losses in the assault wherewith to fight Braun at Lowositz, in place of only 30,000. It is to be noted that Frederick was master of Dresden on the 6th September, and the advance of Braun to Budyn did not take place till the 23rd.

Example 2.- Campaign of 1757. (See Plate I.) -Frederick's object was to invade Bohemia, and to take Prague. During the early part of the year he had only to make head against the Austrian forces (as during the preceding year), than which his own were more numerous as well as of far better quality. He divided his army into four corps, of which Prince Maurice commanded one at Chemnitz on the extreme right; the king himself took command of the second at Lockwitz close to Dresden; the third, under the Prince de Bevern, was at Zittau on the northern frontier of Bohemia; the fourth, under Schwerin, always in Silesia on the eastern frontier of Bohemia.

The Austrian disposition was as follows:

The 1st corps on the extreme left at Egra on the Eger, under the Duke d'Aremberg.

The 2nd corps at Budyn on the Eger under Braun, covering Prague.

The 3rd corps at Reichemberg (opposed to the Prussians at Zittau), under Count Konigseck. The 4th corps in Moravia, under General Daun.

On the left bank of the Elbe, the two right corps of the Prussian army under Maurice and Frederick advanced from Chemnitz and Lockwitz, and, united, crossed the Eger river at Koschitz the 23rd April.

The two left corps of the Austrian army under D'Aremberg and Braun, having united at Budyn, fell back upon Prague where Prince Charles of Lorraine took the chief command. He carried the Austrian army over to the right bank of the Moldau and encamped on the heights of Ziska.

The Prussians under Frederick followed the Austrians in their retreat from Budyn, and arrived before Prague on the left bank of the Moldau, the 2nd May.

Turn now to the operations on the right bank of the Elbe.

Bevern advanced from Zittau, 20th April, dislodged the Count Konigseck from his position at Reichemberg, and obliged him to fall back to Liebenau (on the direct road to Prague by Brandeis).

Schwerin entered Bohemia at Trotenau the 18th April, and marched by Gitschin on Jung Bunzlau in the hope of cutting off the retreat of the Count Konigseck on Prague. But warned in time Konigseck quitted Liebenau, the 24th, and marched with all haste to Brandeis, where he crossed the Elbe, and thence to Prague where he joined Prince Charles of Lorraine on the 3rd May, the day after

that on which Frederick arrived before that city on the opposite bank of the Moldau.

Schwerin having joined Bevern, their united force followed the retreat of Konigseck, and encamped on the right bank of the Elbe opposite Brandeis, the 4th May, until they should concert measures with the king.

Thus on the 4th May the army of Frederick before Prague and that of Schwerin opposite Brandeis were separated by two rivers, the Moldau and Elbe, and had moreover between them to oppose their junction, 70,000 Austrians under Prince Charles, supported by the fortress of Prague.

Nevertheless on the 5th May the king threw a bridge across the Moldau, and passed to the right bank with 20,000 men, leaving Marshal Keith on the left bank with a force nearly equal. This was accomplished without opposition although almost within cannon shot of the Austrian army. On the same day Schwerin crossed the Elbe at Brandeis and advanced to Mischitz. On that night the two armies were within nine miles of each other.

On the 6th at daybreak they were united at Prosick.

On the 6th also General Daun, who was marching with the army of Moravia, 30,000 men, to reinforce Prince Charles, arrived at Boehmisch Brodt, two short marches from Prague.

On that day Frederick attacked and defeated Prince Charles in the battle of Prague. If Frederick had been defeated his only line of retreat was on Brandeis, for he could not have recrossed the Moldau at Prague in the face of a victorious army which was in position almost within cannon shot of his bridge.

Yet in that battle he carried his whole army by a flank march from right to left to attack the Austrian right wing, thus completely abandoning his line of retreat on Brandeis, and placing himself astride on the road to Boehmisch Brodt, by which 30,000 fresh Austrian troops under Daun were advancing on his rear.

Observations. Few campaigns have been more faulty in conception, more fortunate in execution, than that which has just been sketched.

Frederick employed three lines of operation (we may consider both the Prussian and Austrian lines on the left bank of the Elbe as single). These three lines were evidently exterior to the two Austrian lines employed by Braun and Konigseck.

A more flagrant violation of Principles 1 and 3, and of the Maxims 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8, can hardly be conceived.

Of Principle 1, because Frederick exposed repeatedly fractions of his army to be beaten in detail by the mass of the enemy. On the 5th, the whole

Austrian force might easily have overwhelmed Frederick's 20,000 men, isolated after crossing the Moldau; or Schwerin's army, by marching against it after crossing the Elbe; or Ziethen's corps on the left bank of the Moldau might have been overwhelmed on the night of the 5th by leaving 15,000 Austrians to mask their position on the heights of Ziska, and by carrying the remainder through Prague to the left bank to attack Ziethen, having simultaneously burnt the king's bridge to prevent

succour.

Of Principle 3, as to exterior lines, because Prince Charles with 70,000 men supported on a fortress, was in position between the armies of Frederick and Schwerin which were besides separated by two great rivers.

Of Maxim 1, because he abandoned his line of retreat on Brandeis during the battle of Prague. If defeated, he would have been ruined; he could not have regained that line, and he must have retreated, pursued by a victorious enemy, along a line by which 30,000 fresh enemies were advancing.

Of Maxim 3, because the union of the different corps of his army took place under the very nose of the enemy.

Of Maxims 4, 7, and 8, evidently. It may be remarked also, that although the two Austrian left lines of operation were interior to the Prussian three