We have here another form of the law, but let it be observed, not another law. The law is one. The several forms may be viewed as progressing in comprehension, the second including the first, but wider, and so on, until this last expands to embrace the larger duty of man. That it includes the others is evident, for he who rightly serves will not trespass, and will pay his just dues. But it is preferable to interpret each as coextensive with the others, only presenting a different phase. Thus it may fairly be regarded as a trespass, as injustice, as undutiful to withhold helpful service, the moral law being comprised and expressed in the formula: Serve thy fellows.1

§ 82. To serve is to promote the welfare of another. He who does this is a servant. The term as applied to menials. has acquired rather a bad sense, especially when the service is compulsory, and the cognate word servile is distinctly opprobrious. But no bad sense, indeed only the contrary, colors the notion of voluntary service, and of this we are speaking. To serve is to confer a benefit, and he who does this is a benefactor. A teacher is a servant, though we call him a master. He is a servant directly of his pupils, indirectly of his employers, of the public, of posterity. Poliarrested the fugitive, who, on the 16th of May following, was burned to death under the most lingering tortures."

1 It is worth noting that Geometry, the science of Space, arises from the three axioms of Non-inclosure, Straitness, and Possible parallelism; that Logic, the science of Thought, arises from the three axioms of Non-contradiction, Identity, and Excluded middle; and that Ethics, the science of Rights, arises from the three axioms of Non-trespass, Justice, and Loving service. If in any of these several groups we try to deduce one of the axioms from the other two, we find that the axiom to be inferred is necessarily presupposed in the other two. Like the sides of a triangle, each gives, in its own existence, the existence of the other two. They are coordinate and complementary, distinct, yet inseparable. Accordingly we view the ethical axioms as different phases and expressions of an essence that is one and the same,

ticians proclaim themselves servants of the people, which truly is their office, though the profession be insincere. Husband and wife, parent and child, mutually subserve each other's interests.

A servant is a minister, and this is a title of honor.1 Ministers of religion are servants of the Church, and as such are justly honored and reverenced. To become a Minister of State is to attain the highest official rank. The Prime Minister of Great Britain holds a place of exalted dignity. The motto of the Prince of Wales, descending to him from the Black Prince, is Ech dien, I serve, and perhaps no heraldic cognizance is more widely known, or more frequently quoted. A king on his throne is rightly the servant of his subjects; and the very King of kings pronounced himself a lowly servant, coming not to be ministered unto but to minister, and because of his humble service to humanity, he has the highest throne.

All service implies sacrifice. In reaching forth my hand to save a drowning brother, there is some expenditure of mental and neural energy, perhaps not measurable, but real. No service can be rendered without sacrifice, without giving, imparting what is in one's keeping. Hence the law of service is a law of sacrifice. Culture, in general, is preparation for yielding a return; specifically, as the cultured field is capable of yielding fruits, so the cultivated man is one prepared, by what he has acquired, to render services. When a sacrifice is complete and directed to a noble end, we call it heroic. The very essence of heroism is the entire sacrifice of self for

1 Minister, a servant, from Lat. minus, less; cf. to administer, and administration. Master, from Lat. magister, from majus, more; cf. magistrate. In the Virginia Bill of Rights, § 2, it was perhaps first (June, 1776) authoritatively declared: "That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them." This great democratic principle is the gift of Christianity. See infra, § 146, note.

the sake of others. It is the object of unbounded admiration and praise. In ancient days it became distinctly a cult. But heroes and hero worship are not peculiar to antiquity, for always and everywhere the heart of humanity responds to the call. The heroic sacrifice of the great servant of all is commanding, not merely the admiration, but the adoration of mankind.1

1 "Gladness be with thee, Helper of our world!

I think this is the authentic sign and seal

Of Godship, that it ever waxes glad,

And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts,

Into a rage to suffer for mankind,

And recommence at sorrow: drops like seed

After the blossom, ultimate of all.

Say, does the seed scorn the earth and seek the sun?

Surely it has no other end and aim

Than to drop, once more die into the ground,

Taste cold and darkness and oblivion there:

And thence rise, tree-like grow through pain to joy,

More joy and most joy,- do man good again."

-BROWNING, in Balaustion's Adventure, 1. 1917 sq.; spoken of Herakles.

