a part of the ground, but by no means the whole of it, nor indeed the most difficult part of it.

Sin is; God is: these two truths admitted, the inquiry is still left, urgent and irrepressible: How can the two consist with each other? How can sin and suffering be where Omnipotence and Goodness also are? Admit the sin to be wholly from the creature, yet the question remains: Could not Omnipotence preclude it? or, did not the Divine Goodness wish to prevent it? Leaving, then, the peculiar methods of both these authors, we proceed in our own way to find a solution. The attempt is to attain a thorough and conclusive answer, and for this purpose it will be necessary to go over the whole field opened in the inquiry; but we will strive to make our course as direct as possible, consistently with clearness and fullness of investigation.

There are two and only two general methods practicable in prosecuting this investigation: one takes the greatest hap piness, and may be called THE THEORY OF BENEVOLENCE; the other takes the highest worthiness, and may be known as THE THEORY OF RECTITUDE. The distinction is radical between the bene and the recte, though commonly entirely disregarded. Most American, and especially New-England theologians, have worked at this problem somewhere within the theory of Benevolence; and yet in defending or refuting they have perpetually applied principles which can legitimately be found and used only within the theory of Rectitude. That a true psychology teaches such radical distinction, and that it is necessary accurately to mark the sharp discrimination, will be made manifest as we proceed in the discussion.

The theory of benevolence, through all its modifications, has these leading facts: Happiness is gratified susceptibility, and is the desire of all sentient being. The greater amount of sentient life, whether in One Being or in the aggregate of many beings, gives capacity for the greater happiness, and the sum total of sentient existence in its greatest happiness is the highest good, and the ultimate end to be regarded in all action. To wish this is benevolence, and in this is VOL. XIII. No. 49.

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the essence of all virtue. On the other hand, that the individual should regard his own happiness, in any way, in conflict with the greatest sum total of happiness, is selfishness, and in this is the essence of all sin. To encourage selfdenial in the sacrifice of individual for universal happiness, it should be understood that such particular self-denial will react in individual happiness to a greater degree than any self-indulgence could have reached, and thus benevolence is always prudence—a wise expediency for all men in all cases. If this theory use the words right, obligation, duty, etc., the meaning should be interpreted strictly within the ends of greatest happiness. That is ultimate, and the moral measure of all things. This end is also one with God and all his creatures, comprehending his own infinitude of being and that of all his finite creatures; the highest degree of happiness attainable, in the aggregate, is God's ultimate rule of action. He is benevolent, and in this he is righteous, in seeking the greatest attainable happiness upon the whole. Let it be carefully noted, that happiness is ever gratified susceptibility, supplying a sentient craving; satisfying a want, and that as the nature of the sentient being is, such must be the line to its greatest happiness and the motive to its action. The whole root is in nature; as God or man finds the greatest sum total of happiness to be attainable, that is the end of the inquiry, and the end of duty;. the nature found has determined all. And now we say, that on this theory of Benevolence, a number of hypothetical positions may be taken, from which to reconcile the existence of sin with the perfections of God.

The line to be pursued may, at the outset, be indicated. Sin is an evil because of the suffering it induces, and benevolence must desire to exclude all unhappiness, and the power must be exerted to effect it. But if a position can be attained from whence it can be seen that, in the very nature of the case, the greatest attainable happiness involves still some unhappiness, and that no conceived application of power can remedy it, then are we at the point we wish. Benevolence gets all the happiness that any power can, and such remaining un

happiness is no impeachment of any perfection. This is the general guide in the taking of a position, and several such positions may be assumed. The theory itself limits the number, and we may find all and make our examination completely exhaustive. Some of these may be untenable, and we may force the theorist from one to another. We may in fact thus logically drive him through, and out of, the whole sphere of Benevolence, and allow him no rest till he stands fairly and intelligently on the only firm footing of the ultimate Right.

