the general law just quoted, and con- law it follows necessarily," say our taining the reason in general; name- Annotators, "that a woman being ly, it is because "None may marry married to the one brother, she may any near of kin to her." And if she not marry the other, after the former's did marry her deceased husband's decease. And conformably, or by brother, she would be doing "accor- parity of reason, (the Dutch is gelyk ding to the manners of those nations formeelyk,) a mau being married to one whom God cast out," and "whom sister, he may not, after her death, he abhorred" for doing these deeds." marry the other." This exhibits the [Lev. xx. 23.] Now, if I change opinions, practice and law of the the words woman, and two brothers in Churches of Holland, from time imsuccession, in the above quoted law memorial on this point. case, and put down in their stead the But a man is only half done with words man, and two sisters in succes- his work, when he has laid down his sion, I presume it will be evident to argument. He must review the arevery candid man, that I am not chan-guments of his opponents. I pray ging the nature or nearness of the kin. The kin, I affirm, is precisely the same. And I am putting the same just and legitimate interpretation on this law, as I am doing in the above case of the tenth Commandment.“A man shall not covet his neighbour's wife." I change the words man and wife, into woman and husband, and read thus :-"A woman shall not covet her neighbour's husband." Call it implication, or inference, if you please; the one mode of interpretation is as just and proper as the oth-could be no possible reason why the er. my readers, therefore, patiently to bear with me a few moments, while I take a candid view of these. One brother-and he is not a weak brother, I assure you-says, "Before it can be shown that the prohibition of a woman from marrying two brothers in succession, does involve a prohibition of a man from marrying two sisters in succession, it must be made to appear, that there could be no possible reason," [that is, we must set to, and prove a negative,] "that there union might not, in the one case, be prohibited, and in the other permitted. One plausible reason, at least, may be conceived," continues the objector, and he betakes himself very gravely to the ground of expediency, for the benefit of the children, "And that reason is, that the children of the deceased wife might find a more tender and affectionate stepmother in the surviving sister than they could find in a stranger.* And hence, if a woman must not marry two brothers in succession, most evidently a man must not marry two sisters in succession. If the woman who married two brothers in succession is guilty of incest, and does a deed for which God abhorred the Canaanites; even so, let men talk as they please, the man who marries two sisters in succession does a deed for which God abhorred the Canaanites. And, my Brethren, I have just To this I reply, 1st. That, accordlooked into my Dutch Bible, with the ing to the mode of argument pursued learned Annotations of the ablest Di- by the brethren who contend that a vines which Holland has produced-positive precept has been given; that and you know that the Dutch Schools this positive precept does mention have sent forth some of the ablest every case prohibited; that no inferDivines of Europe. And I have here ence must be admitted-we should carefully copied down to you their expect to meet with a positive precept, Annotations on Lev. xviii. ver. 16.--produced by "Veritas," granting and "Thou shalt not marry the wife of thy deceased brother." "By this *See Veritas, p. 15, &c. that it is quite expedient that a woman marry her deceased husbands's brother, because that brother will assuredly prove "a more tender and affection do!" But this reason of expediency would set aside a positive law of God. And, hence, it cannot be a legitimate reason. giving permission to a man to marry his deceased wife's sister. And my reason for saying so is this. A general positive precept, we have seen, does condemn the marrying of "nearate stepfather than any stranger could kin." Aud, by a particular positive law, the marriage of a woman to two brothers in succession is condemned as incestuous. And 66 as near kin" is the reason; and as the sister of a deceased wife is precisely as 66 near kin" as the brother of a deceased husband, this last, of course, must also be incestuous. Now, as nothing can set aside a positive law of God, or grant an exception from it, but another positive law from God;* hence, our brother VERITAS ought to have produed a positive law out of the Book of God to justify such a marriage. It will not do to oppose human expediency against such a plain moral law! And this is my second reason. I object to this mode of argument from expediency in opposition to such authority. And after what VERITAS and his associates have said to DOMESTICUS about expediency, they should not thus have dragged it into the argument. The other argument of our brethren is the strongest, if indeed, it be not their only argument. It is this. There is no positive precept forbidding the marriage, in question. The marriage, say they, of even a sister, or of any near relative, is in itself not morally wrong. It was not only not criminal in the family of Adam; but was even enjoined by God. It is made criminal only by a positive law of God prohibiting it, and declaring it incestuous. Thus the act of eating of any tree in Paradise was not in itself criminal. But a positive precept of God declared that "of the tree of knowledge of good and evil man should not eat." From this time it became criminal to eat of that tree. So it was lawful once for a man to marry his own sister, or "near kin." It was lawful once to eat of every tree of the Garden. But a positive law prohibited the one and the other. But I deny point blanc this reason or ground of expediency. VERITAS admits that a woman must not marry her deceased husband's brother- Now, continue our brethren, a posbecause God's law condemns it as ilive law will contain all the cases inincestuous, on the ground of being tended by the law giver to be prohibiof too " near kin." But even while