CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. DESIGN OF THE BOOK.

2. NEED OF IT.-I. The question being, does a personal God exist, we must

first ascertain what personality is.-II. The ultimate question with the

atheist pertains to the reality of knowledge. Atheism denies that man

can know God. Atheism rests its denial on false theories of know-

ledge. Every atheistic theory of knowledge involves agnosticism. The

real question with the atheist.-III. False positions of Christian theo-

logians.-IV. Results to be attained.

1

. 3-9

CHAPTER II.

KNOWLEDGE AND AGNOSTICISM.

3. WHAT KNOWLEDGE IS.—Implies subject, object and knowledge. Is always

the intellectual equivalent of reality. Is a primitive act, incapable of

definition. Known in the act of knowing.

? 4. AGNOSTICISM.—Partial agnosticism involves complete.

10

10-11

§ 5. REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE.-I. A primitive datum of consciousness. 1. Man's

knowledge of himself and his environment. Objection that this is not

a demonstration answered. 2. Knowledge of first principles. 3. Know-

ledge of God. 4. The Ego, the World, and God. 5. In what sense from

experience.—II. Agnosticism not tenable. Denies the trustworthiness of

human intelligence. Contradicts universal consciousness. Not defen-

sible by argument. Is self-contradictory-Hegel's maxim. Continuous

equipoise of thought impossible.-III. Any theory of knowledge in-

volving agnosticism is false.

36. KNOWLEDGE AND FALLIBILITY.-Objection stated.-I. Answer that it

involves agnosticism.-II. Assumes as fact what is contrary to uni-

versal experience.—III. The rational ground for persistent belief.—IV.

A nucleus of knowledge within a zone of probability.-V. A great mass

of knowledge persists. Changes in the progress of physical science.

Changes in the progress of philosophy. Changes in the progress of

religious belief..

11-20

20-26

7. CRITERIA OF PRIMITIVE KNOWLEDGE-I. Self-evidence.-II. Impossi-

bility of thinking the contrary. Applicable both to Rational and Pre-

sentative Intuition. Primitive belief not the result of mental impo-

tence. The unthinkable distinguished from the inconceivable. Objec-

tion that God is unknowable because inconceivable.-III. Persistence.

-IV. Consistency with all knowledge. Use in science and all reflective

thought. Applied to test primitive knowledge..
... 26-31

8. KNOWING, FEELING AND WILLING.-I. Are distinct, not separate.-II.

True philosophy must recognize the distinctness and the inseparable-

ness. 1. Present tendency to overlook the inseparableness. Exempli-

fied in Theology. 2. Errors from overlooking their distinctness. In

what sense feeling is said to be a kind of knowing. Feeling and willing

not ultimate criteria.-III. In what sense feeling and willing test and

verify knowledge. 1. In rebutting Spencerian agnosticism. 2. In im-

plying objective reality. 3. In finding scope for realizing the highest

ends. 4. The action of the individual and of mankind tests what is

true. IV. Errors of skepticism and materialism from overlooking the

relations of knowing, feeling and willing. 1. Final causes. 2. Wrong

conception of love of truth. 3. Right moral character favorable to the

investigation of truth. 4. Explains the fact that knowledge is advanced

by the growth or development of the man..

. . 31-43

CHAPTER III.

THE ACTS AND PROCESSES OF KNOWING.

? 9. CLASSIFICATION.-Intellect, Sensibility and Will. Intuition, Representa-

tion, Reflection.-I. Faculties.-II. The Mind active in knowing.-III,

Element of intelligence contributed by the mind.-IV. How acts of

knowledge are distinguished.

44-45

10. INTUITION OR PRIMITIVE KNOWLEDGE.-I. Definition.-II. Presenta-

tive Intuition and Rational. 1. Presentative intuition defined. Includes

sense-perception and self-consciousness. 2. Rational Intuition defined.

3. Intuition is primitive knowledge. 4. Intuition the common name of

both.-III. The mind considered as capable of Rational intuition is the

Reason...
... 45-47

* 11. REPRESENTAtive Knowledge.-Definition: representation and memory.

Self-evident knowledge in memory. Relation to other knowledge.

Theories of Huxley and Mill. Physiological Explanation.... 47-48

* 12. KNOWLEDGE BY REFLECTION OR THOUGHT.-I. Definition. 1. Pre-

requisite that the object and regulative principles be given. 2. Pre-

sented indeterminate. Not minima visibilia. Nebulous matter of in-

tuition. 3. Apprehension, Differentiation, Integration.-II. These

three the processes of all human thinking-III. Thought merely dis-

covers.--IV, Subsidiary objects of Thought..
48-54

† 13. Thought Distinguished by ITS OBJECTS.-I. Abstract or Formal.—
II. Concrete or realistic.-III. Creative or Imagination. 1. Fancy its
lower form. 2. Its higher form, creates ideals. 3. Leads in every
sphere of intellectual activity.-IV Science advanced chiefly by con-
erete thought. 1. Formal thought inadequate because it stops in words.

