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The definitions which have been framed of civil liberty, and which have become the subject of much unnecessary altercation, are most of them adapted to this idea. Thus one political writer makes the very essence of the subject's liberty to consist in his being governed by no laws but those to which he hath actually consented; another is satisfied with an indirect and virtual consent; another, again, places civil liberty in the separation of the legislative and executive offices of government; another, in the being governed by law, that iş, by known, preconstituted, inflexible, rules of action and adjudication; a fifth, in the exclusive right of the people to tax themselves by their own representatives; a sixth, in the freedom and purity of elections of representatives ; a seventh, in the control which the democratic part of the constitution possesses over the military establishment. Concerning which, and some other similar accounts of civil liberty, it may be observed, that they all labour under one inaccuracy, viz. that they describe not so much liberty itself, as the safeguards and preservatives of liberty: for example, a man's being governed by no laws but those to which he has given his consent, were it practicable, is no otherwise necessary to the enjoyment of civil liberty, than as it affords a probable security against the dictation of laws imposing superfluous restrictions upon his private will, This remark is applicable to the rest. The diversity of these definitions will not surprise us, when we consider that there is no contrariety or opposition amongst them whatever : for, by how many different provisions and precautions civil liberty is fenced and protected, so many different accounts of liberty itself, all sufficiently consistent with truth and with each other, may, according to this mode of explaining the term, be framed and adopted.
Truth cannot be offended by a definition, but propriety may. In which view, those definitions of liberty ought to be rejected, which, by making that essential to civil freedom which is unattainable in experience, inflame expectations that can never be gratified, and disturb the public content
with complaints, which no wisdom or benevolence of government can remove.
It will not be thought extraordinary, that an idea, which occurs so much oftener as the subject of panegyric and careless declamation, than of just reasoning or correct knowledge, should be attend. en with uncertainty and confusion; or that it should be found impossible to contrive a definition, which may include the numerous, unsettled, and ever-varying significations, which the term is made to stand for, and at the same time accord with the condition and experience of social life.
Of the two ideas that have been stated of civil liberty, whichever we assume, and whatever reasoning we found upon them, concerning its extent, nature, value, and preservation, this is the conclu. sion;—that that people, government, and constitution, is the freest, which makes the best provision for the enacting of expedient and salutary laws.
CHAP. VI. Of different forms of government. As a series of appeals must be finite, there necessarily exists in every government a power from which the constitution has provided and which power, for that reason, may be termed absolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, arbitrary, despotic; and is alike so in all countries.
The person, or assembly, in whom this power resides, is called the sovereign, or the supreme power of the state.
Since to the same power universally appertains the office of establishing public laws, it is called also the legislature of the state.
A government receives its denomination from the form of the legislature : which form is likewise what we commonly mean by the constitution o! a country:
Political writers enumerate three principal forms of government, which, however, are to be regarded rather as the simple forms, by some combination and intermixture of which all actual govern
domination; unnecessary wars: waged to gratify
ments are composed, than as any where existing in a pure and elementary state. These forms are,
I. Despotism, or absolute MONARCHY, where the legislature is in a single person.
II. An ARISTOCRACY, where the legislature is in a select assembly, the members of which either fill up by election the vacancies in their own body, or succeed to their places in it by inheritance, property, tenure of certain lands, or in respect of some personal right or qualification.
III. A REPUBLIC, or democracy, where the people at large, either collectively or by representation, constitute the legislature.
The separate advantages of MONARCHY are, unity of counsel, activity, decision, secrecy, despatch; the military strength and energy which result from these qualities of government; the exclusion of popular and aristocratical contentions; the preventing, by a known rule of succession, of all competition for the supreme power; and thereby repressing the hopes, intrigues, and dangerous ambition, of aspiring citizens.
The mischiefs, or rather the dangers, of moNARCHY are, tyranny, expense, exaction, military ihe passions of an
risk of the character of the reigning prince; ignorance ors, of the interests and accommodation of the people, and a consequent deficiency of salutary regulations; want of constancy and uniformity in the rules of government, and, proceeding from thence, in security of person and property.
The separate advantage of an ARISTOCRACY consists in the wisdom which may be expected from experience and education :-a permanent council naturally possesses experience; and the members who succeed to their places in it by inheritance, will, probably, be trained and educated with a view to the stations which they are destined. by their birth to occupy.
The mischiefs of an ARISTOCRACY are, dissensions in the ruling orders of the state, which from the want of a common superior, are liable to pro. ceed to the most desperate extremities : oppression of the lower orders by the privileges of the
higher, and by laws partial to the separate interest of the law-makers.
The advantages of a REPUBLIC are, liberty, or exemption from needless restrictions; equal laws; regulations adapted to the wants and circumstances of the people; public spirit, frugality, averseness to war; the opportunities which democratic assemblies afford to men of every description, of producing their abilities and counsels to public observation, and the exciting thereby, and calling forth to the service of the commonwealth, the faculties of its best citizens.
The evils of a REPUBLIC are, dissension, tumults, faction; the attempts of powerful citizens to possess themselves of the empire; the confusion, rage, and clamour, which are the inevitable consequences of assembling multitudes, and of propounding questions of state to the discussion of the people; the delay and disclosure of public counsels and designs; and the imbecility of measures re. tarded by the necessity of obtaining the consent of numbers: lastly, the oppression of the provinces which are not admitted to a participation in the le. gislative power.
A mixed government is composed by the combination of two or more of the simple forms of government above described :-and in whatever proportion each form enters into the constitution of a government, in the same proportion may both the advantages and evils, which we have attributed to that form, be expected; that is, those are the uses to be maintained and cultivated in each part of the constitution, and these are the dangers to be provided against in each. Thus, if secrecy and despatch be truly enumerated amongst the separate excellencies of regal government, then a mixed go. vernment, which retains mon
nonarchy in one part of its constitution, should be careful that the other es. tates of the empire do not, by an officious and inquisitive interference with the executive functions, which are, or ought to be, reserved to the administration of the prince, interpose delays, or divulge what it is expedient to conceal. On the other hand, if profusion, exaction, military domination, and Deedless wars, be justly accounted natural proper
God," is by many so interpreted as to authorize the most exalted and superstitious ideas of the regal character. But surely, such interpreters have sacrificed truth to adulation. For, in the first place, the expression, as used by St. Paul, is just as ap; plicable to one kind of government, and to one kind of succession, as to another ;-to the elective magistrates of a pure republic, as to an absolute hereditary monarch. In the next place it is not affirmed of the supreme magistrate exclusively, that he is the ordinance of God, the title, whatever it imports, belongs to every inferior officer of the state as much as to the highest. The divine right of kings is, like the divine right of other magistrates-the law of the land, or even actual and quiet possession of their office;-a right ratified, we humbly preaume, by the Divine approbation, so long as obedience to their authority appears to be necessary or conducive to the common welfare. Princes are ordained of God by virtue only of that general decree by which he assents, and adds the sanction of his will, to every law of society which promotes his own purpose, the communication of human happiness; according to which idea of their origin and constitution (and without any repugnancy to the words of St. Paul,) they are by St. Peter denomi. nated the ordinance of man,
Of civil liberty. Civil LIBERTY is the not being restrained by any law, but what conduces in a greater degree to the public welfare.
To do what we will is natural liberty: to do what we will, consistently with the interest of the community to which we belong, is civil liberty : that is to say, the only liberty to be desired in a state of civil society.
I should wish, no doubt, to be allowed to act in every instance as I pleased, but I reflect that the
rest also of mankind would then do the same; in g which state of universal independence and self-di