theories of Calvinism, Arminianism, and Nationalism, or the system advocated by Locke and Dr. John Taylor, placing in opposition to them what he calls Ecclesiastical Individualism, meaning thereby an election of individuals to the privileges of the visible Church and to the enjoyment of means of grace. His scheme in point of causation agrees with Calvinism and Nationalism, and resolves the cause of election into the good pleasure of God. In point of Ideality it agrees with Nationalism in representing election as a choice of men only to the communion of the Visible Church and to the enjoyment of the means of grace; differing however in that individuals instead of nations are made the subjects of it. He considers Arminianism the most erroneous of the systems: having departed from the true doctrine of the Church, both in causality and ideality, whereas Calvinism and Nationalism are both right, or nearly so, in point of causality, and both wrong in point of ideality.

Dr. Mozley's "Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination" is a work of great ability and learning. The author takes a sound and churchmanlike view of the topics he touches, but his volume is confined to the Predestinarian doctrine of Augustine. He sees no substantial difference between this doctrine and that of the Thomists and Calvinists. He considers that those who suppose that Augustine differs from Calvin in his doctrine of predestination do not really know the doctrine which Augustine held and suppose it to be different from what it was. They suppose it to be a qualified doctrine of predestination to privileges and means of grace; or they have some general idea that Augustine did not hold such a doctrine as Calvin held-an assumption which settles, to begin with, the question for them. Even the cautions and checks which Calvin appends to the doctrine Dr. Mozley points out are substantially the same as we find appended to the doctrine of Augustine and the Augustinian Schoolmen. While seemingly adopting the Calvinistic scheme the author stops short of committing himself to it.

In Principal Cunningham's "The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation," published in 1862, there is a powerful essay in favour of Calvinism, and in his "Historical Theology," published in 1864, he treats at large of the differences between the Calvinists and the Arminians. He takes the view that the one fundamental principle of Calvinism, the admission or denial of which constitutes the real line of demarcation between Calvinists and Anti-Calvinists, is the doctrine of predestination, in the more limited sense of the word, or of election, as descriptive of the substance of the teaching of Scripture with regard to what God decreed or purposed from eternity to do, and does or effects in time, for the salvation of those who are saved; and that every man ought to be held by others, and ought to acknowledge him

self to be a Calvinist who believes that God from eternity chose some men, certain persons of the human race, absolutely and unconditionally to salvation through Christ, and that He accomplishes this purpose or executes this decree in time, by effecting and securing the salvation of these men, in accordance with the provisions of the covenant of grace,

This we cannot admit. The doctrine as thus expressed is not Calvinistic, it is nearer Augustinian. Reprobation cannot be separated from the doctrine of Calvin, and we have his own admission of the truth of this. There are thousands who would be willing to acknowledge the doctrine of predestination, as thus expressed, who would at the same time utterly reject the scheme of Calvin and disown the companionship of his followers.

It is true there is no statement of reprobation in the Scottish Confession of 1560, or in the Second Helvetic of 1566, which was approved of by almost all the Reformed Churches, but it is begging the question to bring this fact in support of his argument, as Dr. Cunningham does, alleging that they are Calvinistic. Surely a Calvinist, strictly speaking, must admit the Canons of the Synod of Dort; and does this not enunciate the doctrine of reprobation in most distinct terms? It would seem fairer not to take election as the peculiar doctrine of Calvinists, this being a doctrine accepted by all Christians, Arminians included, but rather reprobation, this being by no means so widely received.

Dr. Cunningham seems to imagine that a man who is not an Arminian must be a Calvinist, and if not a Calvinist must be an Arminian, and he considered it absurd of Dr. Whately to deny that he was either. The whole of the two works we are considering, as is usual with Calvinists, display an utter ignorance of the views of the Arminians, for we cannot suppose for one moment that the author would wilfully attribute to them what they have invariably repudiated. His position that a man who rejects the Socinian denial of the Divine foreknowledge must be either an Arminian or a Calvinist, or rather must be an Arminian, if he refuses to admit the truth of Calvinism, is simply absurd. He assumes with great confidence the point he proposed to prove, and so irresistible are his arguments that one admitting their validity would by consistency be forced to the conclusion that every piece of furniture not a table must be a sofa!

He asserts that the strength of Calvinism lies in the mass of direct, positive, and, as he believes, unanswerable proofs that can be produced from Scripture and reason, confirmed by much that is suggested by experience and the history of the human race, to establish its fundamental principles of the preordination of whatsoever comes to pass, and the real and effectual election of some men to eternal life. The author, however, makes scarcely any reference whatever to Scripture, and attempts to support his whole

scheme mainly by a refutation of Arminianism. This is quite consistent with the general views to which we have already referred, the author evidently considering that the best proof of the truth of Calvinism must of necessity be the annihilation of the positions usually maintained by the Arminians.

