CHAPTER VIII. FALSE PERCEPTIONS-ERRORS OF THE ORGANS OF SENSE EXAMPLE OF DEI USION-MY OWN DELUSION-CASE OF NICOLAI AND DR. BOSTOCKCASE OF CEREBRAL DISTURBANCE FROM DIFFUSED GOUT-DOUBLE MINDSELF-RESTRAINT-CASE OF MORAL INSANITY. IT must be observed that it is not the greater or less degree of power of the intellectual faculties over the passions (the animal propensities) which I here speak of. This may be more or less powerful, and more or less exercised, according to the temperament, the position in life, the religious convictions, the moral atmosphere in which the individual has been brought up, and the degree of cultivation bestowed on the intellectual powers, in the establishment of that which is the object and basis of all moral discipline-selfrestraint. It is not of this I would now speak, because these are healthy exercises of healthy faculties; it is the control by the sane intellectual faculties of the insane faculties; the tyranny of the sound ratiocinator over the unsound ratiocinator, that is the present object of consideration. The organs which recognise the objects of sense, may give false perceptions; but if the intellectual portion of the brain be sound, the mind resists the false evidence. I have (for example) a predominant taste of garlic on my gustatory nerves, pervading every article of food. It is only a process of reasoning which can convince me that it is a false impression, and induce F me to reject the evidence of my senses. So, if the portions of both brains with which the auditory nerves communicate convey to my intellect the false impression of a deep-toned bell, when I know that there is no bell of the kind within audible distance, my mind at once concludes that the whole is the result of local or general disorder, which I accordingly take measures to remove. I remember hearing a bell, at Mola di Gaeta, with a very peculiar sound; it probably was a musical note of an exact pitch which had never struck my ear before from any instrument, or it might have been something in the quality of the tone, independent of its position in the musical scale. I happened at the moment to be in the midst of a long train of painful emotions, and the two things became associated in my mind. I never heard the same bell again; but in passing Mont Cenis I encountered one of those whirlwinds called a "tourmente," and felt that I had taken cold in my ears, which began to be slightly painful, when I suddenly heard the peculiar sound of the bell of Mola di Gaeta. I was entirely convinced that I heard a bell; looked round for a campanella in vain, and tried, with as little success, to persuade my companions of the truth of my convictions. All the way from thence to Beauvoisin the same sound continued in my ears, renewing all the painful ideas associated with first hearing it; and it was not till I had sat for some time in a very hot room at Martigny that it ceased to annoy me. On resuming my journey the sound was renewed, and it was not till after a hot-bath, and free injection of the ears with warm water, at Lyons, that I finally got rid of the distressing delusion. In this case, the false information conveyed by both brains could not have been recognised as false by the direct process of reasoning, that is, comparing the separate impressions of the two brains, but gave way to the evidence of others. Had this been inaccessible, I must necessarily have remained convinced that there was a bell at Mont Cenis with exactly the same tone as that at Mola di Gaeta. These cases are however very different from that of one intellectual organ in opposition to the other. If, for example, one brain tell me to swallow a quantity of stones, in order to revenge myself on certain persons for supposed insults, and to proportion the number of the stones to the number of the persons who have offended me, or to the number of imaginary insults (not a very uncommon delusion), my sound brain discards the reasoning as absurd and ridiculous, and for a time compels its fellow to acquiesce in a rational view of the case, or depend on the testimony of others; but when the disordered affection extends to the other brain, the absurdity is believed and acted on. A medical man of great attainments, formerly President of the College of Physicians, was under my care, with this curious delusion, and had very nearly starved himself to death, believing, that as the stones could not dissolve, it was useless to eat; he would not take a particle of food for seventeen days. I restored him, by convincing him that the stones would promote digestion, as in the gizzards of birds; and when thus rescued from starvation, and well fed, he recovered his senses, and the stones were voided by the bowels. The late Mr. Anderson, of Cobham, a retired medical practitioner of advanced age, and I believe the first man who professed to be an "oculist," was the subject of a controllable delusion of a curious description. When in a large party, especially in a ball-room, unless he made a strong effort to prevent it, his imagination gradually and slowly went on removing one article of clothing after another from all the persons present, then their integuments, then layer after layer of muscles, then removed the viscera, and, at last, left them all bare skeletons dancing before his eyes, and he burst out into loud laughter at the ridiculous scene. He could at any time stop the morbid process at an early stage, and it was only when his mind was engaged on some other topic that these vagaries were allowed to pass unchecked. Sometimes he watched them out of pure curiosity, but if he allowed the series to be completed could not prevent laughter at the absurd exhibition. Disease of one cerebrum was discovered after death. My explanation of this phenomenon is that one cerebrum was disordered, and from time to time in a state of temporary insanity, but that the other was perfect and capable of entirely controlling its fellow, unless its attention were occupied, and it were neglecting its duty of sentinel. Had this disorder of mind passed on a little further -had the diseased functions become a little stronger, and the healthy functions a little weaker, this gentleman would have been justly pronounced insane, and subjected to restraint. There are thousands of such cases. When very young, I once mounted to the top of a church to view the prospect. The church stood on a high rock, and the ascent to it was by several hundred steps; on the other side, the wall of the building was It almost continuous with a perpendicular face of the On my recovery I became gradually ill, and for a week gave considerable alarm to my friends. I now believe that it was followed by meningitis. It is not extraordinary that I dreamed of the accident for a long time afterwards, and entertained a positive horror of going to sleep. Time gradually effaced these impressions, which were however succeeded by a strange delusion. I imagined my bed to be surrounded by little imps of the height of my knee, whose object was to pull my hair (then worn reaching to the waist), and prevent me from going to sleep. I had fears also that they might scratch my face or injure my eyes; but there was no superstitious horror respecting them—it was rather anger and indignation. At the same moment that I saw these little devils I was perfectly aware that it was a delusion, and, in summer, often got up and dressed myself, and set to learning my lessons for the next day; but in winter, and in darkness, I had not the power of dismissing these disagreeable companions, though equally certain that they had no real existence. I perfectly remember that (still believing |