They are all reduced by Sykes and Taylor under the following heads, 1. It is no where said in the Old Testament, that the life of the victim was given as a vicarious substitute for the life of him who offered it. 2. The atonement was not made by the death of the animal, but by the sprinkling of the blood at the altar. 3. No atonement could be made, where life was forfeited. 4. Atonements were made by the sacrifice of animals in some cases where no guilt was involved. And 5. Atonements were sometimes made without the death of an animal, or any bloodshedding whatever.*-This is the sum total of the arguments, collected by the industry of these writers, against the notion of the vicarious nature of sacrifice: and it must be remembered, that Sykes applies these to the idea, that " the taking away the life of the animal was designed to put the offerer in mind of his demerits," no less than to the idea, that "the life of the animal was given in lieu of the life of the sinner; (pp. 120, 121.) so that they may fairly be replied to, on the principle of atonement here contended for.

Now, to the first of these objections it may be answered, that it is again and again asserted in the Old Testament, that in cases where punishment had been incurred, and even where (as we shall see hereafter) life itself was forfeited, the due oblation of an animal in sacrifice was effectual to procure, the reversal of the forfeiture, and the pardon of the offender; that is, the death of the animal was so far represented as standing in place of the offender's punishment, and in some cases even of his death, that through it, no matter how operating, the offerer was enabled to escape. This however is not

See Sykes' Essay on Sacr. p. 121-141. Ben. Mord. p. 797-799. and Crell. contra Grot. cap. x.

deemed sufficient. Some precise and appropriate phrase, unequivocally marking a strict vicarious substitution, is still required. But as a strict vicarious substitution, or literal equivalent, is not contended for, no such notion belonging to the doctrine of atonement, it is not necessary that any such phrase should be produced. The words, 5, and

, in their sacrificial application, sufficiently admit the vicarious import; and the description of the sacrificial ceremony and its consequences, especially in the instance of the scape-goat, positively prove it; and beyond this nothing farther can be required.

But it is curious to remark, that both Sykes and Taylor, in their eagerness to demonstrate, that the sacrificial terms conveyed nothing whatever of a vicarious import, have urged an objection, which rebounds with decisive force against their own opinion. "The life of the animal," say they, "is never called, in the Old Testament, a ransom; nor is there any such expression, as λυτρον, αντιλυτρον, αντιψυχον, equivalent, exchange, substitute, &c." Essay on Sacr. p. 134. B. Mord. p. 197. Now, not to speak of their criticisms on the expressions in the original, (particularly on the word,) which merely go to prove that these words do not necessarily convey such ideas, inasmuch as being of a more extended signification, they are not in all cases applied exactly in this sense;―an argument, which will easily strip most Hebrew terms of their true and definite meaning, being, as they are denominated by Grotius, (De Satis. Chr. cap. viii. § 2, 3.) лohuone -not to speak, I say, of such criticisms, nor to urge the unfairness of concluding against the meaning of the original, from the language used in the Greek translation; have not these writers, by admitting, that the words λυτρον, αντίλυτρον, &c. if applied to the Mosaic sacrifices, would have conveyed the idea

VICARIOUS IMPORT OF

of vicarious substitution, thereby established the force of these expressions, when applied in the New Testament to the death of Christ, (Mat. xx. 28. Mark x. 46. 1 Tim. ii. 6.) which being expressly said to be a sacrifice for the sins of men, and being that true and substantial sacrifice, which those of the law but faintly and imperfectly represented, consequently reflects back upon them its attributes and qualities, though in an inferior degree.

