tween love and self. Only in this struggle the men of the future may, if they will, be strengthened with a new power; for the socialistic state will render possible what is hardly possible today, — literal obedience to the commands of Christ.

It is possible to claim that when socialism is realized, the fire of life will be gone, and men sink into indolent comfort. It is possible; but only for a pessimistic nature, devoid of faith in man, in science, and in God. Devoid of faith in man must be he who claims that, if the bare necessary of physical maintenance be removed, honor will avail nothing, ambition nothing, love nothing, to impel to effort strenuous and poor. Devoid of faith in natural law must he be if he believes that the result of æons of patient evolution is this sorry creature on a moral level with the brutes. Devoid of faith in God must he be; for if man be of the earth alone, it is possible to conceive him, when earthly incentives are removed, sinking into animal ease: not so if he be formed in the image of the Heavenly. There is a spark of the Infinite in his finiteness, and so he cannot pause. Step by step, urged onward by an imperious inward stress, he must struggle upward to his Source. Stage by stage he must leave behind him the false dreams of physical strife, the antagonism to his fellows, the sharp pursuit of his individual needs. He will not leave sorrow, he will not leave temptation. At every step will appear new evils to be conquered. This his curse is also his blessing, for only in battle can the soul of man be strengthened for immortality. But these evils will become ever more subtle, more mysterious, more inward; and the soul that treads them underfoot shall mount by them to ever new regions of holiness and power. For this struggle ceaseless, eternal, glorious; the struggle upward, by means of the perfect law of liberty, into celestial light - I believe that socialism will, in wonderful and unforeseen measure, set free the soul of man.

BOSTON, MASS.

Vida D. Scudder.

EDITORIAL.

GRADED IMMORALITIES.

LESS important facts than the fact that the Prince of Wales gambles have produced serious and even revolutionary results in political as well as in social life. To some it seems absurd that the column of European news should be chiefly occupied for several days with accounts of a trial arising from charges against an English nobleman for cheating at cards, to the exclusion of intelligence concerning affairs of government and commerce. But this disclosure of the highly-seasoned amusements of some of the aristocracy, and especially of the heir to the throne, may prove to be the little that was wanting to organize public opinion in England in favor of more narrow restrictions of the royal power, and of large reductions in the royal revenue, even if it should not lead to serious changes in the very constitution of the governing powers of Great Britain. The "Nonconformist conscience" is so aroused that there is almost a revival of Puritanism under modern conditions. The immoralities of Parnell called forth a loud protest, which is now heard again with increased emphasis in view of the fact that the Prince of Wales is addicted to the vice of gambling, and depends on it, wherever he visits, as the chief source of his amusement. It is with a new application that the public is now saying Le roi s'amuse. Indignant resolutions are passed by religious bodies at their convocations, and a menacing tone is taken with regard to paying the debts of His Royal Highness from the public revenues. It is a pity that one in so high a station should so demean himself, and that so many of the nobility should dance to the tune he sets, but, at the same time, the disgust of the great mass of the people shows that the moral tone of England has never been healthier than it is to-day.

Not the least interesting aspect of the affair is the discrimination which is recognized as among immoralities. Cheating is worse than betting; one may play for light or heavy stakes, but he may not deceive those with whom he is playing. It may be wrong to gamble, but it is worse to cheat. Betting, if a vice, is one of the smaller vices. Deception is always a vice, and is one of the most flagrant. Modern immorality has its mortal and its venial sins. With perfect freedom, and without apology, ladies and gentlemen admit that they gamble, but are horrified at the discovery that one of their number is cheating. Such is the distinction commonly made in England, and probably anywhere else. The reason and the reasonableness of the distinction are apparent. Betting is bad, but undoubtedly cheating is worse. The English have cultivated the virtue of truthfulness to a remarkable degree. An Englishman's honor is synonymous with his word. He resents nothing so much as an imputation on his veracity. Detection in a falsehood is social

disgrace. Truthfulness assumes a community of life and interests in which every one has his rights, which would be lost if mutual trust were disturbed. One must, indeed, be an outlaw from society who has no right to know the truth. Falsehood is a violation of nature, of the very reality of things, representing them as other than they are; and is always, therefore, a lie against God as well as against men. Exceptions to truth-telling may, perhaps, be justified in some cases when the truth would be used to do injury to society, but even then one hesitates. Martineau concludes that

"After all, there is something in this problem which refuses to be laid to rest; and in treating it, it is hardly possible to escape the uneasiness of a certain moral inconsequence. If we consult the casuist of common sense, he usually tells us that in theory Veracity can have no exceptions, but that in practice he is brought face to face with at least a few; and he cheerfully accepts a dispensation, when required, at the hands of Necessity. I confess rather to an inverse experience. The theoretic reasons for certain limits to the rule of veracity are convincing and unanswerable, and compel me to defend any one who acts in accordance with them. Yet, when I place myself in a like position, at one of the crises demanding a deliberate lie, an unutterable repugnance returns upon me, and makes the theory seem shameful. If brought to the test, I should probably act rather as I think than as I feel; without, however, being able to escape the stab of an instant compunction and the secret wound of a long humiliation."

There is, after all, something noble in the scenes of the London courtroom, as they brought out homage to truth as based upon honor, and revealed the sacredness which an Englishman attaches to sincerest veracity.