2. Inadequate for synthetic processes and judgments. 3. The three

axioms of formal logic insufficient. 4. Leibnitz' Sufficient Reason.

Prof. Bowen's three principles. 5. Principles underlying concrete

thought. 6. These last principles at the basis of all scientific thought.

7. All science empirical, philosophical and theological, advanced chiefly

by concrete thought..

54-61

14. INDUCTION AND THE NEWTONIAN METHOD.-I. Simple or Baconian In-

duction. 1. Extends knowledge beyond observation. 2. The principle

on which it rests. Known by rational intuition. Indefinite statements

of the principle. The uniformity of Nature defined. 3. Distinguished

from erroneous conceptions of it. 4. This brings no discredit on Induc-

tion. 5. Induction and Hume's objection to miracles.-II. The hypo-

thetical, or Newtonian Method. 1. Differs from induction in data, meth-

ods and results. 2. Illustrated from common life; the lost camel. 3.

The hypothesis created by imagination. 4. Aided by previous know-

ledge, habits of observation, analogy. 5. Verification: two requisites;

a third way sometimes. 6. The intuitive principle on which it rests.

7. Importance and general use of this method. 8. Now called induc-

tion; improperly so. 9. Neither method peculiar to physical science.

10. Anticipations..

61-72

. 72-81

15. RELATION OF REFLECTIVE THOUGHT TO INTUITION.-I. Reflection gives

no elemental material for thought. 1. True only when intuition in-

cludes presentative and rational. 2. True only of primitive or elemen-

tal realities.-II. Within these limits knowledge enlarged by thought.

-III. Can discover the unknown only by the known.-IV. Reflective

knowledge always preceded by spontaneous knowledge. 1. In what

sense faith precedes knowledge. Not peculiarly applicable to religious

knowledge. 2. No Faith-faculty as the distinctive organ of religious

belief. 3. Various meanings of faith. 4. Belief of Testimony.-V.

Reflection and experience become spontaneous in common sense.

16. RELATION OF REFLECTIVE THOUGHT TO UNIVERSAL REASON.-The

universe is grounded in and the manifestation of Reason.—I. This the

ultimate ground of knowledge by inference and by induction.-II. Only

by this can thought solve its ultimate problem. 1. Thought culminates

in finding the unity of the manifold. 2. Must be the unity of rational

system. 3. Possible only in recognizing a personal God.-III. Primary

motive of scientific investigation. Kant's three questions of philosophy.81-85

17. PROBABILITY.—I. Assent according to degree of evidence.-II. When the

improbability is slight, it is unnoticed.-III. Assent on probable evi-

dence a guide to conduct.-IV. No peculiar significance in application

to religious belief.

85-87

88-91

CHAPTER IV.

WHAT IS KNOWN THROUGH PRESENTATIVE INTUITION.

18. WHAT IS KNOWN THROUGH SENSE-PERCEPTION..

19. WHAT IS KNOwn Through SeLF-CONSCIOUSNESS.-I. Object, subject

and knowledge known simultaneously. Essential in every act of know-

ing. Object and subject are two realities known in one intellectual act.

Implicit or virtual consciousness. Formulas expressing direct and in-

verse knowledge.—II. Knowledge of our own mental operations.

Comte's objection. Answer.-III. The mind has knowledge of itself.

1. The error that the operations may be known, not the mind. 2. Error

that we are more certain of the operations of the mind. 3. Error that

mind is a series of states of consciousness. 4. Mind conscious of self

only in its operations.-IV. Individuality and identity known in con-

sciousness.-V. Rationality and Freedom known in consciousness. At-

tributes of Personality. Knowledge of personality positive not negative.

Can know others as persons. Knowledge of self as person prerequisite

to knowing God.
. . 91-99

20. KANT'S THING IN ITSELF.-Statement of his doctrine.-I. Phenomenal-
ism his fundamental error.-II. Error of presenting noumenon and
phenomenon in an antithesis and reciprocally exclusive. Origin of two
incompatible types of thought.-III. Misinterprets and contradicts con-
sciousness.-IV. Not a noumenon or necessary idea of reason. 1. Is an
attempt to conceive of substance without properties. 2. The postula-
tion contrary to reason. 3. Assumes creation in thought of an element
not given in intuition.-V. Discredits Reason by making its ideas
fictitious. VI. Involves absurdity. No knowledge if a mind knowing.
Knowledge of the unknowable the condition of knowing. Implies a
faculty above reason to criticise it. The only way in which Reason can
be discredited.-VII. Issues in agnosticism .
99-169

? 21. RELATIVITY of KnowledGE.—I. Objection stated. First form. Second

form. Third form.-II. Answer to Third form. 1. Answered by ?? 18,

19, 20.
2. The statement of the objection implies knowledge of

reality. 3. Involves absurdity. 4. Issues in agnosticism. .. 109-113

CHAPTER V.

