moved to x, a being nearer to b than x to b, A could cut off B from his line of retreat. Example.-The Austrians and Piedmontese, in 1796, showed themselves ignorant of the manner of indirectly protecting their territories. After the battle of Millesimo where Napoleon defeated their united armies, the Piedmontese retreated in one direction to Mondovi to cover Turin; the Austrians in another to Acqui to cover Milan. They would have effected both these objects if both armies had been united at either of the above two places. Had they been united at Mondovi, they would have covered Turin directly and Milan indirectly. Napoleon could not have reached Turin without first E defeating their united army, and he dared not have marched on Milan leaving a superior army close to his line of communication, viz. the route to Savona. If the armies had been united at Acqui, the reverse reasoning holds good. As it was, he beat them in detail with an army very inferior to their united force. CHAPTER I. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR. THE whole science of war may be briefly defined as the art of placing in the right position, at the right time, a mass of troops greater than your enemy can there oppose to you. - The leading principle in war, then, is to use words slightly different - Principle No. 1. To place masses of your army in contact with fractions of your enemy. There are two secondary principles. Principle No. 2 teaches the particular manner in which the leading principle is to be applied so as to inflict the greatest possible amount of injury on your enemy it is as follows: To operate as much as possible on the communications of your enemy without exposing your own. Principle No. 3 points out the mechanical manner of operating so as to apply Principles 1 and 2, and is; To operate always on interior lines. Every true maxim in war can be deduced from the above given principles it being of course understood that they are to be reversed in speaking of the operations of the enemy; or, in other words, that an enemy is to be prevented from applying them at your expense. As thus, care must be taken, 1st, to prevent the enemy from bringing the mass of his force in contact with fractions of your army, or large fractions in contact with small ones; 2nd, to prevent the enemy from operating on your communications without exposing his own; 3rd, to prevent his moving on interior lines. These three principles supply an infallible test by which to judge of every military plan; for no combination can be well conceived, no maxim founded in truth, which is at variance with them. Plan of Campaign. In framing a plan of campaign a general must take into consideration the following elements: 1, The political situation of the belligerents; 2, The configuration of the theatre of war; 3, The distribution of the hostile forces; 4, The relative value of those forces. As regards No. 1, it may easily be conceived that political circumstances may hold out an inducement to a certain mode of operation which in a purely military view is not the most advantageous. Example. In 1756 Frederick the Great threatened by a powerful coalition of which Austria was the heart, and whose extent he guessed although he did not absolutely know, took the field against Austria, the only important member of the confederacy which was prepared for war. Frederick's hereditary dominions consisted of the Electorate of Brandenburgh. He had lately acquired Silesia by conquest. A glance at the map will show that Saxony, whose Elector favoured Austria and possessed an army of about 18,000 men, divides Brandenburgh on the south from the Austrian province of Bohemia, and that Silesia divides it on the south-east from the Austrian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. All military considerations seem to have combined to tempt Frederick to march upon Vienna, the heart of his adversary's power, through Moravia, and thus to end the war by one great stroke. Frederick had 100,000 men; the Austrians only half that number, of whom 30,000 were in Bohemia, while 20,000 were in Moravia blocking the road to Vienna. By assembling his whole force at Neisse in Silesia Frederick would have threatened both provinces; and if, as was probable, his attitude at that place prevented the junction of the two Austrian armies in either province, he could have marched suddenly on the 20,000 men in Moravia, and have overwhelmed them before they could be joined by |