Again, secondly, it is contended, that the atonement was not made by the death of the animal, but by the sprinkling of the blood.—True; and by this very sprinkling of the blood before the altar, it was, that according to the prescribed rites of sacrifice, the life of the animal was offered; as appears from the express letter of the law, which declares the life to be in the blood, and subjoins as a consequence from this, that it is the blood, (the vehicle of life, or, as it is called a few verses after, the life itself) that maketh an atonement for the soul, or life, of the offerer. See Ainsworth, and Patrick, on Levit. xvii. 11. and for the concurrent opinions of all the Jewish doctors on this head, see Outram. De Sacrif. lib. i. cap. xxii. § 11.—The rendering of the above verse of Leviticus in the Old Italic version is remarkable: Anima enim omnis carnis sanguis ejus est: et ego dedi eum vobis, exorare pro animabus vestris; sanguis enim ejus pro anima exorabit. Sabatier. Vet. Ital. And even Dr. Geddes's translation is decidedly in favour of the sense, in which the passage has been applied in this Number. "For the life of all flesh being in the blood, it is my will, that by it an atonement shall be made, at the altar, for your lives."

But thirdly, the sacrifice could not have implied any thing vicarious, as no atonement could be made where life was forfeited.-There is no argument advanced by the opponents of the doctrine of atone

ment, with greater confidence than this; and there is none which abounds with greater falacies. It is untrue, in point of fact: it is sophistical, in point of reasoning: and it is impertinent, in point of applica

tion.

1. It is untrue; for atonements were made in cases, where without atonement life was forfeited. This appears, at once, from the passage of Levit. last referred to; which positively asserts the atonement to be made for the life of the offerer: it also appears from the unbending rigour of the law in general, which seems to have denounced death against every violation of it, (see Deut. xxvii. 26. Ezech. xviii. 19-23. Gal. iii. 10. James ii. 10.) and in particular, from the specific cases, of perjury, (Levit. vi. 3.) and of profane swearing, (v. 4.) for which atonements were appointed, notwithstanding the strict sentence of the law was death (Exod. xx. 7.—and Levit. xxiv. 16.)-see on this Grot. De Satisf. cap. x. § 3. Hallet's Notes and Disc. p. 275-278. and Richie's Pecul. Doct. vol. i. p. 245-249. 280. This latter writer, it is to be observed, though opposing the doctrine of vicarious suffering, and wishing to avail himself of the objection here urged, yet finds himself not at liberty to advance farther than to state, that it seldom happened that death was denounced against any offences, for which atonement was appointed.

2. It is sophistical; for from the circumstances of atonement not being appointed in those cases in which death was peremptorily denounced, it is inferred, that no atonement could be made where life was forfeited; whereas the true statement of the proposition evidently is, that life was forfeited where no atonement was permitted to be made. It is true indeed, that death is not expressly denounced, in those cases, in which atonements were allowed; but VOL. I. 37

this was because the atonement was permitted to arrest the sentence of the law, as appears particu larly from this, that where the prescribed atonement was not made, the law, no longer suspended in its natural operation, pronounced the sentence of death. The real nature of the case seems to be this: the rigid tendency of the law being to secure obedience, on pain of forfeiture of life; all such offences, as were of so aggravated a kind as to preclude forgiveness, were left under the original sentence of the law, whilst such as were attended with circumstances of mitigation, were forgiven on the condition of a public and humble acknowledgment of the offence, by complying with certain prescribed modes of atonement. It should be remembered also, that the law was not given at different times, so as that its denunciations and atonements should be promulged at different periods; both were announced at the same time, and therefore in such cases as admitted of pardon, the penalty being superseded by the atonement, the punishment strictly due to the of fence is consequently not denounced, and can only be collected now from the general tendency of the law, from some collateral bearings of the Mosaic code, or from the inflictions which actually followed on the neglect of the atonement. The whole strength of the present objection rests then upon this: that we have not both the atonement prescribed, and the punishment denounced: that is, the punishment both remitted, and denounced at the same time.

But I have dwelt too long upon this; especially when, 3dly, the whole argument is inapplicable. For even they who hold the doctrine of a vicarious punishment, feel it not necessary to contend, that the evil inflicted on the victim, should be exactly the same in quality and degree, with that denounced