that laid about upon tables in taverns and cof- to those that apply for justice, there consequentfee-houses, nobody understood it to be a libel.ly is neither liberty nor property, nor reputa But it becomes a libel, when the officers of the crown, for the vindication of the character of the king, thought proper to bring it before a court to be justified there. With regard to the lord lieutenant of Ireland, my learned friend says, there is no application to the king. Certainly there is no application to the king whatsoever.' Now let us see a little whether there is not. "The people of Ireland give you every day fresh marks of their resentment;" so that it is introduced to the king. "They despise the miserable governor you have sent them, because he is a creature of lord Bute." This is the abuse upon lord Townshend; for what reason is best known to the author himself; but if they are masters of men's characters to treat them just as they please, there is an end of all law and justice. But when it concerns the person of a king, it is not from the natural ideas they are so ready to confound the person of a king in the person of his representative, as he states the people of Ireland, every day giving fresh marks of their resentment, because they understand there is no difference between the original of a king, and their representative. It is not owing to a confusion of their ideas they do in that manner confound it. What does he say in the next part after Ireland? He then proceeds to state America, of which he first of all says, "they were ready enough to distinguish between the king and his ministers, and to throw the fault upon them;" and that I suppose is not to be applied to the king. But afterwards he says, "the decisive, personal part you took against them;"-is this charging the ministry? "that decisive, personal part you took against them, bas effectually banished that first distinction from their minds; they consider you as united with your servants against America, they knowing how to distinguish the sovereign and a venal parliament on one side, from the real sentiments of the English people on the other." Has this no application to the king? It certainly has. I have stated these few instances, merely because they were those that have been taken up, in order to shew they have no application to the king. Gentlemen, I have stated them to you, imagining we are so far upon a just ground, and that you can imagine no other but that the king is as plainly distinguished from every body else, as any thing in the world can be distinguished. They are right in saying, that if you find it is meant so, what avails all that has been said. But they go beyond that; and very properly say you are the refuge of liberty. You are 50. You are the refuge of those who find themselves wronged contrary to the laws of this country, and apply to the laws of this country for redress. And if you, who are the refuge of liberty, in that sense, should either by such delusion, or influence of prejudice and warmth in favour of such strange ideas, endeavoured to be put upon them, deny that justice tion, nor any thing which this country has hitherto thought worth protection, and the laws would not be able to protect them. I protest to God, it appears to me in a reasoning way, too strange a proposition, to say liberty is concerned in protecting a man in writing injuriously and opprobriously against the character of a man, which is the same as if it was concerned in protecting a man in robbing upon the highways. Gentlemen, you may as well have the question put for your discussion, whether you would have ten or fifteen guineas privately stolen from your person, by which the party would be liable to be condemned, or whether you would have your name hung out to the public, as a man who is disgraceful, dishonest, and unworthy of any post you held. Which would you choose? And in the name of common sense, which can any man expect you should choose? And how can you find your verdict when you are desired to withhold, contrary to all evidence, and every necessary conclusion, that justice which those conclusions do call for? You are not desired to believe they are not published by the defendant; that is given up here; you are desired to believe, that they do not talk of the king in the paper. That argument is not what I expected to have been proved. You are desired to think it would be a derogation from your authority, should you be obliged to find, according to the evidence. To be sure you are bound, if we could not make out the truth that belongs to the charge, which, if we do, without you can find reasons to deny that very truth which your reasons and consciences cannot resist; to be sure, that is one of the inferior situations of a jury. But that is an inferiority which don't belong to your situations alone. Judges are likewise sworn to pronounce according to law; and that is all the constraint upon the office you now hold; and if you find the facts are as I stated in the outset, notwithstanding what has been said in the defence, it will be too plain an absurdity to say he is not guilty. Lord Mansfield. Gentlemen of the jury, if the direction that I am going to give you, as to the object of your consideration, and the rule and ground upon which your verdict ought to be founded, according to the law and constitution of this kingdom, and that oath that is taken by each of you; I say, if that direction should be mistaken, I have this comfort in my own mind, that it will not be final, but upon application to the Court