siders this difference between us and the Romanists one of the utmost consequence. This thing," he says, "I will try by Scripture, by sense, and by Tradition."

The Bishop appeals to Augustin's words in favour of "that principle of representation," which the Archdeacon discards: "That which

signifies is wont to be called the thing "which is signified by it." With Augustin he refers to the Scripture, "That Rock was "Christ, &c."

Indeed the Archdeacon is obliged to acknowledge that Augustin knew nothing of his distinction between the Res and the Virtus. "St. Augustin certainly uses expressions on "which it is possible to put a Calvinistic "meaning. He does not distinguish between "the Res Sacramenti and the Virtus Sacra"menti." (p. 244.) This confession is destructive to his cause. Can we suppose Augustin ignorant of what the Church at large held in his time?

We confidently ask our readers, Can the Archdeacon claim the support of Jeremy Taylor, or of Augustin?

§ 44. MR. NEALE HELD IN HONOUR.

To make amends for the disrespectful neg

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lect which our English Divines in general have experienced at his hands, he has occasionally quoted Bishop Cosin. But it is not his published writings which he quotes-it is certain posthumous expressions of opinion, published on the authority of Mr. Nicholls. He has also made frequent reference to one of our modern divines in his notes, and on one occasion (p. 441) quotes him respectfully—we mean Mr. Neale. This gentleman published, a few years ago, a "History of England for young People," which we reviewed at the time. that History, so called, he scarcely mentions that feature in the English constitution, a Parliament, till he arrives at the reigns of the Stuarts. He speaks of it now and then as a tumultuous and irreverent assembly; but his young readers, if they depended on him alone for information, would scarcely know what it was. The History of England resolves itself, in his hands, into the rise, progress, and decline of what he calls "Church Principles." Thomas à Becket is of much more consequence than King Alfred or William the Third. More recently, the same honest and veracious gentleman has thought fit to publish an edition of the "Pilgrim's Progress," with the omission of many of John Bunyan's sentiments, and the

substitution of his own. Truly we are sorry to see, that a man like the Archdeacon should have deserted the company of our Reformers to take with Mr. Neale's!

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§ 45. WHAT IS SUBSTANCE?

Having thus dispatched his distinction between Res Sacramenti and Virtus Sacramenti -unknown to Augustin, and therefore to the Church in Augustin's time-we will now proceed to lay before our readers his ideas of Substance. The very mention of Substance is so connected with the thought of "Transubstantiation," as to make us tremble, lest we should be approaching, under the Archdeacon's guidance, to the verge of that terrible tenet.

Our fears are the greater, when we recollect the sort of notice which the "British Critic" gave us long ago (No. lxiii.) of what we might expect ;

"The idea, that to a Christian, believing all the "astounding mysteries which are contained in the doc"trine of the Incarnation, the further belief in the Real "Presence, even to the extent of the Tridentine definition, "is a serious additional tax on his credulity,' is not "tenable for a moment."

Is the Archdeacon of this mind? Has the

doctrine of Transubstantiation no terrors for him? Alas! none. They all vanish, like ghosts, before the light of philology.

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"According to the Aristotelian Philosophy all objects were referable to ten heads, Substance, Quantity, "Quality, and seven kinds of relation. These ten heads, or categories, were a metaphysical classification, according to which every conceivable object was sup'posed to be divisible. The first, Substance, expressed "the Quiddity of an object, i. e. what it is, quid est; the "other nine categories expressed its accidents. Now, it was held that there were two sources of knowledge, sense and intellect (St. Thom. Opusc. c. 29, p. 400). Of these, sense was exclusively conversant with the acci"dents of things. For ' sensus est cognoscitivus acci"dentium' (Summa Theol. i. 78. 3). But the Substance or Quiddity was an object to the intellect alone. "Quidditas rei sensibilis est objectum intellectûs proprium, ut dicitur in 3 de Animâ.' (Opusc. xxix. p. 400)." (p. 127.)

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We give the Archdeacon's italics and his exact references to the works of Aquinas (or "Saint Thomas"), to shew the importance which he attaches to what he has here quoted.

Our readers will see that the word substance is used to express the Quiddity—what a thing is. If therefore the substance is changed, the thing is changed. It is not what it was. Consequently, if the substance after consecration, is the Body of Christ, the elements are not what they were. To the senses, as accidents, they may still appear to be bread and wine.

But to the intellect, they are what the substance has become-Christ's Body. This follows from the Philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas. Such is the view which the Schoolmen took.

But our Church takes a different view. She says (in her Twenty-eighth Article): "Transubstantiation, or the change of the substance of bread and wine, cannot be proved by Holy Writ, but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, &c."

It would seem as if these views were not capable of being reconciled. But the Archdeacon, though a clergyman of our Church, being also a disciple of Thomas Aquinas, does not despair. He makes the attempt. He suggests, that the difference between the Schoolmen and our Church is but verbal. The Article, he says, uses the word "Substance" in the popular sense; the Schoolmen in the philosophical. St. Thomas, he ventures to affirm, would not have objected to subscribe our Article, taking the word in its popular meaning, which has reference to what the eye, the touch, the taste, perceive—not what the intellect recognizes. "Aquinas would not "have denied, that, according to that popular "sense of the word substance,' which implies