of his prose writings which were composed in its vindication, are only comments on this text; that any law against conscience is alike in force against any conscience.' Treatise of Civil Power, Dedic. He asserts the principle, that civil laws have no cognizance of church delinquencies; and proves, that for belief or 'practice in religion according to the conscientious persuasion ' of man, no man ought to be punished or molested by any outward force on earth whatever.' These demands, however, are made by Milton in respect to parties accrediting the Scriptures. He denies that an idolatrous religion may be tolerated, and thus leaves us dissatisfied with a principle which limits the freedom that it professes to concede. Milton, in his arguments, sometimes forgets the admonition which he tenders to his opponents, to remember, that the state of religion under the gospel, is far differing from what it was under the law. His works, however, with every deduction which may be requisite, are replete with instruction on the question before us, and augmented the means which, in better times than his own, became available for obtaining the recognition of the rights of conscience.

Among the Independents, the principles of religious liberty were less known and less practised than has been sometimes affirmed. In their debates and conferences with the Presbyterians, they involved themselves in the inextricable subtilties and perplexities of fundamentals'. Dr. Owen's positions, and the application which he would make of them to practical cases, were not uniformly unexceptionable; but he must be admitted to rank with the most enlightened advocates of his time, who far excelled most of their contemporaries in their pleadings for religious immunities. John Goodwin, whom Symmons, in his "Life of Milton," describes, somewhat flippantly, as a writer of no celebrity, is, perhaps, the most honourable name which appears among the Independents, as a writer on the side of religious freedom. He admits 'Jews, Turks, and Papists,' to the rights and benefits of toleration. But the times which preceded the age of Owen and Goodwin, were not without witnesses, who bore a decisive testimony against the restraining of religious profession by external force. Roger Williams maintained the opinion, that 'the civil magistrate ought not to punish any breach of the first table'; and, after his emigration to America, he founded the institutions of Rhode Island on this basis. At a still earlier period, Leonard Busher presented to James I. and the High Court of Parliament, in 1614, his Religious Peace,' in defence of general and universal toleration. The principles of this publication are most honourable to its author; he pleads for the protection of every person and all persons differing in religion, and that it might be lawful for them to write, dispute, *confer, print and publish any matters touching religion, either

'for or against whomsoever. He maintained the perfect equality ' of all members, as brethren and fellow disciples.'

This slight and imperfect sketch may be sufficient to shew in what manner the subject of religious freedom was viewed by some of Locke's precursors; and it may perhaps bring under the notice of some of our readers, the names of meritorious individuals, who are much less honoured than they deserve to be. It will also enable them to appreciate the correctness of certain statements, which have been confidently made by various writers of late, in claiming for their respective parties the honour of precedence, in the exposition of the principles of religious liberty. The republican statesmen of the Commonwealth, and the Independent divines, have been severally invested with this merit; but they, in fact, were only successors to others, in this invaluable service to truth. Nor is the account given of "The Discourse on the Liberty of Prophesying," as the first treatise professedly written in defence of toleration in this country, entirely a correct Busher's "Plea" is rather entitled to this distinction. Jeremy Taylor's "Discourse" is to be classed with those productions which are written on the principle of limitation. It requires an agreement in the reception of the articles of the Apostles' Creed, as the foundation of faith. It has been objected against the Author of the "Liberty of Prophesying," that he was only a special pleader for toleration to Episcopacy, while under persecution. We see no reason for questioning his perfect sincerity. In regard to the time and circumstances of his writing on the subject, he was only doing as the oppressed and suffering of other denominations have done. Milton's integrity no one can possibly impeach; but the objection against Taylor, to which we refer, might as truly be brought against Milton.

one.

With all its extraordinary merits, Locke's "Letter on Toleration," together with the several defences of it which he successively published, is not faultless. No enlightened and unbiassed advocate of the rights of mankind, who would separate civil immunities and claims altogether from religious obligations, and assign to each their precise limits, and the circle of their operation and control, will ever pronounce Locke's principles adequate to the great subject on which he has written so much and so well. His own works may be cited against him, when he ap peals to his reader, that absolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty,' is, in respect both to the equity and reason of the case, the subject of demonstration in his discourse. His positions are not always in harmony, and his reasonings are sometimes at variance with them. Sometimes his principle is so stated, as to leave the whole case of a man's religion, or want of religion, as a question between the individual and his Maker, not to be referred to the arbitration of another; and

sometimes it is qualified and restricted in such manner, as to place the judgement of the question of religion in the hands of some men, against their fellows. We refer to the proposition which Locke maintains, that those are not at all to be 'tolerated, who deny the being of a God.' Is that a proposition, the truth of which can be established by the kind of demonstration which Locke engaged to supply? We think not ;and to this conclusion, we apprehend most of our readers must come, when they shall well have considered the case. Even atheism is not, upon Locke's principles, to be punished as a political crime by the magistrate, in the just exercise of the civil power which the community has placed in his hands, and which he is authorized to employ for its protection. Let us consider what Locke has said of Toleration. 'The com'monwealth seems to me to be a society of men, constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own 'civil interests'.- Civil interests, I call life, liberty, health, ' and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, 'such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.'-' It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all the people in general, and to ⚫ every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of 'these things belonging to this life.' He proceeds to shew, that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments; and that all civil power, right, and 'dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things.' (See Locke's First Letter on Toleration, § 4.) Now, supposing that a man avows himself an atheist, and denies the being of a God, but is, at the same time, correct in his conduct as a member of society, still, he is 'not at all to be tolerated'; that is, he is to be deprived of the magistrate's protection, and is to have no secure possession of outward things, and is to be molested with impunity in his person! So Locke asserts; but we must maintain that, even in this extreme case, the magistrate is bound to protect the subject from all injury and wrong. Let us put the case to the reader. You know, you have before you, a person, irreproachable in his conduct as a citizen, but who denies the being of a God: what, then, would you do with him? Would you fine him, that is, deprive him of his money or his goods? Would you imprison him, and so deprive him of his liberty? You would refrain and let him alone; and so, we think, would Locke. But his position, that those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God', must then be abandoned. The magistrate has no more right to be a judge of Atheism, than of Judaism. Once invest him with any excluding authority, and he may find many occasions of exercising it. Locke himself might not have