for a mis-direction, it can be set right. The direction I am going to give you, is, with a full conviction and confidence, that it is the language of the law. This is an information that is brought against the defendant for printing this letter, which you have heard read, of the tenor set forth, and of the meaning put upon those parts of it, which are blanks in the original, by the in formation, and concerning the persons charged by the information, to be the persons concerning whom it was wrote. This is the charge. Now the question for you to try upon the evidence, is, whether the defendant did print or publish, or both, a paper of the tenor, and of the meaning, so charged by the information? As to its being of the tenor, the paper has been read to you, and if it had not been of the tenor, there would have been an objection made during the course of the reading; and there would have been an end of the information, if the charges were wrong, for they could not have gone on; therefore there is no objection as to the tenor. bare act of printing and publishing. If he prints that which is unlawful, it follows in course, whether it is with a degree of greater or less malignity. For there is no one act, that may be attended with a greater variety of circumstances (almost infinite) than the manner in which a man might print and publish; it might be from the lowest to the highest degree of guilt, even to a very venial degree of guilt. Now that is not established by your verdict, all those epithets being a mere form in informations, and they are inferences of law, which are drawn upon the printing and publishing a fibel, if it comes out upon the face of it to be a libel. It is very true, I am used to speeches made to juries, to captivate them, and The next thing is the meaning; and the carry them away from the point of enquiry. meaning is what is put upon it by the infor- Mr. Serjeant Glynn did admit, the inducement mation, in those places where there are blanks was not to be proved; not so much proved, as in the original, as k dash g for king, m dash y is set forth, as malice of forethought, in cases for majesty, and so on, as you heard it read. of murder, or the instigation of the devil, and As to that, there has been no particular ob- yet the form is kept up. As to the other epijection made by the counsel, that in any one thets, he did admit of them, as his candor made instance the blank is ill filled up. If that could him do. After arguing upon the epithets of have been made, their ingenuity would have seditious and malicious, he did say at last, I found it out. If you say they are not well do not see it is necessary to give proof of the filled, and the paper is not of the meaning set whole; therefore that is not the fact to be found forth in the information, then you must, to be by your verdict, that is inference of law; and sure, acquit him. But, if it is of the tenor and many instances shew when the jury have found meaning, set out in the information, the next him guilty, before the defendant comes up for consideration is, whether he did print and pub-judgment, he is at liberty to extenuate his lish it? Now, as to that, the evidence stands uucontradicted, and without any observations. It is proved to be bought of his servant, at his house that dropt from the counsel without any observation. If you by your verdict find the defendant not guilty, the fact established by that verdict, is, he did not publish a paper of that meaning; that fact is established, and there is an end of the prosecution. You are to try that fact, because your verdict establishes that fact, that he did not publish it. If you find that, according to your judgment, your verdict is final; and if you find it otherwise, it is between God and your consciences, for that is the basis upon which all verdicts ought to be founded; then the fact finally established by your verdict, if you find him guilty, is, that he printed and published a paper, of the tenor, and of the meaning, set forth in the information; that is the only fact finally established by your verdict; and whatever fact is finally established, never can be controverted, in any shape whatsoever. But you do not, by that verdict, give an opinion, or establish whether it is or not, lawful to print or publish a paper, of the tenor and meaning in the information; for supposing the defendant is found guilty, and the paper is such a paper, as by the law of the land may be printed and published, the defendant has a right to have judgment respited, and to have it carried to the highest court of judicature. There is nothing upon the fact: if in point of law it is innocent, it would be an iurocent thing, appearing so upon the record. Neither is it found established upon your verdict, that he did it with any degree of malignity or guilt in the crime, and even his own affidavit will do it; and if the fact had been found by the verdict, it is impossible that can ever be controverted, nor ever further looked into. These are the grounds, therefore, which I leave to you for your consideration. If you are not satisfied that the paper proved, is of the meaning put upon it by the information, where the blanks are filled up, and the persons concerning whom it is spoken of, you must acquit the defendant. If you doubt of the evidence, as to its being proper evidence, you must acquit the defendant. If you are satisfied, as to both those, that is the matter to be established; by both those, and according to right, you ought to find it. And, indeed, if you were for having the