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croachments upon proper church authority. But, after all, the distinction above drawn between apostolical and mere "spiritual" or "ecclesiastical" functions holds throughout.

Our history sanctions this view of the subject, which I have deduced from the nature of the case; as I now proceed to shew:In the first place, I refer to the very instrument above spoken of, in which Edward claims ecclesiastical jurisdiction; for it at the same time explicitly professes to bestow on Cranmer something additional to his apostolical power, "per [præter] et ultra ea quæ tibi ex sacris literis divinitus commissa esse dignoscuntur." To the same purpose is the "Declaration made of the function and Divine institution of Bishops and Priests" (Burnet's Hist., part 1, addenda v.), subscribed by Cromwell, Henry's minister in ecclesiastical matters, by Cranmer, the Archbishop of York, eleven other bishops, and others, in which the power of the keys and other church functions are formally separated from the civil jurisdiction, the apostolical from the spiritual power; and such also the judgment of eight bishops, of whom Cranmer is the first, concerning the king's supremacy (Record x.), in which it is asserted that the church's commission is founded, not on princes' power, but on the Word of God, while they confess that that Divine commission does not impart civil power over princes, or make the church independent of them in civil matters, but that she is in the same position towards the state as Christ was on earth, a subject, yet with supernatural powers. In further explanation, it may be observed, that Bonner took out the same commission for his bishoprick from Henry as Cranmer did from Edward, clearly shewing (from the allowance of a Romanist) that it was merely a commission for exercising jurisdiction, parallel to the license which the dissenter, at this day, purchases to exercise the privilege of preaching.

Further, the nature of the king's supremacy is explained in our 37th article, (which, be it observed, is part of an Act of Parliament,) in a sense quite accordant to that which I have been unfolding, viz. -"that only prerogative which we see to have been given always to all godly princes in holy scripture by God himself,"-viz., to rule all estates of men, and to use the civil sword. It is plain, from this account of the supremacy, 1, that it has no reference to the apostolical powers of the church; for no one pretends, with the instances of Uzziah and Jeroboam before us, that the Jewish kings had right of interfering with the priesthood; 2, it is only granted to "godly," i. e., Christian princes, though Henry, indeed, seemed to make it inherent in the kingly office. There can be no doubt, then, that the oath of supremacy, in which we swear that the king is " governor, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal," must be interpreted by this 37th article, i. e., as having no reference to our apostolical rights and powers.

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But the history of the beginning of Elizabeth's reign puts this matter in a still clearer light. The Act of Henry VIII., in which the title of supreme head of the church" was given to the sovereign, and which had been repealed by Mary, was not revived; supreme VOL. VII.-March, 1835.

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governor being substituted for it, in the enactment of that oath which is observed to this day. "This was done," says Burnet (part 2, book iii.), "to mitigate the opposition of the popish party; but, besides, the queen herself had a scruple about it." Leslie, who refers to this passage, adds, (Case of the Regale, p. 9,) "the same bishop in his travels, letter I. from Zurich, quotes a letter of Bishop Jewel's to Bullinger, dated May 22, 1559, wherein he writes, "that the queen refused to be called head of the church,' and adds, 'that that title could not be justly given to any mortal.'

Moreover, it will be observed, that the 37th article refers to Elizabeth's Injunctions in explanation of its meaning. These clearly set before us the drift of the doctrine of the supremacy, as it has been held in law ever since Elizabeth's time, whatever extravagant and impious notions Henry may ever have entertained about it,-viz., to secure the kingdom against foreign interference, not to restrain home apostolical authority. "Then followed,"-I quote from Burnet, (part 2, book iii.)-" an explanation of the oath of supremacy, in which the queen declared that she did not pretend to any authority for the ministering Divine service in the church, and that all that she challenged was, that which had at all times belonged to the imperial crown of England, that she had the sovereignty and rule over all manner of persons under God, so that no foreign power had any rule over them." Indeed, this comment upon the sense of the words is inserted in the latter part of the oath itself.

