with the blow. The result was supernatural, because it was above and beyond the natural power of Moses and the rod.

Another illustration to the same point may be found in the throwing down of the walls of Jericho by the blowing of rams' horns. There is in sound, as it is called, or in that phenomenon which produces sound, a certain power to shake, or cause to totter. This is evident from experience to the most unlettered mind. The louder the noise, the more sensible the jar; so that the discharge of cannon will sometimes break windows, and perhaps, throw down walls. We will not pretend to say but that a cause of this kind might have been found of sufficient power to have thrown down, by its natural action, the walls of Jericho. But it is entirely evident that no such power existed in the blast of rams' horns. It had power to a certain extent; but not power to produce the result. God either communicated supernatural power to this blast, or He, immediately, by his own direct agency, threw down the walls in connection with the blast. The result was supernatural, because it was produced by a power which did not belong to, or inhere in the means employed.

The same thing may be true of motive power. Let us suppose a mind capable of being moved by money; and that such minds may be found, the reader will not deny. Now there is a certain natural or inherent power in the objective motive to move this mind. But naturally this power to move is increased with the increase of the sum presented. Other things being equal, a thousand dollars has more power to move than a single dollar. But suppose a power to move greater than that possessed by the thousand dollars was communicated to the single dollar. This would not be the power which naturally belonged to, and inhered in itself, but it would be a supernatural power,

communicated from without.

The position we assume is, that the communication of such a supernatural power to motive, is not contemplated in the production and the continuance of holiness under law. It is to be continued (if at all) by the force of that natural power which inheres in the motives presented. Were it practiced under other and supernatural influences, it would be so far the work of the being exerting those influences, that it would not be rewardable under law. This point needs to be well understood by the reader, that he may correctly apprehend the subject under discussion. To make it as plain and simple as possible. we will recur to the rock at Horeb. Suppose Moses possessed,

in himself, sufficient physical power, and the weapon he used was every way adapted to cleave the rock, and that he clave it by the application of his own physical strength. In such a case it would have been the act of Moses, and of no one else. It would have been no more the act of God, than Eve's plucking and eating the forbidden fruit. And had a superior being offered a reward to Moses, provided he would cleave the rock, he would have been entitled to the reward. But the fact was far otherwise. The result was not produced by the natural strength of Moses, or the adaptation of the weapon he used. True, Moses was active in producing the result: and we suppose his agency was so necessary, that the result would not have been produced without it. But this necessity was not in itself considered; it originated in the appointment of God. The act was just as much the act of God, as though Moses had not been the agent. No one thinks of attributing it to Moses. Thus the Psalmist, "He" (The Almighty, not Moses,) "clave the rocks in the wilderness, and gave them drink as out of the great depths." No one would suppose that the act was so far the act of Moses, as to entitle him to a preferred reward; especially if the result was accomplished by the very being who himself offered the reward. Nor does it matter whether God communicated supernatural strength to Moses, or operated directly upon the rock, rendering it so susceptible, that it brake by the application of his natural power, or whether He exerted his own strength, and Himself clave the rock in connection with the blow. In either case the result was not produced by Moses, but by God.

Nor can we see that the fact would have been at all changed, in this particular, had the supplied deficiency been of a moral, instead of a physical nature. Suppose Moses had possessed all the strength necessary to break the rock. God commanded him to break it. The motives to induce him to obey were exceedingly strong. If he refused, that vast congregation would die of thirst, and he would be guilty of their blood. Suppose, in addition to this, God had offered him heaven if he would obey, and had threatened to inflict upon him his wrath, to the deepest hell, if he disobeyed. To entitle him to the reward, his obedience must be induced by the natural power of these motives, and not by any supernatural influences brought to bear upon his mind by God himself. Now suppose these motives had not sufficient power to secure obedience. Moses utterly refuses to obey. Here is a difficulty in the way of the

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desired result entirely different in its nature from the former difficulty. This is moral; that was physical. This consists in an "inability of will;" that consisted in a lack of muscular strength. For this, Moses is exceedingly culpable; for that, he was entirely blameless. But although this difficulty differs in its nature from the other, it is, nevertheless, as truly a difficulty, and must be as certainly overcome, or the act will not be accomplished. Now suppose God determines to bring to bear upon the mind of Moses supernatural influences. It matters not whether this be accomplished by means of these objective motives, or by an operation directly upon the mind itself; the result is the same. The influences used are supernatural. Under these influences Moses yields. He strikes the rock, and the waters gush out. Now we ask, would this be obedience on the part of Moses, in the sense contemplated when the reward was offered? Would it entitle him to the reward? Is the act, so far, the act of Moses, as to make it proper for him to claim the reward of merit? Is it, in the strict and legal sense of the term, obedience at all on the part of Moses? The reader will bear in mind, that the command included, not merely the overt act, but also the influences under which that act was to be performed. It was to be performed under natural influences, and not under those which are supernatural. Would then its performance under supernatural influences be the obedience required? Is this the kind of obedience which God seeks to establish? Is it not rather true that Moses would continue to be guilty of disobedience, although he performed the act required, until such time as he should arrive at the point where he would perform that act under natural influences alone? So it seems to us. But these questions should be examined and answered by every one for himself. They are questions of the deepest interest. They are big with importance in their bearing upon various vital points in theology.