Betting, it must be admitted, deals in another kind of commodity, and is reprehensible on somewhat different grounds. Money has not the value of veracity. If one loses it, he may be none the worse. There is no intrinsic immorality in an agreement among companions to pay each other certain sums, according to the issue of a game or a race. In the course of an evening or a season, losses and gains might be about equal. In principle it would be difficult to show that it is wrong for four English spinsters to play their rubber of whist for the stake of a sixpence. People who have no occupation but amusement do not reduce very much the little value remaining in their lives when they venture sums of money they can well afford to lose in order to spice their already stale pleasures. The wrong of gambling is in various ulterior consequences, which may become so bad as to make the practice almost criminal. It violates the economic law of exchange of values by making one's gain the precise measure of another's loss, and is thus a species of dishonesty. It discredits the slow and sure methods of industry, introducing an element of chance and risk which always proves disturbing to honest toil. It encourages the speculative temper in all kinds of business, and speculation cannot get on without deception. The speculator is always under temptation to make things appear other than they are.

Among poorer people, making bets and buying lottery tickets only increases poverty, while it causes discontent with legitimate work. And so modern ethics is entirely right in considering gambling, in its direct and indirect forms, among the worst elements in the corruption of morals; and economics is of the same opinion. When gambling is analyzed, it is found to rest upon deception. The subject is, therefore, receiving earnest attention in England on the part of all the churches. Discussions concerning the guilt of betting and gambling have been held during the last year at church congresses and on similar occasions. English love of outdoor sports and of horseflesh has had much to do with the bad practices which have spread so widely. In this country the evils of the lottery system are very great, and the moral sense of the people is already protesting. The Prince of Wales and his associ ates present a sorry figure in court, because they are seen not only to be occupied exclusively with their own amusement, but also to be resorting to modes of seasoning their pleasures which are forbidden by law, and which are known to be fruitful of evil and misery in the lower classes of society.

In

At the same time, those who disapprove their practices make the same discrimination they have made themselves, and would be shocked at disregard of truth and honor as they cannot be at playing for stakes. the gradation of immoralities, then, there is some reason. It does not show a confused moral sense, nor a merely conventional standard which artificially classifies the virtues and the vices.

The development of morality is a process, ever going on, by which the realm of virtue is enlarged from regard for the direct obligations between man and man to the obligations which grow out of the complex relations of society, business, and advancing civilization. Such disclosures as have recently been made in England serve at least to mark the stages of progress in modern morality.

THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PROFESSOR BRIGGS.

AT the late meeting of the Presbyterian General Assembly, its Standing Committee on Theological Seminaries presented a report advising the Assembly to disapprove the appointment of Professor Charles A. Briggs to the Edward Robinson Chair of Biblical Theology in Union Theological Seminary. After considerable discussion, the report was adopted and the appointment disapproved by a vote of 440 yeas to 60 nays. The directors of the seminary met the following week and voted to disregard the action of the Assembly.

Professor Briggs will therefore continue to teach in the Union Seminary for the present, at least, if his health permits. Whether the General Assembly is able by legal rights or ecclesiastical influence to secure, if it so desire, his ultimate removal from that institution, and whether,

assuming it to have such power, the Assembly is likely to use it, are questions which we do not here consider.

A more interesting question suggested by the Assembly's action is that of the degree of importance it has as a doctrinal affirmation. It is such an affirmation. It is regarded as such by those who approve and those who disapprove of it. It was occasioned by Professor Briggs's inaugural and the impression which the opinions therein expressed had made upon a part of the Presbyterian Church. Of course the General Assembly did not undertake to correct the judgment of the Union directors, as regards the character or capacity of their professor-elect. This construction has not been put upon its action by any one, so far as we know; we are confident that the Assembly did not intend it to be so construed.

The report of its Committee on Theological Seminaries, which it adopted and affirmed by adoption, and which was its only affirmation about Professor Briggs, said, "On the 20th of January, 1891, Dr. Briggs delivered an inaugural address on The Authority of Holy Scripture,' which has been the subject of severe criticism, and which is the occasion of the recommendations which your Committee feel constrained to make to the Assembly."

The Assembly virtually said, therefore, in vetoing the appointment, that the sentiments expressed in Dr. Briggs's inaugural were so widely at variance with its standards of belief that a professor holding those views should not be allowed to teach in a Presbyterian seminary.

This, then, is the intended meaning of the veto, a doctrinal affirmation. It undertakes to express the mind of the Presbyterian Church as regards important doctrines. The question of its importance is the question of the degree to which it expresses that mind. If the Assembly's utterance were the expression of mature conviction, it might be presumed to be a fairly adequate expression of Presbyterian belief; and would stand as an impressive testimony of a great religious denomination, against the ideas Professor Briggs has put forth.

The question, then, of the importance of the utterance becomes the question of its character, of its having the seriousness and depth belonging to a really representative affirmation of the General Assembly, one which will stand as a landmark of American Presbyterianism.

The present time, in which the circumstances which led to this veto of the Assembly and the veto itself are in fresh recollection, is a time favorable to the discussion of this question; and we wish to make such contribution as we can to a proper answer to it, by comparing the Assembly's action with the obvious characteristics of action which would have seriously met the case in hand.

Let us recall the circumstances under which the Assembly acted. First, the career of Professor Briggs and his relation to the Union Seminary. Professor Briggs had already taught in Union for seventeen