"Primate Usher," says Leslie, "gave the same explanation of it, in a speech at the council-table at Dublin, upon occasion of some magistrates there, who refused the said oath; and King James sent him a letter of thanks and approbation of his speech, both which are in print. And none of our succeeding kings or parliaments have given any other explanation of it, or required that it should be taken in any other sense, but all along refer to these." Gibson might be quoted to the same effect. And, lastly, this is, in the main, Burnet's view, who cannot be accused of allowing too much independence to the church. In a controversial pamphlet on the subject of our Reformation, which he published in Holland, in 1688, he says,— "It is a very unreasonable thing to urge some general expressions," (alluding to the preambles introduced into some of the parliamentary Acts of Henry,)" or some stretches of the royal supremacy, and not to consider that more strict explanation that was made of it, both in King Henry the Eighth's time and under Queen Elizabeth.... In King Henry's time, the extent of the king's supremacy was defined in the necessary erudition of a Christian man, that was set forth as the standard of the doctrine of the time; and it was upon this that all people were obliged to take their measures, not upon some expressions, either in Acts of parliament or acts of the convocation, nor upon some stretches of the king's jurisdiction. In this, then, it is plainly said, that, with relation to the clergy, the king is 'to oversee them, and cause that they execute their pastoral office truly and faithfully, and especially in those points which by Christ and his apostles were committed to them.'" [This is that patriarchal [This is that patriarchal power which I above spoke of.] "And to this it is added, that bishops and priests

are bound to obey all the king's laws, not being contrary to the laws of God.'....The other reserve is also made of all that authority which was committed by Christ and his apostles to the bishops and priests.' And we are not ashamed to own it freely, that we see no other reserves upon our obedience to the king besides these. So that these being here specified, there was an unexceptionable declaration made of the extent of the king's supremacy. Yet, because the term 'head of the church' had something in it that seemed harsh, there was yet a more express declaration made of this matter under Queen Elizabeth.....This explanation," [i. e., that which is in our articles,] "must be considered as the true measure of the king's supremacy; and the wide expressions in the former laws must be understood to be restrained by this, since posterior laws derogate from those that were first made....This is all that supremacy which we are bound in conscience to own; and if the letter of the law, or the stretches of that in the administration of it, have carried this further, we are not at all concerned in it. But in case any such thing were made out, it could amount to no more than this, that the civil power had made some encroachments on ecclesiastical authority; but, the submitting to an oppression, and the bearing it till some better times may deliver us from it, is no argument against our church; on the contrary, it is a proof of our temper and patience," &c.

To conclude; it would seem, on the whole, that the royal supremacy may be viewed under the following aspects :

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1. As the prerogative of governing the church externally, i. e., ruling all the members of it in civil matters, claiming their obedience, to the exclusion of all foreign jurisdiction; and this is the prerogative of every government, as such, whether heathen or Christian. Vide Canon 1, of 1603.

2. A prerogative of interfering in church matters, "in ecclesiastical causes," appointing functionaries, directing usages, providing liturgies, &c., which is only exercised by the king as Christian, and exercised on two grounds, first, because he allows the church's jurisdiction in his kingdom, and creates "prelacy," authoritative courts, and the like; and next, because, by his patriarchal power, he has a claim upon the confidence and devotion of the church. Vide Canon 2, of 1603; agreeably to which is the judgment of the eight bishops already referred to, which declares, that "in case the bishops be negligent, it is the Christian prince's office to see them do their duty."

3. The king has not the power (1) of bestowing the ministerial commission, as is plain from Henry and Edward's words, in granting license to Bonner and Cranmer, "ultra ea quæ tibi divinitus," &c.; (2) of ministering the sacraments, vide Art. 37; (3) of excommunicating, vide the Declaration subscribed by Cromwell; (4) of ministering the Word, (in which, of course, the making articles, &c., is included,) vide Art. 37.

4. There are a number of details in which the extent of the supremacy is undetermined-e. g., the king's power of depriving bishops, of creating or destroying bishopricks, &c. Judge Hales,

indeed, places all these matters absolutely in the crown; "the prescribing who shall be a bishop, the extent of his diocese, the circumscription of him, under pain of contempt, to act his powers of order within those limits." But here Hales' instances impair his rule, for the prescribing who shall be bishop is not "inherent in the crown," inasmuch as the chapter has the right of election. And this, indeed, may be observed generally, that in these details of jurisdiction the church has, for the most part, a concurrent voice, even where the crown has the initiative. Thus the chapter must elect when the king recommends to a bishoprick; the bishop must institute to a living; and so of induction, confirmation, installation, &c. I mean that, letting alone the apostolical powers of the church, ordination, &c., even in (so called) ecclesiastical or spiritual matters, i. e., in those peculiar institutions which, in the words of the ordina tion service, "this church and realm has received," the church must concur in the acts of jurisdiction exercised by the civil power. And this consideration throws some light on the state of the law in such cases of jurisdiction as are not clearly determined by the letter of it, e. g., the union of dioceses.