power of pronouncing a verdiet of not guilty, as to the fact; to be sure the jury, in every cause, may make an end of the question, whether they have not a right to find that verdict. If you take upon you to determine the law, you must, for the sake of your own consciences, be sure to determine according to law, and you must be sure that the law is, that such a paper may be printed and published, of the tenor you find it; the consequence of which is very obvious to be seen upon this occasion. If the law was to be determined in every particular cause, what a miserable condition would this country be in with regard to that part of it, as it is said there cannot be a greater curse than uncertainty See vol. 6, pp. 1013, et seq. As to this method of address to a jury in such a case, see 'Another Letter to Mr. Almon,' p. 58, in the law; for one jury in Middlesex find one way, and a jury in London another way. A jury in Middlesex has found a verdict, and convicted one person* for the publication of this same paper, but you are not bound by that. If juries were to find according to the different impressions the different points of law have upon them, there might be no law at all upon the subject. You will consider of it, and I will repeat to you again, you must be satisfied as to the meanings laid down in the information, and concerning the persons, and you must be satisfied with regard to the publication; if you are satisfied you will find him guilty; if not you will find him not guilty.† The Trial began about nine o'clock in the morning, and was finished about twelve. The jury retired into a private room, and continued locked up, till half an hour past seven in the evening, at which time they were agreed in their verdict; and the Court being broke up, they carried it to lord Mansfield, at his house in Bloomsbury-square. His lordship met them • See Almon's Case, p. 868, of this volume. † But now see stat. 32 G. 3, c. 60. at his parlour door, in the passage, and the foreman having pronounced their verdict Not Guilty, bis lordship went away without saying a word. But there being a vast concourse of people in the square, who had followed the jury from Guildhall, they, as soon as the verdict was known, testified their joy, by the loudest huzzas. Several inaccuracies in the preceding reports of the cases of Almon and Miller I have not ventured to alter. As to the proceeding for an attachment against Almon in respect of the publication of the Letter concerning Libels, Warrants, Seizure of Papers,' &c. see vol. 19, p. 1082; and Lord Chief Justice Wilmot's Notes of Opinions and Judgments' as there cited. Concerning the nou-examination of Miller, p. 835, see what Mr. Dunning said in the House of Commons, reported 16 New Parl. Hist. p. 1279. Of the conversation which passed between Mr. Mackworth and lord Mansfield, p. 838, see Mr. Mackworth's account, 16 New Parl. Hist. 1149, 1189. 555. The Case of HENRY SAMPSON WOODFALL, on an Information filed by the Attorney General for publishing Junius's Letter to the King: 10 GEORGE III. A. D. 1770.* [London Museum.] June 13. THIS day came on at Guildhall, before lord chief justice Mansfield, the trial of an informa The report here given, is the fullest which I have seen of this Trial. I have therefore inserted it, notwithstanding the flippancy and partiality of its manner. In Mr. G. Woodfall's recently published edition of Junius's Letters (in which edition is exhibited various illustration of that work, and consequently of the history of these prosecutions) is inserted in a note to the author's preface, a very abridged account of this Trial, from which I shall print below the report of lord Mansfield's charge to the jury. The following passage from a note to vol. 2, p. 62, of Mr. Woodfall's publication, is not impertinent in this place: "The address to the king through the medium of this Letter, made a very great impression upon the public mind at the moment of its appearance, and though 500 copies of the Public Advertiser were printed in addition to the usual numbers, not a single copy was to be procured in a few hours after its publication. The author himself, indeed, seemed to entertain a very favourable opinion of it; as in Private Letter, No. 15, speaking of this Letter, tion filed by Mr. Attorney General er officio, against Henry Sampson Woodfall, for printing and publishing a letter signed Junius, in the Public Advertiser, of the 19th of Dec. 1769. he says, 'I am now meditating a capital, and, I hope, a final piece.' It was for this production that the printer was prosecuted, and obtained the celebrated verdict of guilty of printing and publishing only,' the consequence of which, as already observed in note to vol. 1, p. 29, was, that two distinct motions were made in court; one by the counsel for the defendant in arrest of judgment, grounded on its ambiguity, and another by the counsel for the crown, to compel the defendant to shew cause why the verdict should not be entered up according to the legal import. The case being decided, that a new trial should be granted. argued, the court of King's-bench ultimately This accordingly commenced, when the Attorney General observing to the Chief Justice, that he had not the original newspaper by which he could prove the publication; his lordship laconically replied,That's not my fault, Mr. Attorney: and in this manner terminated the second trial. The fact is, that the foreman of the jury upon the first trial had pocketed the paper, upon its being handed to the jury box for inspection, and had afterwards