Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law, Ethics, and Economics of Rationing MechanismsA fresh and comprehensive exploration of how health care rationing decisions are made, this book offers not specific criteria for rationing--like age or quality of life--but a comparative analysis of three alternative decision makers: consumers paying out of pocket, government and insurance officials setting limits on treatments and coverage, and physicians making decisions at the bedside. Hall's analysis reveals that none of these alternatives is uniformly superior, and, therefore, a mix of all three is inevitable. The author develops his analysis along three lines of reasoning: political economics, ethics, and law. The economic dimension addresses the practical feasibility of each method for making spending decisions. The ethical dimension discusses several theories--principally classic liberalism, social contract theory, and communitarianism--as well as concepts like autonomy and coercion. The legal dimension follows recent developments in legal doctrine such as informed consent, insurance coverage disputes, and the emerging direction of federal regulation. Hall concludes that physician rationing at the bedside is far more promising than medical ethicists and the medical profession have traditionally allowed. |
Contents
Who Decides? | 3 |
Patient Spending Decisions | 15 |
ThirdParty Rules | 63 |
Copyright | |
6 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law, Ethics, and Economics of ... Mark A. Hall Limited preview - 1997 |
Common terms and phrases
actual agency allow alternative analysis apply argue argument authority autonomy bedside benefit cause Chapter choice choose clinical concerns consider consumers contract costs court coverage decide desirable developed disclosure discretion discussed doctors economic effect entirely ethics example existing expensive fact fiduciary force health care health insurance hospital ideal important incentives individual informed consent instance institutions interest issue judgment less limited mechanisms medicine ment moral necessary objection observed options particular patients percent physicians political position possible potential practice preferences present Press principles problems procedures professional purchase question range rationing reasons reform relationship require resource allocation responsibility result risk role rules simply social society spending decisions standard subscribers theory tion treat treatment trust University