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ments are composed, than as any where existing in
II. An ARISTOCRACY, where the legislature is in a select assembly, the members of which either fill up by election the vacancies in their own body, or succeed to their places in it by inheritance, property, tenure of certain lands, or in respect of some personal right or qualification.
III. A REPUBLIC, or democracy, where the people at large, either collectively or by representation, constitute the legislature.
The separate advantages of MONARCHY are, unity of counsel, activity, decision, secrecy, despatch; the military strength and energy which result from these qualities of government; the exclusion of popular and aristocratical contentions; the preventing, by a known rule of succession, of all competition for the supreme power; and thereby repressing the hopes, intrigues, and dangerous ambition, of aspiring citizens.
The mischiefs, or rather the dangers, of MONARCHY are, tyranny, expense, exaction, military domination; unnecessary wars, waged to gratify the passions of an individual; risk of the character of the reigning prince; ignorance in the governof the interests and accommodation of the people, and a consequent deficiency of salutary regulations; want of constancy and uniformity in the rules of government, and, proceeding from thence, in security of person and property.
The separate advantage of an ARISTOCRACY consists in the wisdom which may be expected from experience and education-a permanent council naturally possesses experience; and the members who succeed to their places in it by inheritance, will, probably, be trained and educated with a view to the stations which they are destined by their birth to occupy.
The mischiefs of an ARISTOCRACY are, dissensions in the ruling orders of the state, which from the want of a common superior, are liable to pro. eeed to the most desperate extremities: oppres sion of the lower orders by the privileges of the
higher, and by laws partial to the separate interest of the law-makers.
The advantages of a REPUBLIC are, liberty, or exemption from needless restrictions; equal laws; regulations adapted to the wants and circumstances of the people; public spirit, frugality, averseness to war; the opportunities which democratic assemblies afford to men of every description, of producing their abilities and counsels to public observation, and the exciting thereby, and calling forth to the service of the commonwealth, the faculties of its best citizens.
The evils of a REPUBLIC are, dissension, tu mults, faction; the attempts of powerful citizens to possess themselves of the empire; the confusion, rage, and clamour, which are the inevitable conse quences of assembling multitudes, and of propounding questions of state to the discussion of the peo ple; the delay and disclosure of public counsels and designs; and the imbecility of measures retarded by the necessity of obtaining the consent of numbers: lastly, the oppression of the provinces which are not admitted to a participation in the legislative power.
A mixed government is composed by the combination of two or more of the simple forms of gevernment above described:-and in whatever proportion each form enters into the constitution of a government, in the same proportion may both the advantages and evils, which we have attributed to that form, be expected; that is, those are the uses to be maintained and cultivated in each part of the constitution, and these are the dangers to be provided against in each. Thus, if secrecy and despatch be truly enumerated amongst the separate excellencics of regal government, then a mixed government, which retains monarchy in one part o its constitution, should be careful that the other es tates of the empire do not, by an officious and inquisitive interference with the executive functions, which are, or ought to be, reserved to the administration of the prince, interpose delays, or divulge what it is expedient to conceal. On the other hand, if profusion, exaction, military domination, and edless wars, be justly accounted natural proper
tres of monarchy, in its simple unqualified form; then are these the objects to which, in a mixed government, the aristocratic and popular parts of the constitution ought to direct their vigilance; the dangers against which they should raise and fortify their barriers; these are departments of sovereignty, over which a power of inspection and control ought to be deposited with the people.
The same observation may be repeated of all the other advantages and inconveniences which have been ascribed to the several simple forms of government; and affords a rule whereby to direct the construction, improvements, and administration, of mixed governments-subjected however to this remark, that a quality sometimes results from the conjunction of two simple forms of government, which belongs not to the separate existence of either; thus corruption, which has no place in an absolute monarchy, and little in a pure republic, is sure to gain admission into a constitution which divides the supreme power between an executive magistrate and a popular council.
