§ 71. The cardinal virtues, as commonly listed, are fortitude, prudence, temperance and justice. The distribution originated with the Greek philosophers, and still holds in modern literature. They are called cardinal, because the specific virtues hinge on them, and indeed they seem to be conditions rather than kinds of virtue.1 Each may be considered a fountain from which virtues flow. The Pythag oreans and Plato regard fortitude, prudence and temperance together as the source of justice, and justice as the genius of all duty, of all virtue, the perfection of human nature and of human society. With Aristotle also, justice is perfect virtue, yet not absolutely, but in reference to others. In this wide sense we have used the term justice, viewing it as the sum of all virtues, which are but variations upon its essence, and are universally prescribed in the concrete commandment, Be thou just.

§ 72. The man who disregards moral law, or in whom the desire to do right is weak, passes, by frequently yielding to adopted when prompted by inclination or native bent of mind; as genuine or ethical when prompted by principle.

1 Socrates (according to Xenophon), Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, each presents a varied list. Turning to the O. T. Apocrypha, in the book of Wisdom, written in Greek, and ascribed by Jerome to Philo of Alexandria, we find, 8:7: "If a man love righteousness, her labors are virtues; for she teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude; which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in their life.”

of Christian virtues in Galatians 5: 22, 23.

Cf. the list

In Nic. Eth., bk. ii, chs. 6-9, Aristotle elaborates his doctrine that "every ethical virtue is a mean state between two vices, one on the side of excess, and the other on the side of defect." Thus courage is the mean between temerity and cowardice; temperance, the mean between inordinate desire and stupid indifference; liberality, the mean between prodigality and parsimony. Hence the familiar phrase "a golden mean.

With reference to prudence, let it be remarked that, taken in its best sense, it is much the same as the wisdom that is from above; see James 3:17. Whenever it is not strictly identical with duty, it is parallel to it, having the same direction, and the two become one there where parallel lines meet.

temptation, under the dominion of other desires.

Especially the appetites are likely, by reckless indulgence, to acquire abnormal vigor, and drive the weakened will helplessly into gross excesses. The appetencies, in men of higher order, may take control, producing the refined voluptuary, the avaricious seeker after material wealth, the secluded scholar absorbed in the pursuit of "knowledge for its own sake," or the unscrupulous ruler ambitious of irresponsible power. The will, whose function it is to regulate these constitutional powers, restraining their exercise, and determining natural, which is normal and moral order, forsakes this high office, and becomes their servant. Thus the man is enslaved by his passions. His moral sense is deafened by their clamor, his actions are determined by their impelling energy, his independent self-mastery is lost, and his freedom is limited to a choice among contending masters and forms of obedience.

To prevent or to escape from such degraded and deplorable condition, one must, by good-will working in the light of conscience, bring all his powers into subjection to moral law. This regulation will give play to the faculties in their natural relations and proportions, which is the essence of right action, and will determine uniformity of fit conduct, which is moral order, the order of facts that ought to be. Such virtuous rectification secures peace, harmony, and the dignity of moral excellence.1

The virtue that brings our activities into due conformity with moral law is usually posited as the necessary condition of soul-liberty, and perfected virtue is identified with per

1 Virtue is simply natural, vice unnatural; man is made for virtue as a clock is to keep time. But he finds himself disordered. Self-mastery, harmonizing one's faculties, directing them to the right end, may seem to be within our power, but uniform human experience shows that when we would do good evil is present with us and in us. This state of human nature is fully set forth in the Scriptures, and that, as we cannot unaided accomplish rectification, we need regeneration.

fected liberty. In surmounting his passions and inclinations, one becomes a freedman, a freeman and a master. The sage, said the Stoics, feels but is without passion, he is not indulgent but just to himself and to others, he alone attains to the complete performance of duty, and thus he alone is free.1 This is the common doctrine of moralists at the present day, and we are exhorted to the exercise of morality because of the worth of liberty.2

The liberty thus acquired is independence of unrighteous, discordant and distracting rulers. The virtuous man is freed from the dominion of overweening inclinations, of unholy lusts and passions. It is an ideal state, exciting our admiration and emulation.3 But this liberty is merely relative, not absolute. In breaking loose from subjective bondage, we pass under the objective bondage of law, an exchange of one bondage for another. All language supports this view. We are bound to do duty, obliged or under obligation to be just, forbidden to trespass, and must submit to many pains in

1 So Epictetus the freedman, whose favorite maxim was, Bear and forbear, ávéxov kaì åπéxov, is reported by Arrianus, in the 'Eyxeipidiov, 8, 9, as saying: "Freedom and slavery are but. names respectively of virtue and vice, and both depend on the will. No one is a slave (doûλos) whose

will is free. . . . Fortune is an evil bond of the body, vice of the soul; for he is a slave whose body is free, but whose soul is bound; and, on the contrary, he is free whose body is bound, but whose soul is free."

2 "The only perfect conception of liberty is perfect obedience to perfect law." - PRESIDENT SEELYE.

"Intellectual freedom consists in the subjugation of the understanding to the truth, which delivers from errors, prejudices, and the babble of human opinions. Moral freedom consists in the submission of the will to duty, which is the practical outcome of truth. To do as we ought is liberty; to do as we like is slavery. Spiritual freedom consists in the bowing down of the whole man to God, who is revealed by the truth, and to serve whom is to be master of self and things."— ALEXANDER MCLAREN.

3 St. Paul says: "He that was called in the Lord, being a bond-servant (doûλos), is the Lord's freedman (ảπeλeú¤epos); likewise he that was called, being free (¿ú@epos), is Christ's bond-servant (doûλos). — 1 Corinthians, 7 : 22. For further discussion of the matter, see infra, § 92,

fulfilling the demands of an inexorable law, constant vigilance being the price of impunity. This is not liberty, but rigorous bondage. It is a voluntary bondage, one that expands and ennobles our powers, satisfies the all pervading and overwhelming sense of duty, and harmonizes the man with himself and with universal order. Still it is bondAbsolute liberty is

age. Strict morality is strict subjection. incompatible with law.

CHAPTER IX

SELFISHNESS

§ 73. Names of mental states with the prefix self abound in speech and literature. A few are, self-approbation, selfcondemnation, self-denial, self-control, self-esteem, self-abhorrence, self-love. Many of this class of expressions probably have their origin in the fictitious idea of an alter ego. The human mind subjectively distinguishes between the ego as conscious and the ego as represented. The former, the consciousness of self, is an element in every feeling, is essential to the existence of any feeling, and is itself recognized as a feeling. The latter, the representation of self, is a normal and habitual cognition, wherein the ego contemplates itself as an object, distinguishes itself from itself, and views this subjective object as though it were really another self, an alter ego.1 The idea of an alter ego is strengthened by a conflict of desires; the opposed impulses, being a pair, are personified as two selves. Moreover, the mind regards the objectified and personified self as a possession of the wholly

1 Spirit is capable of becoming its own object. I am I; at once subject and object. "We find, on reflection, that what we call our spirit transcends, or is, in a sense, independent of the bodily organism on which it otherwise so entirely depends. Metaphysically speaking, this is seen in our self-consciousness, or power of separating one's self as subject from one's self as object, a thing wholly inconceivable as the result of any material process, and relating us at once to an order of being which we are obliged to call immaterial." ILLINGWORTH, Divine Immanence. See Elements of Psychology, § 108 sq., and § 226.