the younger part of this audience. It is not the business of a Christian preacher to perplex himself, and weary his audience with deep points of school divinity. It would seem a strange question, yet very often it is the real question, whether Plato or Aristotle be a better expositor of the doctrines of Jesus Christ. Believe me, Christian congregations are assembled for a very different purpose; and it is our business to inspire them with reverence for God,-with gratitude to their Redeemer, with fervent charity for one another; it is our business to reclaim them from the error of their ways, by inculcating the gracious promises of the Gospel; or (where these fail) by alarming their fears, by reminding them of the shortness of life, and the certainty of a judgment to come. To do this is to preach Christ Jesus.

I fear, I stand in great need of your indulgence, notwithstanding the importance of my subject, for the time I have spent in delivering my sentiments upon it; but I ask no indulgence for the freedom with which I have done it; for in this I have only done my duty. It is in some degree the duty of every

man, of every clergyman most undoubtedly, to study carefully the word of God, and endeavour to find out the true sense of it. And, when this is done, it is equally his duty to "confess with his mouth what he believes in "his heart *.' "If we discharge as we ought these important offices, we shall both " save "ourselves, and them that hear us.Ӡ

*Rom. x. 9.

+1 Tim. iv. 16.

CHARGE III.

ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

Reverend Brethren,

AT our last Meeting I endeavoured to represent to you the true principles of ChurchGovernment*; my present subject shall be LIBERTY. Just government and reasonable liberty are so far from being inconsistent, that they are inseparable.

It was generally conceived before the time of the Revolution, that civil governors were obliged by their office to support and propagate true Religion; but this notion is now so fully exploded, that we seldom meet with any man, even in the warmth of con

See these principles briefly stated in Dis. VI, VII.

troversy, who is hardy enough to defend it. Men's temporal, not their spiritual interests, are under the care of the magistrate; and he is no otherwise concerned in the advancement of truth, than as it stands connected with the interests of society.

On this principle I propose to examine the various branches of religious liberty; and to settle as precisely as the subject will bear, to what length they may be permitted to grow. All of them, I think, may conveniently be referred to three heads :-Freedom of Opinion, Freedom of Worship, and Freedom in Conversation and Writing. To each of these points I shall speak in its turn.

I. Nothing is more true than the proverbial expression, That thought is free. It is free even from the dominion of a man's own mind; and therefore it must be free from the authority of the magistrate. On this ground we may securely maintain that no opinions. whatever, not even the most pernicious to mankind, are fit objects of punishment; for punishment is intended as a restraint on the

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will; that either the offender himself, or others by his example, may fear to transgress. It is therefore applied absurdly, and by consequence unjustly, in matters of opinion; `in which the will has either no share at all, or none that falls within the discernment of a human judge. We cannot change our opinions at pleasure, nor will the sufferings of a mistaken man prevent others from falling into the same delusion; and this is not only true of positive punishment; it holds equally good of what have been called negative discouragements. All manner of distinctions between man and man, intended not to prevent us from acting, but from thinking, wrong, are equally vain and unjustifiable.

Some indeed have maintained, that these discouragements may do good service, both to religion and society, by compelling men to consider. But I will not waste time in confuting this idle pretence, a pretence much more favourable to false religion than true, and attended with this singular inconvenience, that it proves, if any thing, the very contrary of what it was designed to prove; for we have more reason to expect want of