CHAPTER I.

PREDESTINATION AND FOREKNOWLEDGE.

No one denies that Predestination in some sense is taught in Holy Scripture, and the real question is what doctrine is enunciated therein.

This

The word rendered 'predestinate' in the Authorized Version is the Greek verb pоopilav, to determine beforehand,' to 'prescribe,' to 'limit,' to 'pre-appoint." It is used in Rom. viii. 29, 30; Eph. i. 5-11; and Acts iv. 28. It properly signifies to resolve beforehand within one's self what to do, and before the thing resolved on is actually effected to appoint it to some certain use, and direct it to some determinate end. The Hebrew verb Habhdel, has much the same signification. The word 'predestinate' is not used in the Revised Version, the word there employed being invariably 'fore-ordain.' In the Authorized Version a distinction was made between Predestination and Fore-ordainment; the operation of the former being confined to the Elect, while under the operation of the latter, the Non-elect were also included. distinction has not been preserved in the Revised Version. Predestination may be regarded in a general sense as that Eternal, wise, and immutable, decree of God whereby He did from eternity determine and ordain to create, dispose of, and direct to some particular end, every person and thing to which He has given-or is yet to give-being, and to make the whole creation subservient to and declarative of His glory. Of this decree, actual providence is the executive. Most of the Fathers make use of the word Predestination as it refers to angels and men, whether good or evil, and by them it is usually looked upon as of two species, the one to life and glory which is by pre-eminence called Predestination, the other to eternal death and ignominy. The former is revealed in Election, the latter seen in Reprobation.

In gathering any great doctrine from Holy Scripture, we must be careful how we attach a meaning to one portion which may be in antagonism to, or inconsistent with, any other portion. One of the most serious objections to Calvinistic and Arminian views of 1 To which agrees #poridiva, to 'propose,' or 'purpose' (Rom. i. 13; Eph. i. 9), and TáTT, to 'pre-ordain' (Acts xvii. 26); potroμal, to 'prepare' (Rom. ix. 23; 1 Cor. ii. 9),-from which the Ancients for the sake of teaching formed the word pop, predestination,' to which answers póétois Tūs xapdías, ‘purpose of heart' (Acts xi. 23).-Theses iv. of Gomarus.

* The same distinction is made in the Westminster Confession, c. iii., § 3, and Calvi. nists in general have held that there is an important difference between the way and manner in which the decree of election bears on the condition and fate of those who are saved, and the way and manner in which the decree of reprobation operates upon the condition of those who perish, a distinction they consider in some vague way to be marked by the use of the word 'predestinate' in the one case, and of 'pre-ordain' in the other.

Predestination is that the systems are grounded on imperfect and partial views of Revelation, and rest on doubtful interpretations of detached passages of Scripture. The truth of any doctrine cannot be gleaned in this manner from Holy Writ. The Word is one, the Revelation is one, and the only safe course is to take the Word and Revelation as one, and see that our interpretation of any part is in harmony with, or at least not inconsistent with any other part; for the all-wise God cannot be guilty of inconsistency. The Divine purposes, as revealed in Holy Scripture, have occasioned much controversy, a large body advocating the existence, the eternity, and unchangeableness of Divine Decrees, yet differing among themselves as to their extent; some regarding such decrees as embracing every event that transpires, others limiting the operation of such decrees to what is good only. On the other hand, there are not a few who, viewing the doctrine of Divine Decrees as opposed to freedom in God, and irreconcilable with freedom in the creature, deny the existence of any Decrees at all. The denial of the Decrees of God, however, involves most serious consequences. How can we suppose that the Almighty performs in time that which He has not in Eternity designed to effect? The perfections of the Deity are manifest in His works. These are evidence of heavenly wisdom and design, and no contemplative mind, looking up from nature to nature's God, can come to any other conclusion than that all His plans must have been conceived, considered, and settled in Eternity. A Being of such infinite understanding would not act but according to a purpose-a fixed and determinate design, and revelation bears this out most conclusively. "Known unto God are all His works from the beginning of the World."1

Either the Almighty had a fixed and determinate design and purpose or He had not-there is no middle course. He either acted in the great work of Creation and Redemption without forethought and design, or He determined to act in the manner in which He has acted. It would be charging folly upon the Most High to say He acted without design, for this is equivalent to saying He acted without wisdom, there being no stronger evidence of lack of wisdom than action without design and void of purpose.

We may then conclude that the Almighty acts not without design, that He has a purpose, and that all His works and operations in time are the result of determinations or decrees formed before the foundation of the world.

It is clear that God could never give a promise to His people, or predict judgment upon them, if He had formed no purpose to that effect. "Whatsoever God doeth it shall be for ever; nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it," for "He is in one