Bishops that the succession has been usually traced. The two doctrines are not however identical, nor even inseparable. Even granting what we have allegedthat there is no superior order, and that Presbyters have always rightfully exercised the highest powers now belonging to the ministry-it may still be said that this, at most, only proves modern Bishops to be nothing more than Presbyters, and as such authorized to govern and ordain, but that these powers may not be claimed by those who cannot, like the Bishops, prove themselves to be the successors of the primitive Presbyters.

This argument against the validity of Presbyterian ordination I propose to examine; but before doing so, it will be necessary to define the meaning of certain terms continually used on both sides of the controversy. The necessity of this arises from the fact, that much confusion has been introduced into the subject by the abuse of terms, and by confounding under one name things which are materially different. The substitution of a sense in the conclusion wholly distinct from that used in the premises must vitiate the argument, although the effect may pass unnoticed. Hence have arisen many current fallacies, the popular effect of which has been to give a great advantage to that party in the controversy, by whom or in whose behalf the stratagem is practised. Thus, when the question to be agitated is whether apostolical succession is "necessary" in the Christian ministry, the term employed admits of two distinct interpretations. It may be said to be necessary, in the sense of being convenient, useful, desirable, and therefore binding under ordinary circumstances. The necessity here predicated of succes

sion is an improper or a relative necessity, from the admission of which it would be most unfair to argue the existence of an absolute or strict necessity, as of a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no valid ministry. Yet these meanings of the word are easily confounded, or the one supposed to involve the other, so that our theoretical admission of the value of succession, and our requiring it in practice, is regarded as a contradiction of our doctrine that it is not essential, and the seeming inconsistency throws weight into the scale of the adverse argument. The fallacy consists in the assumption, that the utility and relative necessity of this arrangement springs from its absolute necessity, whereas it springs from its simplicity, convenience, and the want of any better method to perpetuate the ministry. If we are bound to effect a certain end, we are bound to effect it in the most direct and efficacious method; but if this method ceases to possess these qualities, our obligation to employ it ceases, while our obligation to attain the end remains unaltered.

The facility with which the two things here distinguished are confounded may be made apparent by an illustration. It is a rule of most legislative bodies, that the qualifications of the members shall be judged of the body itself, and consequently that no new member shall enter upon his functions, until formally recognized and admitted by his predecessors. This practice has been found so useful and is reckoned so important, that with us it is inserted in the Constitution, and in England, whence it is derived, the House of Commons has by solemn votes asserted it to be a natural and necessary right inherent in the body. The

historical fact however is that this important power has repeatedly changed hands, and that recently a proposition has been made to transfer it. Whatever may be thought, by those concerned and authorized to judge, of the expediency of such a change, it would evidently not affect the source or tenure or extent of legislative power in the members of the house. The obvious advantages belonging to the present system, and the force of habit and association, may have led men to believe that reception by the sitting members is essential to the legislative standing of one newly elected; but in point of fact, it is derived from a source exterior to the body and independent of it. This is not adduced as an argument against ministerial succession, but merely as an illustration of the statement that a relative necessity may come to be confounded with an absolute necessity, or at least regarded as a certain proof of it.

The same discrimination is necessary in relation to the word "succession," which may either mean an uninterrupted series of incumbents, so that the office ist never vacant, or a succession in which the authority of each incumbent is derived directly from his predecessor. The material difference between these senses of the term, and the facility with which they may nevertheless be confounded, will be made clear by a single illustration. The Kings of England and the Presidents of the United States hold their office in a regular succession, equally uninterrupted and equally necessary in both cases. But the nature of the succession is entirely different. Each King derives his kingly office from his personal relation to his predecesEach President derives his office from the people,

sor.

without any action on the part of his predecessor contributing to it, often against his wishes, and sometimes in direct opposition to his claims as a competitor. The former is a derivative succession; the latter a succession of mere sequence. Nor is this the only distinction to be made in the application of the word "succession," which may sometimes have relation to whole bodies or classes of men, and sometimes to single individuals, in which respect. it may be distinguished as general or particular succession.

With these preliminary explanations, let us now proceed to consider the necessity of what is called the Apostolical Succession as a condition of a valid ministry. And let it be observed that the amount of evidence in this case should bear due proportion to the extent and the importance of the allegations in support of which it is adduced. If the question were whether an un·broken succession is lawful, or expedient, or an ancient practice, or of apostolical origin, much less would be requisite to establish the affirmative than is required to prove it absolutely necessary to the existence of a valid ministry. When a question of such moment is at issue, it is not too much to ask that the proof adduced be clear, conclusive, and if possible cumulative. Especially may we expect the proposition to be confirmed by an express divine command, or in default of that by some clear Scripture analogy, or, at the least, by clear proof of some natural necessity arising from the nature of the ministry or its design. All these conditions might be fairly insisted on. The want of any, even of the least, would shake the credit of the adverse doctrine, much more the want of several and even of the greatest; but if all are wanting, we

must either reject the doctrine or believe without a

reason.

To begin with the most important, if not indispensable; where is the express command, requiring an unbroken succession in the ministry? The only passage which can be made to bear such a construction, is that in which Paul writes to Timothy: "The thing that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men, who shall be able to teach others also." 2 Tim. 2:2. In order that this text may be made to prove the doctrine now in question, it must be assumed, first, that it relates to a regular derivative succession in the ministry; then, that it makes such a succession absolutely necessary; and lastly, that it makes the succession more necessary than the other things mentioned in connection with it, namely, faith or fidelity, ability to teach, and conformity of doctrine to the apostolic standard. Without this last assumption the argument will prove too much for those who use it, by proving their own orders to be vitiated by a want of ability or faith in any of their predecessors. But all these assumptions are gratuitous. The text speaks only of the transfer of authority to teach from Timothy to others, without mentioning the precise mode in which the transfer should be subsequently made. It is not even said, "who may be able to ordain others also," as might have been expected if the precept were intended to enforce the necessity of an unbroken ministerial succession.

But even granting that it does enjoin such a succession, it does not so enjoin it as to make it more essential to the ministry than many other things which were enjoined by the Apostles upon their contempo