the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of a 'producat', but was immediately inspired from God: so it is not possible that it should be otherwise than by accident subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance.

BACON.

XXI.

OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY.

But this is not all. For we find within ourselves a will, and are conscious of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with fate, it is reconcilable with it in the author of nature. And besides, natural government and final causes imply a character and a will in the Governor and Designer; a will concerning the creatures whom He governs. The Author of nature then being certainly of some character or other, notwithstanding necessity; it is evident this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity and justice in Him, which attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any other character: since we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent than cruel, true than faithless, just than unjust, or if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. For it is said indeed, that what upon supposition of freedom would be just punishment, upon supposition of necessity becomes mani

ἐν τῇ τῶν πάντων γενέσει ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς γῆς οὐκ ἐξῃρέθη ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία δι' ἐντολῆς ποιητικῆς, ἀλλ ̓ ὑπ ̓ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπιπνοίας ἐνετέθη, οὕτως ἀδύνατον αὐτὴν τοῖς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς γῆς πάθεσι, περὶ ἃ ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑποκεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς φύσιν καὶ τρόπους ἐπιστήμην ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς θείας ἐπιπνοίας τῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καταστησάσης ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι.

W. E. C.

ΧΧΙ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ.

οὐδὲ τοῦτο μόνον· σύνισμεν γὰρ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς βούλησίν τε ἔχουσι καὶ ποιοῖς τισὶν οὖσιν· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ τοιοῦτο τῇ ἀνάγκῃ οὐκ ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ τῶν ὄντων αἰτίῳ. ἔτι δὲ εἰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει ὁ ἄρχων καὶ δημιοῦργος, δῆλον ὅτι ποιός τίς ἐστι καὶ βούλησιν ἔχει· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὐδ ̓ ὁπωστιούν κωλύει ἡ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὴ ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν τῶν ὄντων αἴτιον, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀσύμφωνος ἔσται δηλονότι τῷ πρᾶον ἔχειν τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἀληθευτικὸν καὶ δίκαιον ἢ ἄλλο οἱονδήποτε ̇ (περὶ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή·) ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κωλύουσαν ταύτην τὴν ἀνάγκην ὁρῶμεν τοῦ πράους καὶ ἀληθευτικοὺς καὶ δικαίους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τἀναντία χαλεπούς καὶ ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους, ἤ, εἰ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀναγκάζουσιν, οἵους λέγομεν ἀδίκους. λέγουσι γὰρ δὴ τὰς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἐλευθέροις οὖσι δικαίως ἂν ἐπιτιθεμένας κολά

festly unjust: because it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the injustice of murder for instance, would not also destroy the injustice of punishing it.

XXII.

J. BUTLER.

OF THE CONJUNCTION OF BODY AND

SOUL.

And now that I have gone through the six parts that I proposed, and shewn that sense and perception can never be the product of any kind of matter and motion; it remains therefore, that it must necessarily proceed from some incorporeal substance within us. And though we cannot conceive the manner of the soul's action and passion; nor what hold it can lay on the body, when it voluntarily moves it: yet we are as certain that it doth so, as of any mathematical truth whatsoever; or at least of such as are proved from the impossibility or absurdity of the contrary, which notwithstanding are allowed for infal lible demonstrations. Why one motion of the body begets an idea of pleasure in the mind, and another of pain, and others of the other senses; why such a disposition. of the body induces sleep, another disturbs all the operations of the soul and occasions a lethargy or frenzy; this knowledge exceeds our narrow faculties and is out of the reach of our discovery. I discern some excellent final causes of such a vital conjunction of body and soul; but the instrumental I know not, nor what invisible bands and fetters unite them together.

R. BENTLEY.

σεις, ὡς ἀναγκαζομένοις αὖ ταττομένας ἀδίκους γίγνεσθαι· ἐπ ̓ ἀφύκτοις γὰρ ζημιοῦσθαι. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα τὴν τοῦ φονεύειν ἀδικίαν ἀναιρούσης δὴ τῆς ἀνάγκης, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν τοῦ τὸν φονέα τιμωρεῖσθαι.

XXII.

W. E. C.

ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ.

ἐπειδὴ οὖν τὰ ἓξ μέρη διελήλυθα τὰ προτεθέντα, καὶ ἔδειξα ὡς ἀδύνατον ἐξ ὕλης μόνον καὶ κινήσεως ὁπωσοῦν γεννᾶσθαι αἴσθησιν καὶ νόησιν, λοιπὸν ἄρα γίγνεσθαι αὐτὰ ἐξ οὐσίας τινὸς ἀσωμάτου ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπαρχούσης. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν οὐ δυνάμεθα, καθ ̓ ὁποῖον τρόπον ποιεῖ τι ἢ πάσχει ἡ ψυχή, οὐδ ̓ ὅπως τοῦ σώματος ἐπιλαβέσθαι δύναται, ὅταν τῇ βουλήσει κινήσῃ αὐτό, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον φανερὸν ὡς τοῦτο δρᾷ ἢ ὡς ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ γεωμετρικαὶ προτάσεις, ἢ ὅσαι γε διὰ τοῦ ἀδύνατα ἢ γελοῖα φαίνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία βεβαιοῦνται· αὗται δὲ οἶμαι ἀνεξελέγκτως ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὁμολογοῦνται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, διότι αἱ κινήσεις αὐτοῦ ἐντίκτουσι τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ μὲν ἡδονὴν ἡ δὲ λύπην, ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις, αἱ δ ̓ ἕξεις αὖ ἡ μὲν ὕπνον ἐμποιεῖ ἡ δὲ πάσας τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ταράττει ἐνεργείας ἀναισθησίαν ἢ μανίαν ἀπεργαζομένη, τούτων ἤδη ἡ γνῶσις ἔξω τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δυνάμεων φαύλων οὐσῶν κεῖται, οὐδ ̓ ἐφικνεῖσθαι αὐτῶν δύναται ἡ ἡμετέρα ζήτησις. πολλὰ τοίνυν κατιδεῖν δύναμαι ὧν ἕνεκα συνδυάζοιντο ἂν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, τὸ δὲ δι ̓ οὗ ἀγνοῶ, οὐδ ̓ οἶδ ̓ ὑφ ̓ ὁποίων δεσμῶν τε καὶ πεδῶν ἀοράτων συνέχονται. W. E. C.

XXIII.

SENSIBLE THINGS.

Phil. This point then it is agreed between us, that sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight any thing beside light, and colours, and figures: or by hearing, any thing but sounds: by the palate, any thing beside tastes: by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities. Hyl. We do not. Phil. It seems therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible? Hyl. I grant it. Phil. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities or combinations of sensible qualities? Hyl. Nothing else. Phil. Heat then is a sensible thing? Hyl. Certainly. Phil. Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived and that bears no relation to the mind? Hyl. To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another. Phil. I speak with regard to sensible things only and of these I ask, whether by their real evidence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived? Hyl. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from and without any relation to their being perceived. G. BERKELEY.