destroyed it. The expence the defendant was Only seven of the Special Jury attended, as follows: William Bond, of Walbrook. Barnington Buggin, Philpot-lane. it proper to explain his own conduct; because he was not merely an advocate in these matters, but officially answerable. This letter of Junius, he assured the jury, had given universal offence. He had therefore in hand six other prosecutions of different publishers for the same offence. He thought it his duty to prosecute them, and had therefore demanded the names of the publishers, because he, Mr. Attorney General, does not read news-papers. To which were added the following five In the objects of prosecution, he endeavoured talesmen : William Halyard. Paul Varges, carpenter, Distaff-lane. William Willet, plaisterer, Distaff-lane. After Mr. Walker had opened the cause, by reading the letter signed Junius, &c. with the inuendoes of the information, Mr. Attorney General (De Grey) began, exactly at ten o'clock, by saying, that nothing bad ever raised a juster indignation in the mind of every man who wishes the continuance of our excellent constitution, than this letter of Junius. He then addressed himself to the passions and interest of the jurors, by telling them that they were more than any other men concerned to bring such offenders to justice, because any thing that tended to public confu. sion, was more especially fatal to commerce, and to those who hazard large fortunes in trade. He said, that this letter of Junius tended to public confusion. He then harangued with great seeming zeal on the glorious liberty of the press, which he acknowledged ought to be encouraged and exercised, as far as could possibly consist with the very being of society. But he said, that the abuse of the liberty of the press is more fatal than any other; and therefore entreated them not to suffer that liberty, intended for our salvation, to be turned to sedition, to our perdition. He said, the jury would be instructed from the bench, that is,-a-a-be must believe they would be, instructed from the bench; that the only two things for their consideration were, 1. Whether the blanks in the printed paper were fairly filled up in the information: and 2. Whether there were sufficient evidence for the publication of the paper by Woodfall. Mr. Attorney General then said, he thought put to in this prosecution, as stated in Private Letter, No. 19, amounted to about 120l. The late Mr. Almon, who was also prosecuted for selling a reprint of this Letter, asserts, in a note to another edition of this work, that the legal expence incurred in defending his own action, which could not exceed that of the original printer, amounted to between 5 and 600l.! An exaggeration which proves the necessity of exercising no small degree of caution, in estimating whatever other facts he has attempted to advance, with a view of elucidating the gemeral history of the times," VOL. XX. to make a distinction, and to pass by those who were poor or had large families of children, &c. He declared upon his honour, as a man, that he had no motive to urge him against any particular publisher, but merely the execution of his office. That he could have wished to have tried Mr. what's his name?-Woodfall, aye, Mr. Woodfall, the original publisher, first: because as for who was the author of Junius, that he could by no means discover, that remained an impenetrable secret. After this defence of himself, Mr. Attorney General returned again to the cause in hand; by repeating to the jury that if, 1st, the blanks in the Public Advertiser were fairly filled up by the inuendoes of the information; and if, 2dly, the publication was proved, the jury must find Mr. Woodfall guilty. Crowder, the first witness, was then called at twenty minutes after ten, and examined by Mr. Thurlow, (Solicitor General.) Crowder deposed, That it is his office and employment to buy up the publications of this same witness, Crowder, called himself, an every day for the Treasury (on Almon's trial, assistant to the Messenger of the Press) that he bought the Public Advertiser in question, of one Colford, whom be supposes to be Mr. Woodfall's man; he bought it in Mr. Woodfall's publishing room; he bought twelve of them. He had bought the Public Advertiser every day at Mr. Woodfall's for a year past. The Letter of Junius was then read from the paper. He The second witness, Robert Harris, was sworn, and examined by Mr. Morton. said he was the register of the stamps. He produced his book, in which the news-paper of each day is kept, for an account of the advertisements which are paid for: be said, the account for the Public Advertiser is kept in the name of Mr. Woodfall; that receipts are made out to him; that his servant generally attends monthly to settle accounts for the duty on the advertisements in that paper, but that sometimes Mr. Woodfall had attended in person. The third witness, [Lee] was sworn and examined by Mr. Wallace. He said he was a servant to sir John Fielding; that he had often carried advertisements from his master to Mr. Woodfall; had sometimes seen Mr. Woodfall and delivered them to him, but very rarely; that he had one receipt for advertisements in the Public Advertiser, sigued by Mr. Woodfall. 