Page images
PDF
EPUB

of operation from the base of the Rhine, the communication between which was exposed to flank attack from the enemy (Napoleon particularly enjoined him to operate by one line only which should lead from Stein upon the enemy's rear); second, in employing two lines of operation around Ulm, separated by the Danube, which proceeding exposed one of his corps to be beaten separately in disregard of Principle 1, and gave his enemy a great advantage in respect to interior lines, Principle 3.

He also lost a great opportunity of applying Principle 1, in neglecting to follow up Kray in his retreat from Moeskirch to Sigmaringen, where he might have destroyed one half of the Austrian army separated from the other half by the Danube.

His passage of the Danube with three of his corps on the 19th below Ulm, violated all the principles.

Principles 1 and 3, because Kray might have availed himself of the interior lines which Moreau's dispositions afforded him to fall upon the isolated French corps on the right bank in front with his whole force, while the Prince de Reuss advanced on his rear, to utterly destroy that corps, and to intercept the French line of communication by the right bank which that corps was left to guard. If Moreau thought proper to pass to the left bank of the Danube, he should have done so with his whole army in one day, and marched immediately on Ulm,

there to attack the right flank of the Austrian army which guarded the line of the river from that place to Donauwerth. In the event of Kray quitting Ulm to act on the French line of communication by the right bank, Moreau would have possessed himself of the entrenched camp at that place.

Moreau's proceedings in this campaign were a series of faults; he showed himself completely wanting in that decision and energy which mark a great general; he never followed up a success; he repeated three times in six weeks the same demonstrations without result. In short he was completely outgeneraled by Kray, whose aim was to detain Moreau in the neighbourhood of Ulm, and so prevent his striking any decisive blow at a vital part of the empire.

Although Kray showed himself superior to Moreau, his faults were serious.

1st. He disseminated his army along the line of the Rhine in too forward a position, since his rear was exposed to attack by a French force operating from Schaffhausen.

2nd. He established his magazines at Stokach, Engen, and Moeskirch, close to a part of the French base. If Switzerland had been friendly or neutral his magazines in those places would have been well placed, since they would in that case have been

covered by the defiles of the Black Forest; as it was, they were quite at the advanced posts.

3rd. He showed want of energy in not having completely destroyed the two divisions of Sainte Suzanne, when the latter were within two hours' march of his whole army on the 16th May, and isolated from succour by the Danube; again on the 26th May, when the French were disseminated over sixty miles from the Danube to the Lech, he should have attacked their left flank with his whole force, calling up the Prince of Reuss to reinforce him. In his place Napoleon would have marched from left to right of the French front, defeating their corps in detail.

It will be excellent practice for the student to compare this campaign of Moreau with that of Napoleon in the same year with his famous army of reserve, and to remark how completely all the unfavourable remarks on the operations of Moreau must be reversed in speaking of the manœuvres of Napoleon.

DEFINITIONS.

Tactical Points.

All points on a field of battle which may impede the advance of an enemy to attack your position, or which may facilitate the advance of your army to attack the enemy's position, are tactical points, and should be occupied.

Tactical decisive Points.

All points on a field of battle which, when occupied by your army, will enable it to make an attack success would be decisive on the issue of the engagement, and

on

the

enemy whose

All points on a field of battle in possession of the enemy which will enable him to frustrate your attack on any other part of his position, or which will enable him to impede or intercept your line of retreat, if repulsed, are tactical decisive points for offence.

Reverse the conditions, and you will obtain the tactical decisive points for defence.

The flanks and most advanced salients of the position are, in general, the most decisive points.

The flanks, because being only defended by the

fire of a small part of the position, they offer an enemy great facilities for attack, which, if successful, will enable him to take in flank the troops occupying the position, or to act upon their line of

retreat.

The salients, because strong batteries are placed at those points which cross their fire on the ground over which an enemy must advance to attack, and because an attack will probably be unsuccessful so long as those points remain in possession of the defenders.

Orders of Battle.

A line of battle may be straight, or it may be curved either concavely or convexly towards the enemy.

Of these three orders the convex towards the enemy is the best, as a general rule, because the flanks which are the most vulnerable points are the furthest removed from attack; the enemy, in marching to assail either flank, exposes his own more than if the defenders occupied a straight line. Troops sent to reinforce any point move on the chord of the arc, i. e. on the shortest possible line between any two points; and the line of retreat is the best covered and can be the most easily gained from all parts of the position. The general disadvantage attaching to this order is that the fire of the position is divergent.

« PreviousContinue »