social scale, without adverting to the middle class of citizens; of whose importance he is, nevertheless, well aware.* He speaks, indeed, in many places, of the danger of making a government too democratic, or too oligarchical, by inclining too exclusively to the interest of the rich or the poor. He considers it fortunate for a commonwealth when the middle class of citizens is large and powerful, and he advises that this class should always, when it is possible, be invested with political power, so as to make a constitution mixed of oligarchy and democracy.† It may be added, that aristocracy and democracy are, properly speaking, forms of government; and that, in distinguishing between them, the distribution of the sovereign powers, or of the political suffrage, must alone be considered. But, inasmuch as certain states of society are in general found to accompany these forms of government, a people is sometimes called aristocratic or democratic, although its form of government may *Pol. IV. 11 and 12. † In Pol. IV. 11, Aristotle remarks, that “in all states the community consists of three parts—the very rich, the very poor, and those between these two classes." In this and the following chapter, he enlarges, at length, on the advantages arising from investing with power the middle class of citizens. Again, in V. 8, he dwells on the importance of a moderate constitution, avoiding the extremes both of oligarchy and democracy, but founded on the interests of the middle class. Aristotle, however, remarks, that of the two extremes, the oligarchical is the most dangerous: the excesses of the rich destroy the State (he says) more often than the excesses of the people, (IV.12.) Oligarchies are likewise more instable and short lived than democracies, (V. 1 and 12.) A moderate constitution, in which the rights of all the citizens are regarded, founded mainly on the support of the middle class, but inclining to democracy, is what Aristotle calls a Toλireía, (V. 7.) Bodinus, de Repub. II. 6, (p. 345,) thinks: "Civitates optimatum imperio moderatas, stabiliores esse quam populares ;" and, indeed, he says: "aristocratiæ semper diuturniores fuerunt in quibus pauciores erant optimates.”— VI. 4, p. 1102. Muratori likewise speaks of the mixture of aristocracy and democracy in the Italian republics: "Non una sorte di governo stabilimente si conservò una volta nelle città libere d'Italia, ma di tre differenti spezie di governo or l'una or l'altra si praticò. L'Aristocratico fù de' soli nobili, con esclusione della plebe, come tuttavia si osserva nelle repubbliche di Venezia, Genova, e Lucca. Il democratico del solo popolo, esclusi i nobili, come sovente avvenne in Siena, e talvolta anche in Genova, Bologna, &c. Il misto composto di nobili e popolari, con dividere fra loro gli ufizj; il che si osservò non rade volte per quasi tutte le libere città. L'Italia e la Grecia anticamente diedero esempli di questi tre governi."-MURATORI, Diss. 52, (tom. III. p. 119.) not be entitled to be so called. For example, M. de Tocqueville, in his work on the United States, often calls the English people, or state of society, aristocratic; and the French people, or state of society, democratic. There is more social equality, in point of actual wealth, among the upper and middle classes in France than in England; but looking to political institutions-to the power of the crown, the extent of the suffrage, the liberties of the subject, the facility of political association, the freedom of the press, &c., England was, when M. de Tocqueville wrote, more democratic than France. So the state of society in France, before the revolution of 1789, is usually called aristocratic, although the government was a pure monarchy. An aristocratic or democratic period is likewise spoken of, meaning a period characterized by the existence of those political institutions, and that social state, which naturally result from these several forms of government, or by a tendency to their adoption. § 3. If the preceding view of the difference between aristocracy and democracy is correct-if the distinction between them is of degree, and not of kind, it follows that much caution ought to be used in laying down general propositions respecting them. Unquestionably, there are certain tendencies which are common to all aristocracies and all democracies. Where the powers of government are confined to a few, there is a tendency to political inequality to a system of privilege for the persons possessing those powers, and probably to social inequalities of wealth, hereditary rank, &c. Where they are common to a large number—to an actual majority or a large minority of the people, there is a tendency to political equality, to the absence of privilege, and to social equality in respect of wealth and private position. From these distinctions certain consequences may be derived, which it may be possible to express in general terms. By carefully analyzing the phenomena which accompany the aristocratic * “Quand un peuple a un état social démocratique, (says M. de Tocqueville,) c'est à dire qu'il n'existe plus dans son sein de castes ni de classes, et que tous les citoyens y sont à peu près égaux en lumières et en biens."-La Dém. en Am. tom. IV. p. 243. There is, however, no country in which the people are nearly equal in intelligence and knowledge. By a democratic state of society, is meant a state of society in which there are no privileged orders, and in which there is an approximation to an equal distribution of property: where the legal equality is complete, and the social inequality is not considerable. and democratic forms of government; by excluding those which are traceable to other causes, (such as religion, race, geographical position, state of the useful arts, &c.) by thus isolating the residuary phenomena, and referring them to their true cause; certain general theorems respecting the several tendencies of these two forms of government may be constructed.* After all, however, nothing more than general or prevailing tendencies can be predicated. It can only be affirmed that, supposing men who have the power will use that power as men hitherto have for the most part used it, such and such consequences will follow. For it is conceivable, for instance, that in a narrow aristocracy, the ruling body might, under the guidance of some far-sighted and public-spirited leader, administer the government upon liberal and popular principles. Of such a process of reasoning, confined within its proper limits, no better example can, perhaps, yet be named, than the analysis of the Greek oligarchies and democracies, in Aristotle's Politics. Even his inferences require, in many cases, to be limited by the peculiar data of his problem. Amongst the modern speculators on Politics, several have, however, carried the attempt too far, and have selected, as distinctive marks, or invariable accompaniments, of aristocracy and democracy, or of free governments generally, circumstances which do not * "So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us."