Lastly, I have no wish to contend that the existing state of the law is, in every part, as consistent as the theory of it is just. E. g., the power of excommunication lies in the spiritual courts, of which the king is the head; which is as great an anomaly as though he was invested with the power of ordination. Warburton, indeed, defends it; but he seems to have made his theory with a view to fit on to the existing state of our law, not upon any religious and philosophical basis.

ON THE TIME AND MANNER OF NOTICING DISSENT.

NO. IV.

SIR,-It remains to answer some objections of various kinds, to any systematic notice of Dissent, at the time and in the manner recommended in No. II,, which appeared in the British Magazine of January. The subjects of these objections shall be taken in the same order as when the probable advantageous results of so doing were spoken of,-viz. (1) as they apply to the clergy, (2) to church people, (3) to dissenters.

(Obj. 1.) A clergyman feels uncomfortable and embarrassed in making such a public claim to respect for himself, as if it were magnifying his own profession, and making arrogant pretensions in his own behalf. This is natural; and the feeling arises from various causes, some of them amiable and praiseworthy-in part from a confusion between the dignity of an office, and the worth of its holder as necessarily resulting therefrom,-and some I fear blameworthy. On these last I forbear to say anything, only wishing each person, who feels thus, to search his heart very narrowly for the reason, why he shrinks from, and dislikes, avowing the sacred character of the priestly office which he bears; and to ask himself, whether he, in his mode of life, willingly

(so to say) secularizes it more than he ought, and so that an avowal of its sacred character would be, in some degree, a condemnation of his own habits of life. Upon the almost insensible confusion between the dignity of an office, and the consequent worth of its holder, let thus much be observed-that, be this as it may, the assertion of one's office is due both to those for whom we minister, and also to the office itself. Would an ambassador shrink from producing his credentials, from fear of seeming to exalt himself, if he thought that those, to whom he was commissioned, were ignorant, or forgetful, of the authority with which he was invested? To me this seems a humbling, rather than a self-exalting admission. We have a commission-do our actions run according to its tenor? Do we ourselves sufficiently respect our own office? and if not, how can we expect others to do so? At least here we ought to set the example, and shew we do not claim for the office that which we, its bearers, do not extend to it ourselves.

(Obj. 2.) It may be also objected, that it is so difficult to handle these subjects with discretion, or to find fit opportunities for bringing them forward in sermons without seeming to force them, that it may be better to leave them altogether. Might not the same argument be as conclusively used about all controverted doctrines? Besides, opportunities are not so difficult to find, as would be soon seen on an attentive observance of the lessons, or epistles, and gospel for the day. Further, there is no need always to wait for such occasions. Chance occurrences may turn the preacher's mind, or some of his congregation, that way; or it would be sufficient reason, that a long time had elapsed without any recurrence to these topics. It will not, I think, be found, that a congregation makes such nice discriminations in regard to their pastor's choice of subjects.

(Obj. 3.) Oh, but (say many persons) these are arguments which, though true in themselves, are not level to the understanding of an ordinary congregation, and cannot be brought home to their feelings, because there are not clear and decisive statements respecting them in the Bible. The conclusion may be doubted, and the premiss denied. It may be doubted whether such subjects may not be made intelligible to ordinary hearers, since doctrines more abstruse than these are made so, sufficiently so at least for the full reception; e. g., the doctrine of the Trinity-the propriety of infant baptism-of confirmation-of the present manner of observing the Lord's day-which are constantly and heartily received by those who would be quite unable to give satisfactory proof of them. Consider, as a further illustration of the fact, that the power of giving proof is in no way the law of what we receive and believe; how few common people would be able to give a clear and satisfactory account of the received canon of scripture, or even of the grounds of our reception of the Bible. The forcible words of Jer. Taylor upon another subject may be here appositely used :— "Men may be sure of the thing, even when they are not sure of the argument."

Moreover, the premiss may be denied, that there are not clear and decisive passages of scripture bearing on these subjects, which might

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