects upon which it is competent to judge, will not fail to produce a powerful impression on the public. A government, considered as a source of authority, furnishes a model, or pattern, and does not act by compulsory and imperative laws. Its subjects fashion their actions, by a voluntary and self-imposed imitation, according to the type which it places before them-like the pupils copying a model in a school of design. They are not coerced into uniformity by the voice of command, like soldiers at drill. In absolute monarchies, the personal influence of the monarch, or of his court, in establishing a standard of manners and morals, as well as of taste, and in determining the aim and course of personal ambition in the numerous aspirers to honour and public employment, has often been most extensive. In constitutional monarchies, and other free governments, the ruling power is more divided, and its influence less concentrated; but, even here, its moral weight, in determining public opinion and conduct, is not inconsiderable. Bad examples set by rulers are almost invariably followed, to a greater or less extent, by their subjects. And, on the other hand, a good moral influence, in respect either of conduct or opinion, on the part of a government, can scarcely fail to produce a beneficial effect.* Indirectly, in the way of example and patronage, by the remuneration of merit and the distribution of honours, a government, and persons in eminent stations, can do much to countenance sound opinions, to establish a correct standard of conduct, and to encourage persons of genuine merit. But a government has little direct power of influencing opinion, except by preventing the free expression of thought, and by thus producing an intellectual stagnation, such as prevails in Spain, and, to a certain extent, even in Italy. No government of a * πόλις γὰρ ἐστὶ πᾶσα τῶν ἡγουμένων, διδασκάλων λόγοισι γίγνονται κακοί. (SOPH. Phil. 386-8.) Cicero particularly dwells on the moral effect produced by the example of the chief persons in the State: "Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes (quamquam est magnum hoc per se ipsum malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum existunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescumque summi civitatis viri fuerint, talem civitatem fuisse: quæcunque mutatio morum in principibus extiterit, eandem in populo secutam. Pauci, atque admodum pauci, honore et gloriâ amplificati, vel corrumpere mores civitatis, vel corrigere possunt." -De Leg. III. 14. Claudian applies the same sentiment to the imperial period: Componitur orbis Regis ad exemplum; nec sic inflectere sensus Humanos edicta valent, ut vita regentis. Mobile mutatur semper cum principe vulgus. (De IV. Cons. Honor. 299-302.) Machiavel repeats these views, with examples derived from more recent times: "Non si dolghino i principi d'alcun peccato che civilized country, for example, could now, either by punishment or reward, by persecution or endowment, restore a general belief in the Ptolemaic system of the world, or in judicial astrology, within its dominions, Adam Smith remarks, that the most richly endowed universities have been the slowest in adopting improvements in the different branches of philosophy, and have been the most prone to retain exploded errors in their course of education.* Even if this statement were true, it would not prove that the endowment produced the effect of giving currency and authority to antiquated errors and obsolete systems. The probability is that the endowment, thus misapplied, would be merely wasted; and that the doctrines taught would gain little or no acceptance among the public, if it was known that they were rejected by the competent scientific judges, and that they were still maintained by the university merely through the influence of its endowed chairs. facciano i popoli ch'egli abbiano in governo, perchè tali peccati conviene che naschino o per sua negligenza, o per esser egli macchiato di simili errori. E chi discorrerà i popoli che ne' nostri tempi sono stati tenuti pieni di ruberie e di simili peccati, vedrà che sarà al tutto nato da quelli che li governavano, che erano di simile natura. La Romagna innanzi che in quella fussero spenti da Papa Alessandro VI. quelli signori che la comandavano, era un esempio d'ogni scelleratissima vita, perchè quivi si vedev a per ogni leggiera cagione seguire uccisioni e rapine grandissime. Il che nasceva dalla tristizia di que' Principi, non dalla natura trista de li uomini, come loro dicevano."-Disc. III. 29, where the following verses of Lorenzo dei Medici are also quoted : "E quel che fa il Signor fanno poi molti, Che nel Signor son tutti li occhi volti." * Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 2. On this subject, so far as regards the English universities, see the remarks of Dr. Whewell, Hist. of the Ind. Sciences, b. VII. c. 3, § 2. § 15. A government may likewise countenance sound opinions by upholding institutions which imply those opinions, and are founded upon them. A criminal law in which the definitions of crimes, and the gradations of their punishments, are derived from correct principles respecting the grounds of moral imputation and the measure of moral guilt, tends powerfully to establish a good ethical standard in the minds of the community. The same may be said of the civil law: its definitions of contracts, rights of property, fraud, &c., tend to fix and enlighten men's ideas as to honesty and good faith in their mutual dealings. The theory of the criminal and civil law, and its application in practice, when governed by sound principles, thus contribute materially to the establishment of a good code of morals for the public. In like manner, the observance of good faith by the government, in its relations with foreign countries, tends to accredit sound maxims of international law, and to inculcate their observance upon other nations. Every good system of municipal laws, faithfully administered— every steady observance of sound rules of international law-tends to create a real, not an ideal, model of government, which serves for the imitation of other nations and future times.* * Adam Smith adverts to the good moral influence exercised upon the character of the Romans, by the excellent constitution of their judicatories: "The superiority of character in the Romans over that of the Greeks, so much remarked by Polybius, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better constitution of their courts of justice, than to any of the circumstances to which those writers ascribe it."-Wealth of Nations, b. V. c. 1, art. 2. See Polyb. VI. 56. The influence of laws upon the morals and usages of a people is considered by Matter, in his treatise De l'Influence des Mours sur les Lois, et de l'Influence des Lois sur les Mours. (Paris, 1832.) Part III. On the other hand, a government, by adopting erroneous opinions as the basis of its legislation, may not only give them the currency arising from its countenance, but also that strength which arises from the existence of vested interests. This is particularly per ceptible with regard to the economical principles, which are involved in legislation upon commerce, navigation, taxation, public charity, &c. § 16. But although (as we remarked above) it has not been thought the duty of the State to take an active and impulsive part in propagating the truth upon secular subjects, it has not been held that the State could with propriety be equally passive with respect to the permission of error. The censorship of the press was, from the first invention of printing, exercised by all the European governments for preventing the circulation of dangerous and unsound opinions. As has been already stated, it was employed, in the first instance, and principally, for the repression of religious error; but it has also been used for the prohibition of writings upon philosophical, political, and historical subjects. It was thought, at one time, that the government rendered itself responsible for the errors which it permitted to be propagated through the press; and that one of its duties was to protect the public against the diffusion of false opinions by means of books, as it was its duty to adopt measures for preventing the diffusion of pestilential diseases, or the passing of false coins.* There is no doubt that this office was undertaken by the European governments with a * On the censorship of books, see Hoffmann's Treatise; and Beckmann, Hist. of Inv. vol. III. p. 93, art. Book Censors. In p. 98, a passage is quoted from a letter of Hermolaus Barbarus, written in 1480, in which he expresses an opinion favourable to the |