WHAT IS KNOWN THROUGH RATIONAL INTUITION.

22. UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES not Particular REALITIES.

114-115

23. RISE AND DEVELOPMENT IN CONSCIOUSNESS.-I. Are constituent ele-
ments of reason.-II. Appear in consciousness on occasion in experi-
ence.-III. Regulate thought and action before they are recognized in
thought.-IV. Not innate ideas. Dr. Büchner's mistake.

115-117

24. SIGNIFICANCE AS REGULATIVE.-I. Significant only as applied to beings.

Distinguished from Mysticism.-II. Do not guarantee correctness of

judgment. Objection that the ancients believed antipodes impossible.

Objection by Helmholz.-III. Determine the possible and the impos-

sible. 1. What is possible to thought. 2. What is possible for will-

power to effect. 3. What is possible in nature.
117-121

25. VALIDITY OF RATIONAL INTUITIONS.-I. Sustain all the criteria of pri-
mitive knowledge.-II. Indispensable in Reasoning. - III. Verified in
experience. In common sense. In physical science. Exemplified in
Mathematics. Prof. Clifford's objection. This verification continually
going on.-IV. Essential to interpret sense-perception.-V. Objection
that not universally believed. 1. Unknown to infants and savages. 2.

Not necessarily believed by the cultivated; J. S. Mill's objection.

Inane objections.-VI. Objection that they are self-contradictory; 1.

Kant's Antinomies explained; Prof. Clifford's use of them. Hamilton's

use of them. Mansel's use of them. 2. If the objector's assertion is

true the objection is fatal; but it is the only objection. The objection

itself appeals to the authority of reason. 3. The antinomies rightly un-

derstood are not contradictions but complemental truths; examples.

4. The true argument from the antinomies. Kant's explanation of it;

and why inadequate. 5. H. Spencer's Antinomy and agnosticism. 6.

Kant's admission as to his phenomenalism.—VII. Objection that ra-
tional intuitions arise from the experience of the individual by associ-
ation of ideas. Statement of Mill. Statement of Diderot. 1. Individual
experience inadequate to account for them. 2. If thus arising, they would
be inveterate prejudices. 3. Falls into subjective idealism and agnosti-
cism. 4. Has been found inadequate and is abandoned.-VIII. Objection
that they are the result of the experience of the race in its evolution. 1.
Admits they are now constitutional and a priori to the individual. 2.
Admits they are valid and give real knowledge. 3. If so, their origin is
of minor consequence. 4. Evolution does not account for them. 5. Ob-
jection that evolution reaches back of the primitive man. 6. Laws of
thought not in continuous flux.-IX. Objection that rational intuitions
are subjective and illusive. 1. Is a specific application of the theory of
relativity of knowledge. 2. Incompatible with the theory of ancestral
experience. 3. Without rational intuitions knowledge is disintegrated
into subjective impressions. 4. Reason is everywhere and always the
same.-X. The validity of rational intuitions involves the existence of su-
preme and absolute Reason. 1. Truth has no significance except as a
mind is its subject. 2. These principles not peculiar to an individual.
3. They have reality only as truths of absolute Reason. 4. Reason in
man the same as in God. 5. Christian Theism explains and confirms
them by the truth that man is in the image of God. 6. Objection; this is
anthropomorphism. 7. Objection; this involves Pantheism.-XI. The
only reasonable explanation is that the intuitive principles are truths of
Reason. Failure of the three empirical positions exhausts the resources
of empiricism.-XII. Three conditions of the possibility of science.-
XIII. Atheism rests on some theory involving agnosticism.

121-151

CHAPTER VI.

THE ULTIMATE REALITIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

26. MEANING OF ULTIMATE REALITIES.-Categories: Aristotle's use of the

word and Kant's.

152

27. MATTER AND FORM.-Plato's "Ideas."-Kant's error as to forms and

categories. The true position.

152-153

28. CLASSIFICATION.-The two classes and their subdivisions, and why.
Aristotle's classification of categories. Knowledge begins as knowledge
of particular beings; issues in knowledge of the Absolute Being. 153-154