be delayed a moment by the river when the proper time should arrive for his retiring.

At eight o'clock on the evening of the 17th, the advanced guard of Marlborough's army, consisting of 20 battalions and 38 squadrons, assembled secretly in front of the right wing and marched to their right under the command of the Count de Noyelles, who was selected by Marlborough for this service on account of his daring spirit and his intimate acquaintance with the country. He alone, of the men composing the advanced guard, was in the confidence of his chief.

The remainder only received orders to march a few hours beforehand, but were ignorant of their destination.

The different corps composing the detachment were unknown to each other; and as the collection of fascines would have pointed out the object of attack, every trooper was ordered to provide himself with a small truss of forage, as if the design was merely a rapid march, but in reality for the purpose of filling up the ditch of the entrenchments.

The advanced guard directed its march towards the villages of Elixheim and Neerhespen on the Little Gheet, which the English commander had observed to be very weakly guarded, and where the ground between the Great and Little Gheet would

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afford an excellent defensive position, the flanks resting on those rivers, subsequent to the passage.

An hour afterwards the main body followed in two columns; and at the same instant Overkirk repassed the Mehaigne over his twelve bridges, and connected his force with the rear of Marlborough's army.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 18th the advanced guard approached the outposts of the enemy. A part cleared the villages of Neerwinden and Neerhespen, while others obtained possession of the village and bridge of Elixheim, and of the castle of Wange which commanded a passage over the Little Gheet.

The troops forded the Gheet without waiting for the construction of pontoon bridges, and crowded across the undefended lines in such numbers that in a few minutes a strong body had entered the French lines, and a detachment of French dragoons, which was posted at Oostmal, retired.

The alarm having spread, a body of the enemy, consisting of 20 battalions and 50 squadrons, appeared on the rising ground near Oostmal, and forming order of battle opened fire with eight guns. Marlborough, who had passed with the first squadrons, saw the necessity of immediate action, and himself headed a charge of cavalry against the French, who made an obstinate resistance, but were eventually

driven away in disorder; and the main army coming up, the allies were left in undisputed possession of the lines.

Villeroy, apprised on the same morning of the passage of Marlborough at the very point which he had almost denuded of troops, hastened toward the scene of conflict, and, perceiving it was too late to repair the disaster, directed his scattered troops towards the Great Gheet, which they crossed near Judoigne, and by making a forced march they reached Louvain the same night. But so impressed was Villeroy by the enterprising spirit of his antagonist, that he gave his troops no rest until he had placed them behind the Dyle, with bridges broken down, and their left protected by the cannon of Louvain.

Marlborough's Passage of the Lines of Bouchain in 1711. (See Plate IV.)

These famous lines were constructed by Villars at the command of the French king, for the purpose of covering the northern frontier of France. They extended from the seacoast of Picardy to Namur on the Meuse. That part of the line of defence immediately concerned in the operations about to be related ran behind the river Canche from Hesdin to its Thence it was connected with the source of the Gy by a continuous line of redans commencing

source.

at Oppy and terminating at Montenancourt, the flanks of which were protected by strong redoubts.

Along the Gy rivulet to its junction with the Scarpe, and thence along the Scarpe to Biache, small dams were constructed which caused inundations. Below Arras on the Scarpe, Athies, Fampoux, and Biache, were provided with têtes-de-pont. From Biache on the Scarpe to l'Ecluse on the Sanzet, a canal was constructed. At l'Ecluse, Pallue, and Aubanchoil-au-bac, were narrow dams bearing causeways across the inundations which existed along the course of the river between those places. These causeways were swept by artillery contained in redoubts at l'Ecluse, at Arleux opposite Pallue, and Aubigny opposite Aubanchoil-au-bac; the fire of the last also protected a dam which was laid across the canal of communication with Douay, and which by retaining the supply of water greatly impeded the navigation. Further on was the fortress of Bouchain, to besiege which was Marlborough's object. Below that place têtes-de-pont at Neuville and Denain covered the course of the Scheldt as far as Valenciennes; and thence a series of entrenchments, strengthened by Quesnoy and Landrecy, ran to the Sambre, along which river Maubeuge and Charleroi completed the line of defence to Namur.

Marlborough's force consisted of 129 battalions and 196 squadrons.

The French army under Villars numbered in the field 131 battalions, and 186 squadrons; it was posted behind the Scarpe, having the right at Biache, the left at Montenancourt, and head quarters in the suburbs of Arras.

Marlborough's plan was to possess himself of the triangular portion of ground between Pallue, Cambray, and the junction of the Scheldt and Sanzet rivers, which he had previously observed to afford a very strong position for a small force against a superior enemy.

So long as the French held the posts of Arleux and Aubigny he could not hope for success. They were therefore immediately attacked. Aubigny was carried without difficulty; but Arleux was a post of great importance, since it enabled the French to impede the navigation of the Scarpe below Douay, on which Marlborough depended for the arrival of his supplies, and their attention was particularly fixed upon it.

To divert the attention of Villars from his real design, Marlborough had recourse to a masterly stratagem. He knew well the lively and impatient disposition of the French marshal, and resolved to play upon it.

If the Duke were to take Arleux, to strengthen its defences, and to preserve his acquisition against all attempts to retake it, Villars would of course divine