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remains. Only the ideal ri is perfectly good.30 And as condensation continues the "Way" (ri) disappears from among men; the world returns to chaos, and the process begins again.31

the "

Jinsai and Sorai charge the Tei-shu school with making Way" nothing but speculative philosophy, and the contemplation of ri. This is so far true that philosophical knowledge is represented as essential to virtue, in agreement with Plato. But it is not taught that knowledge terminates in itself. It leads to action and its end is a virtuous life.82

As natura naturans and natura naturata are both ki; as ki is both matter and force, both soul and body; as by its varying degrees of condensation there may be ki within ki and ki visible and invisible, Shushi's own language is not always clear and there is room for differing interpretations. However, the theory is fairly consistent, though, as in all the philosophy of the Far East, clear definition is wanting. It may be questioned whether Shushi was always clear as to his own meaning. Ri is more difficult of explanation than ki, for it never condenses nor changes. It is forever one and yet each particular thing has its own. When the difficulty

is forced upon him Shushi takes refuge in illustration and

saysAs the moon is one and yet is seen in every stream,

so is the ri; an illustration which shows how far he was

from solving his problem.

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極會又言 得 亦 獨之 善固靜異相陰

壞問
問矣以欲有象惡並

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一番人物都 盡、又

極 了便 ㄧ 齊打合混

重新

打將壞 無全

重混

新沌道不

為復

之象而言則 人 之 性本

善惡之分 若以善惡

0 陰陽之氣相勝而不能

固 並 立而 無先後之序、 静 無 端陰 陽無始、其本

異乎此蓋以氣 言則 動

善相

無氣惡勝

之而

本動則能

80

The Kogaku school is right in its criticism of the quotation of the Classics in support of the Tei-Shu ontology. Kyusō praises the philosophers of the Sō dynasty for discovering that which was not taught by the Sages, but still cannot resist the temptation to quote Classical authority for the discomfiture of his opponents. His success is perhaps equal to that of most men who quote ancient proof texts in support of modern theory.

33

The polemic of the Kogaku school in general furnishes another illustration of the ordinary method of philosophical controversy in the past in the Far East. The Okina Mondo, the Heki-ja-sho-gen and Kyuso's writings, offer further illustrations. On the whole they justify Faber's severe comment on Shushi's own criticism of Buddhism and Taoism --" But the polemics seldom or never enter thoroughly into the doctrines which are really brought forward by their opponents, but instead, they caricature them. so that their monstrosity is easily proved. In this way Mencius treated Meti, and it seems as if this method is especially adapted to the Chinese mind."84

66

The Kogaku school succeeded in shaking the faith of many in the Tei-Shu doctrine, but did not substitute any clear and defined system in its place. As constructive philosophers they do not appear worthy of a place with Shushi and Ōyōmei. The judgment of the orthodox scholars upon their teaching was perhaps not wholly undeserved.

In conclusion it may be noted that the Tei-Shu philosophy still retains sufficient vitality in Japan to lead Dr. Inoue Tetsujiro, Professor of Philosophy in the Imperial University, in the current number of the Transactions of the Philosophical Society, to devote an article to the exposure of the absurdities of its teaching as to Natural Philosophy.

88 Pp. 47-49 above.

34 The Doctrines of Confucius, p. 33.

REMARK BY PROFESSOR INOUE.

Dr. Inoue, Professor of Philosophy in the Imperial University, expressed himself as much gratified with the exposition of Japanese philosophy given by Mr. Haga and offered the following criticisms. Mr. Haga had mentioned the names of most of the Japanese philosophers who dissented from the Tei-Shu school, but he had forgotten to add a very famous writer, Kaibara Yekken (†) who was the contemporary of Jinsai and Sorai. Among the numerous books written by Yekken, there is only one which claims especial attention from a philosophical point of view: his Taigiroku (*), which means "Great Doubt," so called because he explains in the book why he doubts the philosophical doctrine of Tei-Shu. In one place Yekken says: "Ri and ki are surely one thing, but Shushi takes them for two different things. I am therefore embarrassed, and I cannot follow him." Yekken was without doubt a monist, because he thought that ki alone is the fundamental principle of the world. But he had adopted his main idea from a celebrated Chinese writer, Rasei-an (*), in the Ming dynasty.

On the other hand Mr. Haga, he thought, might well omit some writers, for example Shiwonoya and Yasui, who had done nothing in the sphere of philosophy.

Moreover it would have been advisable to trace the connexion between the Japanese philosophers, whom he mentioned, and the Chinese philosophers from whom they borrowed their fundamental ideas. Most of the Japanese

philosophers had adopted the views of some Chinese philosopher or other. Jinsai, for example, got some of his philosophical principles from Goteikan () in the Ming dynasty, who wrote a book entitled Kissai-manroku (‡ A&). Sorai got his principal idea from Junshi. Junshi considers human nature as originally bad, and Sorai adopts this view implicitly, although he does not express it openly. Junshi considers rei (ceremony) as highly important, and rei has almost the same position as moral order in his philosophy. The views of Sorai approach very near to this, because he thinks that rei (ceremony) and gaku (music) are the moral principles of the sages. Sorai has also adopted some views of the savant Yōshōan (4). In the case of Ōshio it would also be better to show in what points he is indebted to the philosophy of Ōyōmei, and whether or not any of his views at all were his own. *

Dr. Inoue thought that Dr. Knox had shown a surprising acquaintance with Chinese and Japanese philosophy. He agreed with Dr. Knox that Shushi had never believed in anything like a Creator in the same sense as Europeans generally understand the term. The philosophy of Shushi was on the whole materialistic. The ri of Shushi just referred to could be held, he thought, as the reality in opposition to ki, just as the "thing-in-itself" of Kant, although ki is not the manifestation of the ri.

As regards the periodical change of the world, Shōkōsetsu (F) in the Sung dynasty had maintained that the world must undergo a radical change in every 129,600 years and become chaos once more, but after the same length of time it would be set in order again, so that the world would change in an eternal round like day and night.

The Mukyoku mentioned by Dr. Knox comes first in the Tao-te-king of Laotz. In the well known letter of Rikushōzan to Shushi we find that this point is well noticed.

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KI, RI AND TEN.

BY GEORGE Wм. Knox, D.D.

[Read 9th March, 1892.]

The Japanese view of the Chinese philosophy is well represented by Ohashi Junzō and Kaibara Yekken, The first is a fervid upholder of the Tei-Shu orthodoxy, and the second a modest and moderate critic of that system. In the following extracts from their writings passages have been combined and condensed that the essential points may be presented compactly.

Ohashi Junzō was born near Utsunomiya, of a family which had lost its position and property. His fondness for books attracted the attention of a merchant of Utsunomiya, Kikuchi of the Sanoya, who adopted him, educated him and gave him his daughter in marriage. Junzō studied at the Confucian college, the Seido, in Edo, and after completing his studies opened a school in the suburb called Kō-m’me mura, beyond Mukojima.

He lived in the times when the old was giving place to the new, and strenuously opposed the opening of Japan to foreigu ideas and civilisation. To his earnest conservatism the foundations of good government, of morals and of society seemed to be threatened; and yet the scholars who had been his teachers were among the advocates of the new policy.

The Heki-ja-sho-gen was published Jan. 26th, 1857. It is an impassioned attack upon the sympathizers with the West from the position of implicit faith in the Tei-Shu philosophy.

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