ing of Justice and of Humanity in general, how near the Duties belonging to the two approach each other, and how difficult it is to draw the boundary line. It is a Principle of Humanity, and, in an extended sense of Justice, a Principle of Justice also, that all men should possess the Natural Rights of man; namely (514), the Rights of Personal Security from violence; of Sustenance and Property so far as is requisite for moral agency; and of Marriage. Such Rights, in every State, are actually possessed by the citizens only so far as the Law allows them; but the question now before us is, what the Laws ought to to; what Civil Rights it is the State's Duty to give to its citizens.

1003. We have already seen (522) that the existence of Slavery is contrary to Morality. Such a condition of the community is a violation of the Duty of Humanity which belongs to the State; and wherever it exists, Humanity requires that the State should take steps towards its abolition. But we have also said (530) that the abolition ought to proceed by legal and constitutional means; and must often be attained only by many steps, and by slow degrees. Still, it must be again repeated: delay in this course can be tolerated by the Moralist, only so far as it is inevitable. Every State which acquiesces in the existence of Slavery among its members, as a permanent and stable condition of things, neglects the great Duty of Humanity, which is incumbent upon States as upon individuals. A State cannot neglect such Duties, without divesting itself, to an extent shocking to all good men, of its moral character, and renouncing its hope of that moral progress which is its highest purpose.

1004. Slavery involves the denial of all Rights to the man, and especially of the Right of security from arbitrary personal violence, and the Right of Property. But even in States where these Rights

are allowed by the Law to all, it often happens that there are Classes of persons who do not practically enjoy them. With regard to the Right of Sustenance, and such Property as is requisite to make the man a moral agent, there are large bodies of the people, even in States conspicuous for their general freedom, who hold these necessary means of moral being very precariously, and occasionally lose them altogether. Men perish of hunger in opulent cities. Many are mendicants, who are supposed to have nothing of their own, and depend for sustenance upon the casual bounty of their fellow-citizens. Many, belonging to the industrious classes, are frequently destitute; though willing to work, they can find no one to hire them, and they have expended all their previous earnings. Does the Duty of Humanity in the State admit of its tolerating the existence of such things? To pass by the Right to sustenance, in cases of extremity, which, as we have seen, the Humanity of the old law of England allowed, is it possible for the State to put an end to Mendicancy and Destitution? and if this be possible, is this the Duty of the State?

1005. We find, in this case also, other Duties of the State which may interfere with the Duty of Humanity, and may limit or prevent its operation. It is the Duty of the State to leave room for the exer. cise of the Humanity of individuals; for this is an important part of their Moral Culture. If the Beggar obtains alms on which he can live; if the poor Labourer be supported through his seasons of desti. tution by the benevolence of his richer neighbours; the men so provided for are not degraded from the rank of moral beings; and the givers are probably morally improved by what they do. Such dependence of the poor upon the rich, has existed in all communities; and it is not necessarily contrary to the Duty of the State to tolerate such a condition of

things, which includes the means of a valuable Moral Culture of Benevolence. Moreover, it is the Duty of the State to teach Foresight and Thrift to the poor, as well as Benevolence to the rich. Beggary, destitution, and want of work, may arise from improvidence, carelessness, prodigality, idleness, and perverseness. By letting the consequences of these bad habits fall upon those who are guilty of them, the State teaches useful lessons. If the State were to maintain in comfort all who chose to beg, or all labourers who remained unhired, the produce of the labour of the industrious and provident would be given to the idle and improvident; and this might proceed to such an extent, as to destroy the rewards of labour and the value of property.

1006. But if it appear that the destitute are not provided for sufficiently by the benevolence of individuals, what then is the Duty of the State? If, when room is thus left for the Humanity of the rich to act, it appears that there is still a large class of starving poor, what is the course to be taken? If benevolent individuals do much, but still not enough to prevent the existence of extreme distress among numbers of men, is it the Duty of the State to do the rest? And if so, how is this Duty to be limited, so as not to interfere fatally with the other Duties of the State which we have mentioned? Ought there to be a State Provision for the poor? and if so, upon what Principles ?

1007. To the first of these questions the Moralists must needs reply, that taking the case as here supposed, the spontaneous bounty of the rich being insufficient to keep the poor from starvation, it is the Duty of the State to interpose, and to make, by taxation, or in some other way, a provision which shall save them from the extreme of want. This is a Duty of Humanity on the part of the State in any If the deficiency of private bounty arises

case.

from the want of benevolence towards their poor neighbours on the part of the rich, it is the business of the State to be humane for the rich, both in order to discharge its own Duty, and to teach them theirs. If the prevalence of distress arise, not so much from men's wanting the benevolence to relieve the distress which is brought before them, as from the multitude, density, and variety of the population, which conceals large classes of sufferers from the eyes of their fellow-citizens; it is then proper that the State should be humane for all and towards all, in order to supply, for the benevolent citizens, that which they cannot do for themselves: for the State has the means of reaching all classes; and can diffuse relief more widely than private givers can.

man,

1008. With regard to the Principles on which such public Relief is to be given, we may remark ; First, that the Relief ought always to be contemplated as temporary. For the object of humanity is, that the man be preserved as a moral agent; but in a state of unlimited and hopeless destitution, is not capable of moral agency. He has not the means of self-guidance and advancement, which are requisite to his moral being. If a man, by accepting public relief, is placed in a condition in which there is a permanent bar to his becoming again an independent and thriving labourer, the object of hu manity is defeated, and the man is reduced to a kind of servitude. Hence, it would be a mistake to require a man to sell or part with the tools of his trade, or the furniture of his house, before he receives pub. lic relief: for the want of these things will be a most serious obstacle to his resuming his character as an independent workman. On the other hand, in order that the State may not teach lessons of improvidence and idleness, it is necessary that the public relief be given on harder terms than the wages of independent labour. For the poor must be taught to earn

their subsistence independently, as long as it is possible; and to recur to public charity, only in cases of necessity. These conditions appear to be satisfied if we make public relief come to the labourer, in the shape of wages for labour at some public work; the wages being smaller than those of the independent labourer, and yet sufficient for subsistence. In such a system, it may be supposed that men would claim public relief, only so long as it was necessary; and would gladly return to independent labour, as soon as it was possible; while at the same time, relief to the extent of necessary subsistence, would always be within their power.

1009. There can hardly be much difficulty in devising works which might be so conducted; especially if it be recollected that the question is not, whether such works will pay for the labour, but whether they will pay better than supporting the labourers in idleness. As instances of such works, we may mention making and repairing roads, harbours, canals, leveling obstacles, reclaiming wild land, draining morasses, building public edifices, ships, and

the like.

1010. It may be a question whether the relief of Paupers (as poor persons relieved by the State may be termed, for the sake of distinction) should be administered by the general Government: or whether the paupers belonging to districts, as Parishes, should have relief administered each by his own Parish. The latter scheme appears, at first sight, better suited to make the relief-both a lesson of humanity to the givers, since it is bestowed on their neighbours, whose distress they know—and a lesson of industry and economy to the receivers, since, if they are idle and improvident, their neighbours, who know their conduct, will be disposed to show them less favour, in the public relief which they give them. If indeed there be a Poor Law, which gives