ted. We must not draw inferences every person sees that the "kin" of from like cases, or kin appearing to two sisters, is just as near as that of be equally near. The very cases two brothers, he argues that a woman will be specified. Where the specimay marry her deceased sister's hus-fications of the law stop, there stops band. Why? "Because she will the prohibition. A positive law is make a kinder and more affectionate thus different from a moral law, taken stepmother." Well, but the rule will in its usual acceptation; which does also work the other way, by this same include, and imply all degrees, and convenient thing called expediency.similar cases of crime. Thus in the On this same principle I also argue * As was done by that law which, with out leaving him any other choice---commanded a man to marry the widow of a brother who died without an heir to his estate. above case, the positive law singled out a particular tree and prohibited the eating of it. No inference must be drawn to prohibit the use of other similar trees. But, continue they, we find in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus, a law prohibiting a "man from marrying his brother's widow ;" that is, of course, a law prohibiting a woman from marrying her deceased husband's brother. But here the specification stops. The two sisters The two sisters may, or may not be as near of kin, as two brothers are. It is enough for us that the law of God does not, by any positive precept, forbid a man to marry the sister of his deceased wife. Where the law is silent we must stop. "Where there is no law there is no transgression." We have been thus very explicit, in order to give the argument of our brethren its entire strength. Now I request our Brethren's attention to our reply to this plausible argument. 1. Since we must not reason from inference; but must adhere strictly to the letter of the positive law, which declares what is incest; let us follow out our opponents' argument. If it be correct, it cannot lead us into error, by any fair and legitimate consequences drawn from it. In 1 Cor. v. the case of incest prohibited, is simply that of a man marrying his stepmother. There is nothing else specified here. Hence, according to our opponents' argument and we keep them to the letter a man, for any thing specified here, may marry his grandmother, or his sister, or his daughter without the guilt of incest! Do our Again, let us look into Levit. chap. xviii. the only other place containing the positive law of incest. brethren apply the same form of argument here? Does this law specify every individual who may not marry without being guilty of incest? Yes, if their fundamental position be admitted as correct. Yes, says Dr. Ely, we must leave the positive institution of marriage, in the condition in which the positive restrictions of our Maker have left it. Then a man may marry his niece; and a niece may marry her uncle! A man may marry his mother's brother's widow; and a women may marry the widower of her VOL. II.-7. mother's sister! A man may, moreover, marry his grandmother; and a woman may marry her grandson! For there is no positive law here prohibiting these! And our opponents say that we must not carry our prohibitions farther than the cases laid down in the letter of the positive law. Hence, our brethren's argument seems to resolve itself into one of those sophisms, which by proving too much; or by narrowing down too much, prove nothing in the point, on which it was made to bear. 2. They lay the entire stress of their argument on the letter of the positive law of incest: and they admit of no reasoning by inference from that law. The law, say they, covers fully every case that it does intend to prohibit. If it had intended a wider application, it would, as a positive law, have specified the cases. The letter of the law does prohibit a man from marrying his brother's widow. And, by parity of reasoning, a woman may not marry her deceased husband's brother. Here our opponents stop. The letter of the positive law carries them no farther. They admit of no inference touching those of equally near kin as most positively prohibited. We object to this. insist on reasoning from legitimate inference. We say God forbade his covenant people to marry any of near kin. This we call the general law of incest. One, at least, of the particular instances is specified under the application of this law; that is, a man shall not marry his deceased brothers widow; or, a woman shall not marry two brothers successively. When I look simply at this particular law, I ask, for what reason are these parties prohibited from marrying? I recur to the general law, and answer, because "they are of near kin." We Now by a form of argument (you may call it inference, or implication, or what you please-it is simply the application of a plain general law to a particular case under it.) By this form of argument we are led to the conclusion, that, because the general law forbids one class of parties to marry because they are "near of kin," it does forbid another class of parties who are just precisely "as near of kin.”—It is as if I said; The general precept binding me to keep holy the sabbath day, says, "Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. This implies that I must keep holy the entire sabbath day. Yes, says A., I must not take away any part from the sabbath day. The precept claims every hour of the day under this term "the sabbath day." I differ from you, says B. I do not, it is true, take ought from the begining of the sabbath day, or from the middle of it : but I take two hours from the end of it. And the positive precept does not prohibit it. It does not say in positive terms that I shall not take away two hours from the end of it. And there may be an expediency why I should do it.-You are in error, A. replies. We must not take ought from the beginning, or the end, or the middle of the sabbath day.When the law says "keep the sabbath day," it means the whole day.