"act thus in all thofe cafes, in which the moral fitnefs of things can be a rule to him. As to all other cafes, he muft act arbitrarily, if he acts at all; because the fitnefs of things does not come into the queftion." Thefe things being premifed, I proceed to confider,

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Tho' God does in fome instances at from, or according to the moral fitness of things, yet he does not always do fo, that is, be fometimes alts arbitrarily.

With regard to this propofition, I shall first, examine the propofition itself: and fecondly, what the Gentleman has offer'd for the proof of it. And First, With regard to the propofition itself, I obferve, that, whereas it faith God fometimes acts arbitrarily, the meaning of this must be, as it is urged by way of objection to what I have laid down, that he acts thus in fome inftances in which the moral fitnefs of things can be a rule to him; and, confequently, if he made the moral fitness of things a rule to him in those instances, he would act otherwife. I fay, this must be the meaning of the propofition, as it is urged by way of objection against me; because to urge, that God acts arbitrarily in fuch inftances in which the moral fitnefs of things cannot be a rule to him, is to urge that against which I have not opposed any thing, and confequently, is wholly foreign to the prefent queftion. So that the obvious meaning of the proposition is this, namely, that tho' God does in fome inftances act from, or according to the moral funefs of things, yet he fometimes acts contrary to it; which in other words is the fame as to fay, that in some infiances God's actions are morally evil. The fenfe of the propofition being fettled, viz. that God fometimes make the

moral

moral fitness of things the rule and measure of his actions, and fometimes acts contrary to it, I now proceed to fhew that it is erroneous. And,

First, Tho' it could be made appear that God does, in fact, fometimes do what is right and fit in the nature of things that fometimes he acts otherwife; yet it would not follow, that the fitness of things was a rule to him, that is, that it was the ground or reafon of his acting in any cafe, because he might act from capricious humour; as well in those instances in which he act right, as in those in which he acts wrong. Like the unjuft judge in the gospel, who, tho' he neither feared God nor regarded man, yet he would do the widow justice that required it, left, by her continual coming, she should weary him. He would do a right action, tho' it were from a wrong motive or principle. Again,

Secondly, If God makes the moral fitnefs of things a rule to him in fome inftances (which is allow'd in the propofition) then he will do it in every inftance, in which that fitnefs can be a rule to him. And the reafon of this is evident, namely, that as the moral fitness of things is in its own nature truly excellent and valuable, and highly preferable to capricious humour and arbitrary pleasure; and, as God knows full well wherein the fitnefs and valuableness of every action lies; and, as he cannot poffibly be under any temptation to act wrong; fo this will always be a reason, arifing from the nature of things, for God to prefer a rational conduct before arbitrary pleafure, and to direct his actions according. It is true, that man, tho' he is qualified to difcern and judge betwixt good and evil, yet, notwithstanding this, he fometimes acts right, and fometimes wrong. And the reafon of this is likewife evi dent, namely, that as man is a compounded crea

ture,

ture, confifting partly of understanding, partly of appetite, of affection, &c. and as each part of his compofition affords a diftinct kind of motive or excitement to action; fo he fometimes acts from one motive, and fometimes from another. And this gives occafion for his mixed character, viz. that he fometimes acts right, and fometimes otherwife, he fometimes follows reafons, and fometimes acts against it. But this cannot be the cafe with refpect to God, who, as he knows the moral difference in things, fo he has no felf-intereft nor vitiated affection to mislead him (which is generally the cafe with refpect to men) and therefore, he will, not only in some instances, but in every cafe do what is right and fit in the nature of things. Having thus fhewn that the propofition is erroneous, I now proceed,

Secondly, To examine what the Gentleman has offer'd to fupport it. In my previous question I brought two arguments to prove, that God always makes the moral fitnefs of things, and not arbitrary pleasure, the rule and measure of his actions. And I do not understand, that the Gentleman attempted to fhew the weakness and inconclufiveness of thofe arguments; but only, in oppofition to them, he urged an argument drawn from fact, by producing two inftances, viz. the prohibiting Adam and Eve to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and the probibiting the ufe of fines-flesh to the Ifraelites; which inftances he urged as a proof, that God fometimes acts arbitrarily. And here I observe, that it is fuppofed, as thefe inftances are urged against me, that it was really wrong, in the nature of things, for God to make thofe prohibitions. And indeed I grant it would be fo, fuppofing the things prohibited were proper and useful, and that no ill confequence attended the enjoyment of them; becaufe

here

here is a reason for, but no reason against that enjoyment. But this does not appear to be the cafe; and therefore the contrary ought rather to be prefumed. As to the firft inftance, tho' the prohibited fruit might be proper food for the ferpent, yet it might be otherwife to man. For, tho' it was agreeable to the fenfes, and gave a brifknefs to the fpirits; yet the taking plentifully of that fruit might tend to the burt and diffolution of the human compofition. And, fuppofing this to be the cafe, then here is a reason for the prohibition; and confequently this is not an inftance of arbitrary pleasure. Here is a reafon for the prohibition, namely, because this fruit was prejudicial and hurtful to mankind: In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt (or thou wilt) furely die (or contribute to thy death.) As to the fecond inftance, namely, the prohibiting the use of fwines-flesh to the Jews; this I think likewife falls fhort of proof, as in the former cafe. For, tho' fwines-flesh might be proper food in one climate, yet it might be very hurtful in another; and this might poffibly be the cafe, with refpect to the land of Canaan. The taking plentifully of that food might introduce the leprofy, or fome other disorder very affictive or difagreeable to mankind. And, if this was the cafe, then here is a reafon arifing from the nature of things for the prohibition; and confequently this is not an inftance of arbitrary pleasure.

If it fhould be urged, that these are mere fuppofitions, which have no foundation in the hiftory. I anfwer, Allowing them to be fuch; yet, if God governs himself by the moral fitnefs of things in his dealings with his creatures (which I think I have proved that he does) then thefe, or fomething like thefe must be the cafe. If any hould yet infift, that thefe are inftances of arbi

trary

trary pleasure. I anfwer, This is begging the queftion, and, if thefe prohibitions are allow'd to be divine, then there is a moral certainty of the contrary. Befides, whoever thus infifts, I think it will lie upon him to prove (upon the foot of God's acting arbitrarily) that the foremention'd probibitions are divine; which I think cannot be done, as I have fhewn in my previous question (obfervation III.) and which I now come more particularly to confider. And, Tho' all religions which are founded on revelation ftand upon a foot in this cafe; yet, feeing the fuppofed instances of arbitrary pleasure, which are urged against me, are taken from the Jewish revelation, therefore I fhall make the divinity of that revelation the fubject of my prefent enquiry. And, left my opponents fhould fall under any difficulty with regard to the biftorian, the tranfmitting the biftory or the facts recorded in it, I fhall, in favour of them, give them leave to take for granted that Mofes was the writer of all the books which are commonly afcribed to him; that those books have been truly tranfmitted to us without corruption; and that the facts (viz. the turning a rod into a ferpent, water into blood, and the like) were real as they are recorded. And farther, that those facts were fupernatural, that is, they were above the natural ability or inherent power of man to perform; and confequently, that they were performed by the agency or co-operation of an invifible being. This being the state of the cafe, the question will be, Whether this revelation and the law, of which Mofes is allow'd to be the promulgator, is divine; feeing the fupernatural operations, abovemention'd, were wrought to prove it to be fuch? And, The true answer to this queftion will be, that this is perfectly uncertain upon the prefent fuppofition; because God may act

arbitrarily