3 M Here ended the evidence and pleading on the side of the prosecution. Mr. Lee, the other counsel for the defendant, then got up, and began with observing, that after the very learned and able speech made by Mr. Serjeant Glynn, little remained for him to say, but he particularly urged the jury to consider the intention of the printer in publishing it, and to remember how peculiarly necessary it was, at this juncture, that the press should be open to all political discussion. He defended the paper on the same principles as Mr. Glynn, and made a very eloquent and judicious harangue, concluding with declaring, that as ne intention could be proved, they ought not to find his client guilty. Mr. Attorney General affected a kind of surprise; he said, the counsel for the defendant had stated points of law to the jury; that he believed he had a right to reply, notwithstanding they had not examined witnesses; and he believed so, he said, because they had stated points of law which he did not allow. Lord Mansfield told him, that, as Attorney General, he might reply, notwithstanding the defendant had not examined witnesses: that the Solicitor General indeed, or any other counsel, could not; but that the Attorney General might. [See p. 762, and vol. 19, p. 1S78.] Mr. Attorney General doubted about his right to reply; said, however, he believed be had a right; but that he would not be particular, that he would not reply (yet all the while he still kept making a reply, such as it was) at length finished with saying, The bench will reply on those points to the defendant's counsel, and instruct the jury properly. Mr. Serjeant Glynn said, He agreed with Mr. Attorney General as to the excellence of a London jury, and doubted not the liberties of the people were sufficiently safe, while there were trials by jury. He told the jury, that if they were of opinion, that the sense put upon Junius's Letter in the information, was the true sense; if it was clear, that it was a false, scandalous, and seditious libel; if they thought his client published it with a professed intention, a premeditated design, of abusing and aspersing the king; if the defendant meant or wished to alienate the affections of his majesty's subjects; if it appeared to them that his end in printing it was to stir up rebellion and commotion; as honest men they ought, and undoubtedly would, bring his client in guilty: but-if, on the contrary, the temper of the times was such, that the people needed that kind of information contained in the letter; if the facts could be proved; if the acts of government, in which the king, as a part of government, was necessarily and virtually concerned, highly demanded public reprehension; and the printer published it with the truly laudable motive of informing his fellow-subjects; if, so far from containing any personal abuse of the king, it was written with an honest but guarded freedom; the author and publisher would, by all worthy, all sensible meu, be considered as having acted the parts of good subjects, and good citizens. He informed the jury, that the counsel for the crown had not gone upon the subject-matter of the Letter; they did not even attempt to prove it a libel, notwithstanding the epithets bestowed upon it in the information; and that the paper in which it was first printed, was not by any means set apart solely to canvass for party or faction, but was equally open to all he admitted, that private personal abuse was wrong, but the public acts of government often demanded public scrutiny; that many, very many of the highest rank, as well as from the highest to the lowest in the opposition, bad been scandalously traduced and vilified in "Lord Mansfield, in his charge, told the the public papers with impunity; that if the jury, That there were only two points for their defendant was brought in guilty, the hands of consideration: the first the printing and pubevery publisher would be tied, and the gentle-lishing the paper in question; the second, the men not in office might, by the ministerial sense and meaning of it: that as to the charges scribblers, be abused to the grossest degree, as of its being malicious, seditious, &c. they were it would be dangerous to answer them, if, upon inferences in law about which no evidence need appearance of every free answer, informa- be given, any more than that part of an indicttions were to be filed, and the printers con- ment need be proved by evidence, which victed and punished; the liberty of the press charges a man with being moved by the instiwas immediately concerned; the stroke was gation of the devil: that therefore the printing levelled at it in this prosecution: but he did and sense of the paper were alone what the not doubt the jury would maturely, deliberate-jury had to consider of; and that if the paper, ly, and attentively consider the matter, read over the Letter with care and circumspection; and if they found it was not written with intent to vilify the person of the king, but freely to canvass the acts of government, they would consider the publisher as having done his fellow-subjects essential service, and acquit him. the : his former belief, and in his latter declaration Mr. Attorney General was not mistaken in of what the bench would do and say: for lord Mansfield then gave his charge to the jury according to Mr. Attorney General's anticipa tion. Lord Mansfield told the jury, that there *The following is the report of lord Mansfield's direction to the jury, given in the preface to Mr. G. Woodfall's edition of Junius': should really contain no breach of the law, that was a matter which might afterwards be moved in arrest of judgment: that he had no evidence to sum up to them, as the defendant's counsel admitted the printing and publication to be well proved: that as to the sense, they had not called in doubt the manner in which |