escaped the visitation of the public functionary thus armed with power; for we find him alluded to by John Edwards, in his "Thoughts concerning the Causes and Occasions of Atheism", as the author of opinions pernicious, and not far from Soci'nianism and Atheism'.

Locke seems to have been led to introduce this exception, by the apprehension, that the entire absence of the religious principle would incapacitate men from judicial obligations. But he might have met this difficulty in a more effectual manner, than by putting out of the pale of the law the man who might avow his Atheism. By the constitution of the American States, an affirmation is equal to an oath; and it is at the option of the asseverator, either to invoke the name of God, or to affirm under the pains and penalties of the law in cases of breach of faith. The invoking of the name of God is far enough from being, in the courts of our own country, a safeguard to truth. It should have occurred to Locke, to what persons, and in what cireumstances, it had happened, to be subjected to the imputation of Atheism. Sir Walter Raleigh was branded with the title of an Atheist, though a known assertor of God and Providence'. Actions, not principles, are cognizable by the magistrate, who, as one of Locke's predecessors in this argument, De Laune, remarks, 'is, and ought to punish evil doers, not evil believers :God reserves that to himself." Locke also excepts from the benefit of toleration, the professors of the Roman Catholic faith.

In the "Extracts from Locke's Common-Place Book", there are some passages on which animadversion would not be misplaced. In the article 'SACERDOS', (p. 287,) Locke represents the magistrate as having a power of commanding or forbidding things indifferent which have a relation to religion'. This power, indeed, he limits to the church of which the magistrate is a member; and this church he describes as being a voluntary society. But the magistrate has evidently no superiority in such a community over the other members, and therefore no such power. In the paper endorsed Excommunication', (p. 303,) we find the opinion of the Author as follows. But if 'any one differ from the Church "in fide aut cultu", I think 'first, the civil magistrate may punish him for it where he is fully persuaded that it will disturb the public peace; other'wise not.' We need not expose the unwarrantable doctrine here maintained, or enlarge upon its mischievous tendencies. 'Persuasion' is entirely excluded. The worst enormities have been perpetrated, and would receive their justification, on Locke's principle.

We may further observe respecting Locke's writings on the subject of Toleration, that he has never followed out the prin

ciples which he has so admirably detailed and so perfectly proved. His entire doctrine is opposed to the very existence of national establishments of religion; and he represents a national Christianity as the cause of more disorders, tumults, and bloodshed, than all other causes put together. But he has never directed his arguments against the state religion of this country, which blends and holds in the closest union the objects which Locke is constantly labouring to prove should exist apart.

The "Treatises on Government" were Locke's next publication; and in the following year (1690), a " Second Letter on "Toleration" was given by him to the world, in vindication of the principles of religious liberty, which, Lord King remarks, had as naturally been attacked by a churchman'. From the period of the Revolution, Locke's usual residence was in London, where he became known to Sir Isaac Newton. With Somers, he lived in habits of the most intimate friendship; and he was one of a company who met weekly at the house of Lord Pembroke, for the purpose of conversation and discussion. In 1691, Locke, whose asthmatic complaint rendered a London residence very distressing to him, took up his abode with Sir Francis and Lady Masham, at Oates, in the parish of High Laver, near Ongar, in Essex. This lady, who was the daughter of Cudworth, is described by Locke in his letters to Limborch, as ardently attached to the cause of religious freedom, * tyrannidi ecclesiasticæ inimicissima', and is said to have been a woman of great sense and of most agreeable manners. In this family, Locke was perfectly at home; and in the society and attentions of the friends whom he warmly regarded, he found his highest gratifications.

During the last four years of his life, increasing infirmities confined him to the retirement he had chosen at Oates, near High Laver, in Essex; and although labouring under an incurable disorder, he was cheerful to the last, constantly interested in the welfare of his friends, and at the same time perfectly resigned to his own fate. His literary occupation at that time, was the study of and Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles, published among his posthumous works.

In October, 1704, his disorder greatly increased: on the 27th of that month, Lady Masham, not finding him in his study as usual, went to his bed-side, when he told her, that the fatigue of getting up the day before had been too much for his strength, and that he never expected to rise again from his bed. He said, that he had now finished his career in this world, and that in all probability he should not outlive the night, certainly not be able to survive beyond the next day or two. After taking some refreshment, he said to those present, that he wished them all happiness after he was gone. To Lady Masham, who remained with him, he said, that he thanked God he had passed a happy life, but that now he found that all was vanity, and exhorted her to consider this world only as a preparation for a bet