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own proper and particular consequences: by the duties that are deserted; by the claims that are defrauded; by the loss, affliction, or disgrace, which our death, or the manner of it, causes our family, kindred, or friends; by the occasion we give to many to suspect the sincerity of our moral and religious professions, and, together with ours, those of all others; by e reproach we draw upon our order, calling, or sect; in a word, by a great variety of evil consequences attending upon peculiar situations, with some or other of which every actual case of suicide is chargeable.
I refrain from the common topics of " deserting our post," ," "throwing up our trust," rushing uncalled into the presence of our Maker," with some others of the same sort, not because they are common (for that rather affords a presumption in their favour,) but because I do not perceive in them much argument to which an answer may not easily be given.
Hitherto we have pursued upon the subject the light of nature alone; taking however into the account, the expectation of a future existence, without which our reasoning upon this, as indeed all reasoning upon moral questions, is vain: we proceed to inquire, whether any thing is to be met with in Scripture, which may add to the probability of the conclusions we have been endeavouring to support. And here I acknowledge, that there is to be found neither any express determination of the question, nor sufficient evidence to prove, that the case of suicide was in the contemplation of the law which prohibited murder. Any inference, therefore, which we deduce from Scripture, can be sustained only by construction and implication: that is to say, although they who were authorized to instruct mankind, have not decided a question which never, so far as appears to us, came before them; yet, I think, they have left enough to constitute a presumption how they would have decided it, had it been proposed or thought of.
What occurs to this purpose, is contained in the following observations:
1. Human life is spoken of as a term assigned or prescribed us: "Let us run with patience the race
that is set before us."-" I have finished my course." ""That I may finish my course with joy."-"Ye have need of patience, that, after ye have done the will of God, ye might receive the promise."-These expressions appear to me inconsistent with the opinion, that we are at liberty to determine the duration of our lives for ourselves.If this were the case, with what propriety could life be called a race that is set before us; or, which is the same thing, our course; that is, the course set out or appointed to us? The remaining quotation is equally strong;- That, after ye have done the will of God, ye might receive the promise."The most natural meaning that can be given to the words," after ye have done the will of God," is, after ye have discharged the duties of life so long as God is pleased to continue you in it. According to which interpretation, the text militates strongly against suicide and they who reject this paraphrase, will please to propose a better.
2. There is not one quality which Christ and his apostles inculcate upon their followers so often, or so earnestly, as that of patience under affliction.Now this virtue would have been in a great measure superseded, and the exhortations to it might have been spared, if the disciples of his religion had been at liberty to quit the world as soon as they grew weary of the ill usage they received in it. When the evils of life pressed sore, they were to look forward to a "far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory;" they were to receive them 66 as chastenings of the Lord," as intimations of his care and love by these, and the like reflections, they were to support and improve themselves under their sufferings; but not a hint has any where escaped of seeking relief in a voluntary death.The following text, in particular, strongly combats all impatience of distress, of which the greatest is that which prompts to acts of suicide:- Consider him that endured such contradiction of sinners. against himself, lest ye be wearied and faint in your minds." I would offer my comment upon this passage, in these two queries: first, whether a Christian convert, who had been impelled by the continuance and urgency of his sufferings te de
stroy his own life, would not have been thought of the author of this text, "to have been weary," to have "fainted in his mind," to have fallen off from that example which is here proposed to the meditation of Christians in distress; and yet, secondly, Whether such an act would not have been attended with all the circumstances of mitigation which can excuse or extenuate suicide at this day?
3. The conduct of the apostles, and of the Christians of the apostolic age, affords no obscure indication of their sentiments upon this point. They lived, we are sure, in a confirmed persuasion of the existence, as well as of the happiness, of a future state. They experienced in this world every extremity of external injury and distress. To die, was gain. The change which death brought with it was, in their expectation, infinitely beneficial.— Yet it never, that we can find, entered into the intention of one of them to hasten this change by an act of suicide; from which it is difficult to say what motive could have so universally withheld them, except an apprehension of some unlawfulness in the expedient.
Having stated what we have been able to collect in opposition to the lawfulness of suicide, by way of direct proof, it seems unnecessary to open a se parate controversy with all the arguments which are made use of to defend it; which would only lead us into a repetition of what has been offered already. The following argument, however, being somewhat more artificial and imposing than the rest, as well as distinct from the general considera- ' tion of the subject, cannot so properly be passed over. If we deny to the individual a right over his own life, it seems impossible, it is said, to reconcile with the law of nature that right which the state claims and exercises over the lives of its subjects, when it ordains or inflicts capital punishments. For this right, like all other just authority in the state, can only be derived from the compact and virtual consent of the citizens which compose the state and it seems self-evident, if any principal in mo rality be so, that no one, by his consent, can trans fer to another a right which he does not posses himself. It will be equally difficult to account
the power of the state to commit its subjects to the dangers of war, and to expose their lives without scruple in the field of battle; especially in offensive hostilities, in which the privileges of self-defence cannot be pleaded with any appearance of truth; and still more difficult to explain, how in such, or in any circumstances, prodigality of life can be a virtue, if the preservation of it be a duty of our nature.
This whole reasoning sets out from one error, namely, that the state acquires its right over the life of the subject from the subject's own consent, as a part of what originally and personally belonged to himself, and which he has made over to his governors. The truth is, the state derives this right neither from the consent of the subject, nor through the medium of that consent; but, as I may say, immediately from the donation of the Deity. Finding that such a power in the sovereign of the community is expedient, if not necessary, for the community itself, it is justly presumed to be the will of God, that the sovereign should possess and exercise it. It is this presumption which constitutes the right, it is the same indeed which constitutes every other and if there were the like reasons to authorize the presumption in the case of private persons. suicide would be as justifiable as war, or capital executions. But until it can be shown that the power over human life may be converted to the same advantage in the hands of individuals over their own, as in those of the state over the lives of its subjects, and that it may be intrusted with equal safety to both, there is no room for arguing, from the existence of such a right in the latter, to the toleration of it in the former,