-HUME, Essays, Part I. Essay 3-That Politics may be reduced to a Science. See also, Mill, System of Logic, b. VI. c. 6. + See above, p. 140. "It has often happened (says Aristotle) that the constitution according to law is not popular; but, as to its spirit and conduct, is administered in a popular manner: and again, in other cases, the constitution has been according to law of a popular tendency; but in its spirit and conduct is rather oligarchical.” -Polit. IV. 5. In like manner, Bodinus, De Rep. II. 2 (p. 295): "Optimates pauci rempublicam populari modo regere possunt, si cives omnes omnium magistratuum participes fecerint: aut aristocratice, si paucis quibusdam, [paucos quosdam?] qui aut virtute, aut censu, aut nobilitate cæteris præstent." He makes the same remark with respect to a king, viz.—that he may govern the State either on popular or on aristocratic principles. belong to the essence of these forms of government, and only are in certain cases accidentally found in connexion with them.* Thus, it cannot be laid down universally, with Montesquieu, that Virtue is the principle of democratic, and Moderation of aristocratic governments. Neither can it be affirmed, with him, generally, that luxury is advantageous to monarchies, and detrimental to aristocracies and democracies; or, that the Catholic religion best suits a monarchy, and the Protestant religion a republic.§ Some of the theorems respecting free or popular government, laid down by Hume, in his Essays, appear, in like manner, to be derived from an imperfect induction, and therefore not to admit the generality which he assigns to them. Thus, he lays it down, as a general truth in politics, "invariable by the humour or education both of subject or sovereign," that free governments, though commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom, are the most ruinous and oppressive to their provinces. "The provinces of absolute monarchies (he adds) are always better treated than those of free States."|| That many free States, as well aristocratic as democratic, have misgoverned their dependent provinces, cannot be disputed; and it may, perhaps, be admitted, that the peculiar opinions and customs of a dependent community are more likely to be treated with respect where the paramount nation is governed by a monarch, than where it is under an aristocratic or democratic regimen; though the treatment of Flanders and the American provinces by Spain affords a remarkable proof of a similar tendency in a despotic government. But it cannot be conceded, * Hume remarks, that many of Machiavel's general inferences on political forms are founded on too narrow an induction for general application: "Machiavel (he says) was certainly a great genius; but, having confined his study to the furious and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little disorderly principalities of Italy, his reasonings, especially upon monarchical government, have been found extremely defective; and there is scarcely any maxim in his Prince, which subsequent experience has not entirely refuted."Part I. Essay 12-Of Civil Liberty. + Esprit des Loix, liv. III. ch. 3, 4; V. 2—8. 16. 1. VII. c. 2, 3, and 4. He concludes the latter chapter thus: "Tout ceci mène à une réflexion; les républiques finissent par le luxe, les monarchies par la pauvreté." Under republic, Montesquieu includes both aristocracy and democracy. § Ib. 1. 24, ch. 5. -That Politics may be reduced to a Science. || Essays, Part I. Essay 3 that there is anything in the essence of a free government (i. e. a government which is not an absolute monarchy*), necessarily tending to produce oppression of dependencies. Hume, himself, on the other hand, refutes a position which he found laid down by many writers, that the arts and sciences never can flourish but under a free government. He likewise questions the universality of another established opinion on the same subject, that trade can only flourish under free institutions; though he admits, that this latter opinion rests on a wider observation than the former one.‡ Elsewhere, however, he lays it down, that "it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any people, unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free government:" and that, "though the only proper nursery of those noble plants [the arts and sciences] be a free state, yet may they be transplanted into any government; and that a republic is most favourable to the growth of the sciences, and a civilized monarchy to that of the polite arts."§ Positions such as these, respecting the attraction or repulsion, of either monarchy, on the one hand, or of aristocracy and democracy on the other, for the arts and sciences, and for commerce, seem to me scarcely to admit of satisfactory demonstration. No one, however, has carried this mode of reasoning so far as M. de Tocqueville, in his work on Democracy in America. In this able treatise he attempts to lay down a number of general propositions respecting democracy, and a democratic people or age; not confined to the more immediate and palpable effects of the form of government, but extending to very remote consequences, and comprehending subjects having no obvious connexion with political institutions. For example, he lays it down that a democratic age has a natural tendency to pantheism; he believes that this philosophic or religious system has a peculiar attraction for a democratic people.|| He thinks * "The government, which in common appellations [parlance?] receives the appellation of free, is that which admits of a partition of power among several members, whose united authority is no less, or is commonly greater, than that of any monarch; but who, in the usual course of administration, must act by general and equal laws, that are previously known to all the members, and to all their subjects."-HUME, Part I. Essay 5-Of the Origin of Government. † Part I. Essay 12.-Of Civil Liberty. Ibid. § Part I. Essay 14,—Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences. La Démocratie en Amérique, tom. III. p. 59. |