An hereditary MONARCHY is universally to be preferred to an elective monarchy. The confession every writer on the subject of civil government, e experience of ages, the example of Poland, and the papal dominions, seem to place this amongst defew indubitable maxims which the science of thees admits of. A crown is too splendid a prize whiconferred upon merit: the passions or inteprovf the electors exclude all consideration of the draves of the competitors. The same observation vernconcerning the appointment to any office consis attended with a great share of power or pnument. Nothing is gained by a popular choice, orth the dissensions, tumults, and interruption, of regular industry, with which it is inseparably attended. Add to this, that a king who owes his elevation to the event of a contest, or to any other cause than a fixed rule of succession, will be apt to regard one part of his subjects as the associates of his fortune, and the other as conquered foes. Nor should it be forgotten, amongst the advantages of an hereditary monarchy, that, as plans of nationa! improvement and reform are seldom brought to ma
turity by the exertions of a single reign, a nation cannot attain to the degree of happiness and prosperity to which it is capable of being carried, un. less a uniformity of counsels, a consistency of public measures and designs, be continued through a succession of ages. This benefit may be expected with greater probability, where the supreme power descends in the same race, and where each prince succeeds, in some sort, to the aim, pursuits, and disposition, of his ancestor, than if the crown, at every change, devolve upon a stranger, whose first care will commonly be to pull down what his predecessor had built up; and to substitute systems of administration, which must, in their turn, give way to the more favourite novelties of the next
ARISTOCRACIES are of two kinds.-First, where the power of the nobility belongs to them in their collective capacity alone; that is, where, although the government reside in an assembly of the order, yet the members of that assembly separately and individually possess no authority or privilege beyond the rest of the community-this describes the constitution of Venice. Secondly, where the nobles are severally invested with great persons' power and immunities, and where the power of th senate is little more than the aggregated power the individuals who compose it-this is the ca stitution of Poland. Of these two forms of go the ment, the first is more tolerable than the last d to although the members of a senate should mauses even all of them, be profligate enough to abr the authority of their stations in the prosecution provate designs, yet, not being all under a temp deof the same injustice not having all the same te to gain, it would still be difficult to obtain the co sent of a majority to any specific act of oppression wich the iniquity of an individual might prompt him to propose or if the will were the same, the power is more confined; one tyrant, whether the tyranny reside in a single person, or a senate, cannot exercise oppression at so many places, at the same time, as it may be carried on by the dominion of a numerous nobility over their respective vassals and dependants. Of all species of domina
tian, this is the most odious: the freedom and satisfaction of private life are more constrained and harrassed by it than by the most vexatious laws, or even by the lawless will of an arbitrary monarch; from whose knowledge, and from whose injustice, the greatest part of his subjects are removed by their distance, or concealed by their obscurity.
Europe exhibits more than one modern example, where the people, aggrieved by the exactions, or provoked by the enormities, of their immediate superiors, have joined with the reigning prince in the overthrow of the aristocracy, deliberately exchan ging their condition for the miseries of despotism. About the middle of the last century, the commons of Denmark, weary of the oppressions which they had long suffered from the nobles, and exasperated by some recent insults, presented themselves at the foot of the throne with a formal offer of their consent to establish unlimited dominion in the king. The revolution in Sweden, still more lately brought about with the acquiescence, not to say the assistance, of the people, owed its success to the same canse, namely, to the prospect of deliverance that it afforded from the tyranny which their nobles exercised under the old constitution. In England, the people beheld the depression of the barons, under the house of Tudor, with satisfaction, although they saw the crown acquiring thereby a power which no limitations that the constitution had then provided were likely to confine. The lesson to be drawn from such events is this: that a mixed government, which admits a patrician order into its constitution, ought to circumscribe the personal privileges of the nobility, especially claims of hereditary jurisdiction and local authority, with a jealousy equal to the solicitude with which it wishes its own preservation for nothing so alienates the minds of the people from the government under which they live, by a perpetual sense of annoyance and inconveniency, or so prepares them for the practices of an interprising prince, or a factious demagogue, as the abuse which almost always accompanies the existence of separate immunities.
Amongst the inferior, but by no means inconsi