We first assume, under the general theory of Benevolence, a position that looks to the nature of Benevolence itself. We suppose, here, that God directed both his creating and controlling agency, in the attainment of greatest happiness, by the nature of Benevolence. The greatest intensity of the benevolent desire is of the most value, inasmuch as it must produce the greatest happiness. This is to be estimated by the trials it will endure and the sacrifices it will make. That being who will practise self-denial strongly and promptly under the application of tempting motives, has a higher intensity of benevolence, and of more value for happiness, than he who perseveres in a benevolent course only amid the most favoring circumstances. God, then, so makes and disposes all the agents in his system, that obedience to the law of benevolence, in those very circumstances, will attain the highest aggregate intensity and value of benevolence, and he, of course, desires and requires obedience in every case.

But he also foreknows, that in these circumstances the motives will not be sufficient to secure benevolent action in all cases. Sin and misery will enter; yet he also foresees, that on this entrance of sin he can introduce other motives of chastisement, punishment, atonement, etc., which shall be sufficient to induce an augmented intensity of benevolence, in the aggregate exactly to counterbalance the evils of the still prevalent selfishness. He, thus, makes the issue equal in intensity of benevolence, and value in happiness, that universal obedience would have originally gained. The problem is herein solved. Sin is; but the interpositions, by

God himself, consequent upon its entrance have attained an equal value in benevolence and happiness to the highest, the entrance and prevalence of present sin notwithstanding.

From such a position, we can reconcile the present degree of sin and unhappiness with the power and goodness of God, if we can stand upon it. But here is the difficulty; the position is assailable and indefensible. To God, it must be a matter of indifference which course should be taken, for it comes out equal in value in both cases; but the Scriptures nowhere tolerate the notion that God was indifferent whether Adam sinned or not. It involves palpable absurdities. Benevolence is right; but here are two courses equal in benevolence, and of course both must be right. It is in itself just as right to have the system with sin as that without. Moreover, the process under the two suppositions necessitates endless absurdities. God desires all to obey on the first supposition, and when he brings in his measures after sin has entered, he still represents himself as desiring obedience and not sin; and if so, he must still keep the alternatives open with equal values on each side. There must then be a perceiving of equivalents through all the permutations of quantity that may be made of all moral agents, and of all points of activity in all moral agents!

But the real difficulty is more radical than its indefensibility; the position cannot be used for its purpose without itself sliding away and changing to quite another hypothesis. While we are applying the nature of benevolence and determining its value, we are obliged to see that no such determination can be made without estimating the motives employed. One set of means will augment, and another diminish, the intensity of the benevolence, so that, after all, the whole must turn upon the nature of the means to be ap plied, and this logically places us in quite a new position.

We are thus forced to a second hypothesis, and find ourselves in this position: the nature of the means must have guided the author and governor of this system of benevolence. The nature of the means to be employed cannot be determined without regarding the subjective excitability, and

the congeniality of the objective appliance. Motive has its strength according as the susceptibility is quick and the appliance pungent. Subjective excitability and objective appliance might be so low, as not to endanger selfish gratification, and thus the system would be kept free from all sin; but such a torpid suceptibility and weak appliances would exclude not merely all sin, but also the very means necessary to the highest benevolence. The very measures which minister to the man's or the angel's highest happiness and benevolence, endanger also his selfish perversion and fall into sin. God has therefore so tempered both the subjective and objective motives, as to secure the greatest practicable amount of benevolence with the least selfishness. Better the present order of means with the consequent sin, than any lower means and less or no sin and misery, but with also the less benevolence and happiness. The question is in this solved. Power and goodness attain all the benevolence and happiness that the nature of the case admits. God must work by means, and he gets all the good that the nature of the means to be used can secure, and with as little evil.

We might, perhaps, object to this hypothesis, that, begin with as low excitability as there might be, it is the nature of mental capacity to grow with its own activity, and that, at some augmented stage of susceptible being, selfish gratification would be induced, and sin come in and run on in its indefinite aggravations; or we might suppose that, with a given degree of motive on one side, infinite wisdom and power might effectually counterbalance the conservative motives on the other, and then, though happiness should grow, yet selfishness would never come in, but the real happiness of the position is, as before; it will not stay in its own use. It glides away while we are attempting to take our observations from it; for we are forced, in looking, to see that the means must be estimated altogether by the helplessness that is to be attained. The happiness is in the nature of the sentient system; if we find the greatest amount to be in one order of gratification, the means must conform to it, and the highest intensity of benevolence will be in thus carrying the