SERMON VII. DIVINE PROVIDENCE. MATTHEW, VI. 30. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith? Our Saviour as often addressed his disciples, as others, in his publick as well as his private discourses. He lost no opportunities for instructing and preparing them for the great, and difficult, and dangerous work in which he was about to employ them. He meant to send them forth as sheep in the midst of wolves, without arms, without purse, without script, to preach the gospel in the face of a frowning world. And to prepare them for such a dependent and defenceless state, he taught them to place an unshaken dependence upon the care and protection of divine providence. "Seeing the multitudes, he went up into a mountain: and when he was set, his disciples came unto him. And he opened his mouth, and taught them," as well as the multitudes. And among other duties, he clearly and beautifully illustrated the duty and safety of trusting not only in the universal, but in the particular providence of God, for the peculiar comfort and consolation of his disciples, when they should be thrown poor and defenceless on the world. "I say unto you, take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment? Behold the fowls of the air; for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much you, better than they? And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: and yet I say unto that even Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" Here the argument is from the less to the greater. If God takes care of the lilies and all the inanimate creation, will he not take care of the fowls and all the animal creation? And if he takes care of all the animate and inanimate creation, will he not take care of all the intelligent creation? If God exercises a general providence over the natural world, will he not exercise a particular providence over the natural world? And if he exercise a general and particular providence over the natural world, will he not exercise a general and particular providence over the moral world? Christ appeals to the common sense of all mankind, whether they have not reason to believe, that God, who made the world and all that is in it, does exercise a particular, as well as a general providence over it; and whether they have not good ground to confide in his constant and particular care over them, and disposal of them. The spirit of the text may be expressed in this general observation That God exercises a particular providence over every thing in this world. I shall, 1. Explain a particular providence; and, II. Offer some considerations in favour of it. I. I am to explain what we are to understand by a particular providence. Many infidels, and some, who do not choose to call themselves infidels, deny that God exercises a particular providence over the world. They acknowledge, that he exercises a general providence over all the natural and moral creation, but deny that he governs individual creatures, persons, or events. They suppose, that he governs the world by general laws, which he impressed upon it, when he willed it into existence; which laws he will continue in force as long as it exists. These general laws, they suppose, leave room for what we call contingencies. They suppose all things roll on through a vast variety of contingent events, according to the first impressions of motion, that were given to them by the first Mover, and under the direction of an universal providence. As to the tribes of lower animals, they are left under the direction of instinct; and as to men, God has given them the materials of natural and moral happiness, in the natural and moral constitution of things. He has given them also faculties and powers, necessary to collect and apply these materials, and carry on the work of their own happiness. They suppose, that God takes no care of men as individuals, but only as a species, or as large bodies and communities; that he takes no care of animals as individuals, but only as species: and in a word, that he takes no other care of his creatures than to continue their species according to the first law of their creation. Indeed, they consider this world like a great machine, which God at first created and set in motion, and left to run on according to the general laws given it, without the continued agency and direction of the great Creator. This is what some call a general providence, and suppose is the only one that God exercises over the world. But christians in general maintain the doctrine of a particular providence, by which they mean, that God not only gives general laws for the government of the world, but that he gives energy to such laws and applies them to every individual creature, object, and event in the world: or that he takes care of every individual person among mankind, as well as of the whole human race collectively; that he takes care of every particular animal, as well as of every species of animals collectively; that he directs and controls the smallest, as well as the most important events that take place in the world; that he does not merely see all . things as an unconcerned spectator, but by his invisible and almighty hand, guides and governs all his creatures and all their actions; and in a word, that he is the first and supreme cause of all that lives, and moves, and exists in this, and every other world. I now proceed, Il. To offer some considerations in favour of such a particular providence, as we have just described. Here it may be observed, 1. That it appears from the nature of providence, that it must be particular. We cannot conceive of a general, without a particular providence. The very idea of providence supposes the preservation and government of the world. If God exercises any kind. of care or concern over it, it must be in upholding all things in existence, and in directing the conduct of creatures and the events, which respect their happiness or misery. And if this be the nature of providence, it must be particular and extend to every individual creature, and every individual event. For we can no more conceive, that one creature can uphold itself in existence, than another. If one creature needs the divine support, then all creatures need it. And if all creatures need the divine support at one time, then they need it at all times. It involves an evident absurdity to suppose, that any created object or created agent should be one moment independent of its creator for support and preservation; because independence is an incommunicable attribute of the Deity, which he can no more give to any of his creatures, or to any of his works, than he can give them eternal and uncaused existence. Since then all created things are necessarily dependent; God's preserving providence must respect aud support them all individually. The small dust of the balance as much needs the constant agency of divine providence to support its existence, as the whole material system. The drop of the bucket as constantly needs the supporting hand of God, as the whole collection of waters in the deep and mighty ocean. The smallest animal or insect as con stantly needs the preserving power and agency of God, as all the species collectively. And every man in particular, must depend upon a divine and almighty influence to continue his existence, as much as the whole human race. The preserving providence of God, therefore, must of necessity be particular, and extend to every created nature and object, without a single exception. And so must the governing providence of God. For if one creature needs to be under a divine direction, so does another. If one event needs to be under a divine direction, so does another. And if one secondary cause needs a divine influence to give it energy to produce its effects, so does another. In short, if there be any need of a divine providence to uphold this world, there is the same need of a divine providence to govern it. And if there be any need of a divine providence to uphold and govern it in general, there is the same need of a divine providence to govern every thing in it, in particular. Every argument in favour of a general providence, is equally pertinent and forcible to prove a particular providence. 2. That the supreme and ultimate end of divine providence proves it to be particular. If God exercises any providence or government over the world, it is to answer some particular end, and the same, no doubt, for which he created it. This is the dictate of reason as well as scripture. Hence that ascription of praise to the creator in the fourth chapter of Revelation. "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power, for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are, and were created." And the apostle says, "That of him, and through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory for ever." To this may be added the declaration of Solomon, that "God hath made all things for himself." Now, if God's last end in the creation of the world, be his own glory, and if he aims at the same end in the exercise of providence, then his providence must be particular as well as universal, and concerned in all created objects and events. If he means that the whole creation shall |