me merely from a sense of duty, I should be displeased, I would tell him to begone, I will hire a nurse. Is it sufficient for a father to guard and promote the welfare of his child simply out of respect for his rational obligation? Shall a mother tend her babe with all the wonderful, beautiful solicitude and ready self-sacrifice that win our adoration, merely because she knows she ought so to do? No, there is a higher, nobler impulse, maternal love. Should a husband and wife serve each other merely from a sense of duty, it would be a just cause of dissatisfaction, and perhaps of disunion. The conception of duty, enlarged beyond innocence to include beneficence, comes short of obligation. If it be thus limited, then it is legality, not morality, and again there is something higher than duty, something nobler than service. We heartily reject a scheme of ethics implying that a man is under no obligation to love his mother or his country, but should purify his character by eliminating all such inclinations; a scheme that clearly, distinctly enacts: Thou shalt not love thy neighbor.

CHAPTER XI

CHARITY

§ 87. An argument already offered, having its basis in the general principle that the natural or constitutional powers of man ought to fulfill their normal functions, or, more specifically, that every one has a right to gratify his normal desires, a right being a duty, concludes the appetites and appetencies to be auxiliary to the affections, which are thus normally supreme.1 From this it was directly inferred that self cannot rightly be an end. With equal cogency it is implied that the object of affection is the normal and rightful end of all endeavor. In other words, the affections,

included under the general name love, are obligatory; they ought, in due manner and measure, to be gratified. The moral law, found in the original and innermost nature of man, enjoins that he love his fellow man.

Consider the meaning of affection, love, charity, benevolence, these terms being taken synonymously. Love is a desire, an impulse or inclination toward others, disposing one to give out from his own resources what may benefit them. Let it be kept clearly in mind that love is strictly a desire. It should not be confused with volition, though the synonym, benevolence, partakes, etymologically, of the volition; for love is simply the causative antecedent of the volitional endeavor.2 It is not a feeling, though attended

1 See supra, §§ 78, 79.

2 Benevolence, from Lat. bene, well, and volens, wishing, willing. Beneficence, from bene, and faciens, doing. Endeavor, from Fr. en, in, and

by peculiar feelings; being neither an emotion, though the name is commonly applied to its attendant emotions; nor a sentiment, though the sentiments that normally accompany Love is it act and react powerfully to stimulate the desire. properly and definitely a desire, relative to a sentient object, whose welfare it would promote.1

§ 88. Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of high authority, Love cannot be commanded, for it is an affection, and not a volition which alone is subject to command.2 But love, benevolence, charity, pathological love,

devoir, duty, Charity, love; from Lat. caritatem, acc. of caritas, dearness, from carus, dear; cf., cherish, caress. We use the beautiful word charity, ¿yáŋ, in this wide sense which is imbedded in our early literature, not approving the reduction to almsgiving and like external acts, which it has suffered in common speech. The Revisers of The English New Testament unfortunately make the concession, and in 1 Corinthians, xiii, replace it by love, which term, besides marring the rhythm, is quite as ambiguous in usage, and as liable to be misunderstood. The words chastity and virtue have suffered a like reduction to a certain narrow and less delicate sense; see supra, § 70, note.

1 The so-called love of complacency especially should be distinguished from the love of benevolence. Complacency is the quiet, pleasurable feeling that arises on contemplating with approbation the character or conduct of another. It hardly differs from the feeling of approbation, and as one may have self-approbation, so also he may be self-complacent. Complacency is strictly a feeling, a sentiment, and not a desire, and it is a misnomer to call it love. The love of benevolence alone is love. Hence it is quite possible to love one whose character and conduct are abhorrent. Jesus loved both Judas and John, but his love of John was mingled with and strengthened by complacency.

2" Love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination, nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love [i.e. service], and not pathological [i.e. affection], a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense, in principles of action, and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded. It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those passages of Scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbor, even our enemy."-KANT, Grundlegung, S. 19; Abbott's trans., p. 21. See

as distinguished from practical love which is not properly love but willing service, can be commanded; though truly it is an affection, becoming active only as the subject is affected by an amiable object, that is, an object susceptible of welfare. For, although every command is primarily addressed to the will, yet the will, having, by means of voluntary attention, indirect control of all the mental faculties, carries out the command, if not thwarted by passion, in impressing its subordinates into the required order. Otherwise the subjective springs of conduct could have no moral quality. Even belief, a feeling of assurance, of conviction, is commanded in the presence of truth; and the command is obeyed, and the feeling is induced, by giving attention, sincere heed, to the presented truth.1 Love, charity, a desire for another's welfare, may likewise be commanded in the presence of amiability, and the command obeyed, the affection induced, by giving like heed to the amiable capacity of the object. Hence the love of benevolence can be commanded, since it can be voluntarily induced, nourished and invigorated. Not only can this love be commanded, but it is commanded. The moral law is embedded in and arises from the

very constitution of human nature. Desires awakened by objects and guided by intelligence are the motives of voluntary conduct. We have seen that among these the affections are normally supreme, rightly subjecting all other motive impulses to their ends. Therefore we find that, in order to

in Luke, 6: 27-38, where this "practical love" specifically is commanded. Elsewhere Kant says: "Love to God, considered as an inclination (pathological love), is impossible, for he is not an object of the senses. The same affection toward men is possible no doubt, but cannot be commanded, for it is not in the power of any man to love anyone at command; therefore it is only practical love that is meant in that pith of all laws, Love God above everything, and thy neighbor as thyself."- Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Auflage der R. und S., Seite 210; Abbott's trans., p. 250.

1 See Supra, § 60.

fulfill their natural functions, the affections must have not merely free but preeminent exercise, and that this is essentially the supreme law of humanity demanding reverent obedience.

§ 89. The affections having different objects, have received various names; as, conjugal, parental, filial and fraternal love, friendship, kindness, patriotism, philanthropy. In each of these the affection varies both in kind and degree. The differences in kind are due to differences in the relations. The differences in degree are regulated by the possibilities. We are not bound to love all others equally, this being unnatural. Many ties, many obligations. Those most nearly related are bound to love each other with a special ardor; as, parents and children.

The sentiment of gratitude excites love for a benefactor or neighbor. It enters largely along with friendship and kindness into the forms and substance of true politeness, which is love in littles, and in all its grades is essential to high moral culture, and is ennobling.1

We are bound to love those whose character and conduct

1 Friendship is discussed by Aristotle at length in Nic. Eth. bks. viii and ix. On gratitude, see Elements of Psychology, § 254. The royal law, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, suggested the reasonable question, Who is my neighbor? Luke, 10: 25 sq. The answer, in the parable, is, The Samaritan was neighbor to the wounded man, because he showed mercy on him. Hence the wounded man was bound to love the Samaritan as himself. This is the obligation of gratitude to a benefactor. The parable does not, as commonly supposed, teach philanthropy, but gratitude, and the love that would requite benefaction. My benefactor is my neighbor, come he from the far east or west, from a despised race or a hostile camp, and I am told to love him as myself. The added injunction, Go and do thou likewise, is philanthropic in tone, but it is no part of the parable, no part of the answer. There is no Scripture commanding us to love everybody as in fact we love ourselves. The new commandment, John, 13: 34, is to a special class, and sets up a higher and purer standard. See supra, § 74, note, and § 48, note,