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his two first wars. The other two volumes relate to the seven years war.

First. Respecting the past conduct of statesmen :

"Whoever has a heart capable of compassion, when he coolly examines such objects, must be agitated at the remembrance of evils which statesmen, either from want of wisdom or hurried on by their passions, have brought upon nations.” Vol. i. preface p. 25.

This reflection was made after his second war; but it did not restrain him from pursuing a military career, which multiplied the evils "brought upon the nations."

Second. What is to be expected from success in war :"All that princes may hope from the greatest advantages in these times, is to acquire, after accumulated success, either some small town on the frontier, or some suburb which will not pay interest for the debts incurred by the war, and the population of which is far inferior to the number of inhabitants which have perished in the field."-p. 24.

This the king inferred from the then present state of Europe, and probably from the general result of the wars in that country. He, however, had conquered some provinces, which, by the ravages of armies, were reduced to great distress. But in general the result of the European wars for a long time had been perhaps no better than his statement implies :-that even the conqueror did not acquire enough property or territory to pay the interest of the money expended, nor enough people to balance the loss of his own troops.

Third. Frederic's principle of making war :

"Reason prescribes a rule on this subject, from which, it appears to me, no statesman ought to depart: which is, to seize occasion, and when that is favourable, to be enterprising; but neither force occasion nor leave every thing to chance."-p. 25.

The plain English of this principle is, that a ruler should not make war unless circum stances are such as to af

ford a clear prospect of success; but whenever an opportunity occurs to take such an advantage of his neighbour as to ensure a conquest, then he should be enterprising. Accordingly in assigning his reasons for making war on the queen of Hungary and Bohemia, he says:

"The death of Anne, empress of Russia, which soon followed that of the emperor, finally determined the king, (that is, himself,) in favour of this enterprise. Probabilities were, that during the minority of the young emperor, Russia would be more occupied in maintaining tranquillity at home than in support of the Pragmatic sanction, concerning which, Germany could not but be subject to troubles. Add to these reasons, an army fit to march, a treasury ready prepared, and perhaps the ambition of acquiring renown. Such were the causes of the war."—His. vol. i. part i. ·P. 94.

In page 112, he further observes :

"Ministers were every where sounding, negociating, and intriguing to arrange their parties and to form alliances; but the troops of no power were ready; none were provided with magazines, and the king profited by the crisis to execute his grand projects."

By "the king" in this history, he always means himself. The reasons he gives for declaring war, are as good as are generally found on the part of the aggressor; and the principles on which he acted are as just and honourable as those of the pirate and robber. They "seize occasions,” take advantage of the weak or defenceless, and are enterprising.

Fourth. The ease with which rulers form manifestoes :

"When sovereigns are determined to come to a rupture they will not hesitate concerning materials for a manifesto. They decide, make war, and leave the care of their justification to some laborious civilian.”—p. 41.

The truth of this concession will not be doubted by any man who has paid proper attention to history, and to the falsehoods with which manifestoes are generally stuffed.

Perhaps there are no persons in this world who allow themselves greater latitude in violating the truth than war makers; and no occasions on which these indulge the spirit of falsehood and misrepresentation more than in forming their manifestoes. By these, and by the writings of the "laborious civilians" who are hired to attempt "their justification," the multitude are deceived, and made to believe a war just and necessary-even when there is no better ground for it than the ambition of the sovereign, or that "one man likes what another man has." Henceforth let Christions of every country be on their guard, and be no more deceived by men who "will not hesitate concerning materials for a manifesto."

Fifth. Occasions of prolonging war :

"Conflicting events alter the cause of dispute; effects, however, continue though the motive has ceased; fortune rapidly flies from side to side, but ambition and the desire of vengeance feed and maintain the flames of war. We seem to view an assembly of gamesters who demand their revenge, and who refuse to quit play till they are totally ruined."Vol. i. preface, p. 23.

The pretexts for war are generally so frivolous, that 'conflicting events," may very easily "alter the cause of dispute" and occasion it to be forgotten. Still as "fortune rapidly flies from side to side, ambition and the desire of vengeance feed and maintain the flames of war" and prolong its existence.

In the conduct of princes at war, we more than “seem to view an assembly of gamesters"-gamesters too of the most deluded or the most abandoned character, who gamble away the property and even the lives of their brethren. In another part of the history the king has compared the conduct of princes at war to that of gamesters :-" When sovereigns play for provinces, the lives of men are as counters." That is, as things of no value except to keep

the reckoning of these royal gamblers.-Vol. i. part ii. p. 194.

But are mankind always to be thus duped, and to have their lives sported with or played away by gambling princes, who delight in war and bloodshed! Let the eyes of men be opened to see at what rate their lives are estimated, and how they are gulled out of their property by these gamesters, and they will soon cease to praise the wanton destroyers of mankind.

In comparing war to gaming and the lives of men to counters, Frederic very frankly exposed the inhumanity of war-making rulers, and the wantonness with which they sacrifice human life. Let Christians reflect on this concession-bewail the past follies of mankind, and resolve never to volunteer their lives to be used as counters by those who "play for provinces."

Sixth. Effects of exhausted treasuries, and the result of the second war of Frederic :

"Exhausted treasuries are at length productive of peace. which ought to be the work of humanity, not of necessity. In a word, if the fame of, and respect due to arms merit efforts for that attainment, Prussia, by gaining these, found a recompense for the second war she had undertaken: but this is all she found. Yet did this vapour inspire new envy." Close of vol. i.

Exhausted treasuries have perhaps more commonly been productive of peace, than the humanity of sovereigns.

The concession of Frederic respecting the result of the second war is truly remarkable. In the first war he had conquered some provinces; in the second none. Prussia, however, acquired great fame : « this is all she found Yet did this vapour inspire new envy," and it laid the foundation for a subsequent war of seven years duration. Whether "this vapour" was an ample recompense for the evils which were brought on the nation, the reader will judge when he shall have seen the results of the subsequent war.

It will, however, be acknowledged, that Prussians are not the only people who have seemed to be satisfied with "this vapour" as a recompense for the loss of many millions of property and many thousands of human lives!

REVIEW OF CONCESSIONS BY FREDERIC II.

PART II.

THE "new envy" inspired by the fame of Frederic in his first and second wars, together with his "ambition for renown" soon found pretexts for breaking the treaty of peace. Hence we have to remark :

First. The difference between sovereigns and other people as to their obligations to keep a promise sacred :

"To me," says the king, "it appears evident that a private person ought to be scrupulously tenacious of a promise though he should have made it inconsiderately. If he is injured he can have recourse to the laws, and be the issue what it may, an individual only suffers. But where is the tribunal that can redress a monarch's wrongs, should another monarch forfeit his engagement? The word of an individual can only involve an individual in misfortune, while that of a sovereign may draw down calamities on nations. The question then will be reduced to this, Must the people perish, or must the prince infringe a treaty ? And where is the man weak enough to hesitate a moment concerning the answer ?"—Vol. i. preface, p. 18, 19.

Frederic was fully aware that he, as well as other princes, was liable to the charge of violating treaties, and the passage now under review is his vindication. From which it appears that, in his opinion, princes are not bound like other men by their promises, but may violate them at any time when they imagine the good of a nation requires it ; and such a man as Frederic will find no difficulty in making himself believe that the interest of his people requires

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