Narratives of

It is fitting here to observe that standard literature, especially of history, biography, and prose and poetic fiction, owes its position largely, perhaps chiefly, to its ethical elements, thereby appealing to the profound interest which men universally take in questions of right and wrong. mere adventure, sentiments, mysteries, intricate plots, novelties, extravagancies, though of highest rhetorical finish, command but a passing attention, or have but an ephemeral popularity; while such as rightly apply ethical principles to life, hold permanently a high place in the esteem of the world. A skillful account of difficult duties well done, of brave endurance by an innocent sufferer, of resistance to sore temptation or the fall and rising again of the tempted, of stern repulsion of aggression, of struggles for liberty, of the heroic self-sacrifice of patriots, never fails to stir the heart of our common humanity, and to inspire a noble emulation. Very familiar to us all are the sturdy manhood and piety of Crusoe, the heroism of Leonidas and his Spartan band, the lofty steadfastness of Luther, the warning cry of d'Assas, the simple truthfulness of Jeanie Deans, it being divinely impossible for her to lie, the vacillation of Prince Hamlet, the torture of Othello, the unscrupulous ambition of Lady Macbeth, the wifely faithfulness of Imogene, the .mmaculate chastity of Isabella, and the filial piety of Cordelia. Minor incidents and characters are mere accessories. Shakespeare's most famous works, resolving questions of casuistry or developing the inevitable consequences of injustice, oppression and crime, are ethical treatises. They

§ 83. The constant service demanded by moral law is not to be indiscriminate. One is not to serve all others equally. Our obligations to our fellows vary very greatly in extent. To near relatives we are bound for more service than to those further removed; first, because the possibilities are greater; secondly, because service creates debt, and where intercourse is intimate the exchange of benefactions is more frequent; and thirdly, because in certain cases, as of husband and wife, the minute interdependence calls for minute reciprocation. The extent of obligation is to be judged by the law of trespass. My service is due to one in so far as I do not thereby trespass on the rightful claims of some other. I may, for example, distribute my fortune in alms so widely as to violate the rights of my children. Likewise I am bound to promote the general welfare of the state only in so far as I do not thereby trespass on the rights of individual citizens, or of neighboring states, either by encroachment, or by transferring to either the service due to the other.

Moreover, it should be particularly observed that the alien service required does not preclude the agent from participating in the benefit conferred. When a man labors for the

welfare of his family without thinking of or caring for his own individual profit, still, as a member of the family, he shares in the beneficence. When one serves the community or his country, either by promoting or by defending the common interests, it is evident that, since the interests are common, he thereby enlarges his own liberty, and guards his own well being. If he does these things selfishly, himself his end, then he meanly degrades his family, his country, so far as in his power lies, to merely useful means; which treatment is unworthy, is a trespass, whatever be the result. But if, with no thought of his own interest or gain, he does those

discuss matter of deepest and of universal interest, and constitute a handbook of morals for mankind. See infra, § 133, note.

things unselfishly, making perhaps many painful personal sacrifices, still he shares in the beneficial results, is repaid and rewarded; and even should his efforts fail, he nevertheless enjoys the satisfaction of disinterested intent. Moral law does not prohibit any one from acting in a way that shall benefit himself, but only from thus acting in order that he may benefit himself.

These modifying considerations forestall the criticism usually and justly applied to strict altruism, that if every one should be constantly sacrificing his own welfare for that of others, there would be no permanent recipient of benefaction, and the perfection of morality on this basis would be not only a universal disregard of welfare, but also its annihilation. But according to the modified altruism of the present treatise, moral law does not call for such absolute self-sacrifice, for the extinction of the natural and healthful desire for one's own welfare.1 It forbids this only as a personal end; and the gratification of the desire is provided for, in the economy of human nature, by the community of interests, so that whatever promotes the welfare of another redounds to the benefactor; for, although, in the existing disorder of society, the objective return fail entirely, still the subjective sanction is abundant reward.

§ 84. In view of the right to service arises the question, in what manner and to what extent may one use another person. According to Kant, never as a means, but only as an end. He says: "The foundation of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. . . . Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another,

1 Nor does Christianity make this call, though it is often charged with so doing. See supra, § 79, note.