The influences of the Spirit in the economy of grace, furnish us with a most beautiful and impressive illustration of this point. These influences are supernatural. They are above and beyond the natural power which inheres in the motives of the Gospel to move mind. Nor does it matter whether they are exerted through these motives, or directly upon the mind and heart of the subject, or whether God uses both these methods to produce the desired result. The fact remains the same in either case. These influences are supernatural. They are such influences as the law never contemplated. They be

long exclusively to the economy of grace. The holiness produced by them is considered the product of the Spirit to such an extent, that it is not rewardable under law. True, it receives the reward of congruity, but not that of condignity, or of merit.

We suppose that these influences were entirely unfelt before the Fall: and that they never have been, and never will be experienced in heaven. Yea, we go farther, and contend, that if Gabriel himself was to live holy under such supernatural influences, his holiness would not be rewardable with the reward of merit.

The reader will at once perceive that, in our opinion, there are at least two reasons why redeemed sinners cannot be saved by their works. The one is, because they have violated law; the other is, because the holiness which they exercise is so far the product of the Spirit, that it is not sufficiently their own to receive the reward of merit. This holiness is not that which God seeks to establish throughout his universe. This is a gracious holiness, but he seeks to establish a holiness purely legal. This gracious holiness is produced by Him, not as an end, but as a means to an end, viz. the establishment of the legal. The supernatural influences of the Spirit will be used by God until such time as His people will persevere in holiness without them, and then they will be entirely removed. We repeat it then, that the holiness which God has determined to establish, is holiness under law, or a purely legal holiness: and it must be continuous under the natural power of those motives which can consistently be brought to bear upon mind.

Motives which can be brought to bear upon mind in connection with law, are of three classes: motives arising from, or contained in the law itself, which comprise its inherent excellences, and its relations to the Sovereign who framed and published it; motives growing out of the reward and penalties attached to the law; and motives evolved by the exercise of mercy, in the direction of atonement and pardon. It would seem that, under the government of God, the combined force of all these motives is necessary to preserve for ever the allegiance of holy beings to the eternal throne.

When the law was first published, there was of course no exhibition of inflicted penalty, nor of pardon through grace. These developments could not be made until sin was introduced into the universe; for until beings had sinned, there were none to punish or to pardon. We do not believe that sin was intro

duced, that these developments might be made; but its introduction furnished both the occasion for making, and the opportunity to make them. Could God consistently have prevented the introduction of sin, there would have been no occasion for these developments. The introduction of sin was a matter incidental to free-agency, in connection with the fact that God's purpose is to establish holiness under law, by means of the natural power of those motives which he can consistently bring to bear upon mind. Had he exerted supernatural power to prevent the introduction of sin, he would have thwarted his own plan. But, sin being introduced, he makes use of it to develop still further the power of motive, in the direction of inflicted penalty, and of pardon through grace, to prevent a more extended rebellion, and to bind those subjects who still remained loyal, to his throne forever. This part of our subject may be clearly stated in a few brief propositions:

1. The Sovereign of the universe has, in infinite wisdom, determined to bind his subjects to his throne by virtue of the natural power which inheres in motive, without the addition of that which is supernatural.

2. Before the fall of angels, the only influences tending to hold them to their allegiance, were the excellency of the law itself, the relation it sustained to the lawgiver, and the blessings they enjoyed in consequence of obedience. They undoubtedly loved and delighted in the Lord their God, and owing to the fact that it was his law, that he had framed and published it, they delighted in, and honored it. They also saw great beauty and perfectness in the law itself; and they were reaping great and rich blessings, while living in obedience to it. But on the other hand, there were influences tending to lead them astray, and cause them to rebel against their rightful Sovereign. What these influences were, we are not informed. But we know they must have existed, or angels would not have passed through a state of trial, and the fall of a portion of them would not have transpired. Here, then, were contending influences: one class holding angels to the throne of God; and the other class tempting them to break away from their loyalty, and rebel against his righteous government. The fact, that a part of the angels sinned, shows conclusively that the influences exerted in the direction of holiness, were not sufficiently powerful to hold them. And the probability is, that this rebellion would have been far more extended, had it not been for