-Even so when the positive law says "near kin," it means all near kin. You ask where will you stop? I answer, at all near kin, which are precisely as near; or which are the same as that specified in this portion of the law. We do not take away all limits. We do confine ourselves to limits fixed by God's law. If I say to my child while standing together on the same side of a den of snakes, My child, you must not come within three yards of that den. Well, says the child, I understand you. You set me a positive prohibition, I will obey you. I will not come within three yards on this side, where we stand, and where you point. But I may come close up to the den, on the side opposite to this. There can be no danger there. And your command did not specify the other side of the den.-I reply to him the danger is all around. You must not come nearer on the one side, than on the other. Even so, we must not marry "near kin in all degrees equal to this me case specified. The danger is "all around the den." If a man marries his deceased wife's sister, he comes as near the "den of dangerous reptiles," as if he married the wife of his deceased brother. By no means, say our opponents. This is reasoning from inference.— We cannot admit it. We bind you to the letter of the positive law. Well, gentlemen, be it so. The danger it seems in your opinion, lies only on the one side of the den. You keep within three yards from it, on one side. But on the other side you are willing to come close up to the danLet us gerous reptiles. Be it so. try the force of this your main argument on other points of truth, on which we are perfectly at one. And now, in return, we bind you gentlemen, down to the letter of positive law.—You must, by fair interpretation of your argument, give up the keeping of the first day of, the week for sabbath. You must give up infant baptism. You must henceforth, refuse to admit pious females to the Lord's table.-How so?-For the best reason in the world. I mean providing that your form of argument in the incest question be correct. We must not, you say, reason by inference. And by no other form of argument do we pretend to sustain these solemn ordinances. And these instances, which I adduce, are strictly in point. They are instituted by a positive law of God.— There is nothing in the law of nature enjoining them. enjoining them. There would, you very justly say, be no moral turpitude in marrying our nearest kin, if a law of God had not forbidden it. There would have been no moral turpitude, we say in neglecting the sabbath day; no moral turpitude in neglecting infant baptism-if no law of God had enjoined them. Thus far, these ca ses are on a perfect footing of equality, in the argument. And if we must not reason by inference in the one case, then we must not reason by inference in any of the other cases.-Hence we must give up the sabbath, and infant baptism, and female communion, if we give up this argument on the incest question. But every Theologian knows that a legitimate inference from a text of holy writ, is just of as perfect authority as the text itself, or any positive text. The proof from inference, every candid theologian knows, to prove the perpetuity of the sabbath on the first day of the week, and infant baptism, and the female right to the Lord's Supper, is as complete and perfect, as if we found the command in express terms. Every minister learns this as one of the first lessons of Theology. And every sound divine knows that this is one of the most important admissions in all orthodox exposition. And every one of our opponents does admit this as readily as we do-in the case of infant baptism, and the Sabbath, and female communion. All we ask is, that they would extend it to this case, sustained also by a positive law. It now remains that we should notice a little more distinctly that difficulty at which we have glanced already. The difficulty for it does not deserve to be called an argument-is this-Ifyou do not let the positive letter of the law fix the limit, (I quote the words of our brethren on the other side,) then where will you end? Where will you fix a limit? We reply, that we do fix a limit, as distinctly as do our brethren with all their positiveness of the letter of the law. The law does not, indeed, specify every case, as we have seen above. But, it does specify every degree of kin within which it is forbidden to marry. Thus, take a specimen-And "ex uno disce omnes.” A man is forbid den to marry his aunt. And this implies that a woman ought not to marry her uncle. A man is forbidden to marry his paternal uncle's widow; therefore he is forbidden to marry his maternal uncle's widow. A man is forbidden to marry his granddaughter;' therefore a woman is forbidden to marry her grandson. A man is forbidden to marry his brother's widow; therefore a woman is forbidden to marry her deceased husband's brother. A woman is forbidden to marry two brothers seccessively; therefore a man is forbidden to marry two sisters successively, &c. This principle of limitation, is as easy as it is necessary and legitimate, It breathes the very spirit, and embraces fully the intention of the law.* It is the principle which guided those venerable and truly pious men, who composed the Canon of our Church, declaring the marriage of a man to his deceased wife's sister, to be incestuous. It was the same principle which guided those truly venerable, and most pious Divines of the Westminster Assembly, who composed the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church, and particularly the twenty-fourth chapter in which they also pronounce these marriages incestuous. Thus, we think, we have fully removed this objection of our brethren. By our inferential mode of argument, or, to speak more properly, our apply ing the general law of incest to particular cases, we do not travel out of those degrees of kin fixed and determined by the law of God. Nay, we do strictly adhere to the limits here fixed. Our principle is this:-We do not pretend that every supposable case is found in Lev. xviii. With respect to every case not found in this law, apply your rule respecting the specifications of a positive law.Here we go cheerfully along with you. Let every case that is not condemned be deemed lawful. But we do maintain that all the degrees of kin are distinctly specified in the law; and *See a late writer in the Philadelphian, for March 24th, in reply to Dr. Ely, &c. |