of comparing with Plutarch in the discussion of such themes.1 I am not aware, indeed, that even Christian writers, who have attempted to defend the same truth within the same limits of natural religion, have been able to do anything better than to re-affirm the positions of this heathen philosopher, and perhaps amplify and illustrate somewhat his arguments.2 Before proceeding to the proposed abstract, it may be proper to say a word on the general plan and structure of the dialogue.

The subject is represented as discussed in a conversation between Plutarch and several of his relatives or intimate friends, as they happened to be walking, on a certain occasion, for exercise. The scene is laid at Delphi, the seat of the celebrated oracle, where Plutarch resided, to which locality repeated allusion is made in the course of the dialogue. The person whose remarks gave rise to the discussion, a certain Epicurus, one of the "minute philosophers" of the age, has just left the company, at the opening of the piece, as here reported, in a state of great excitement. We learn what it was that had thrown him into such a passion, from the tenor of the conversation which ensues on his departure. Unlike the other speakers, this Epicurus is no doubt a fictitious person, who bears that name as indicating the sect in philosophy whose views he represented. Plutarch sustains the principal part in the dialogue, and may be considered as defending not only his own opinions, but those of the New Platonic school in general, the class of philosophers with whom he agreed in most of his religious opinions. It is interesting to recollect, that Christianity found, in this

1 De Maistre assigns the superiority on the whole to Plutarch: "Je ne vois pas trop ce qu'on pourrait opposer a cet ouvrage, parmi ceux des anciens philosophes. On trouvera sans doute ca et la, et dans Platon surtout, des traits admirables, de superbes eclaires de verite; mais nulle parte, je crois, rien d'aussi suivi, d'aussi sagement raisonné, d'aussi fini dans l'ensamble." See the Preface to his Translation of the Treatise.

2 Wyttenbach has expressed the general opinion of critics on this point: "Sive argumentum spectes, nullum majus graviusque est; sive explicandi rationem, adeo subtiliter eleganterque disputavit Plutarchus, ut, summorum virorum judicio, proxime ad christianae doctrinae praestantiam accesserit."

form of Platonism (sometimes called Platonic Eclecticism), its point of nearest approximation, on the part of heathenism, and that in this school, as a sort of intermediate position, several of the earlier and more distinguished Christian Fathers received a training which prepared them, on hearing the Gospel, to embrace it the more readily. The other speakers in the dialogue are Patrocleas, Timon, and Olympicus. The first of these was a son-in-law of Plutarch, who is introduced elsewhere in his writings, as sustaining that relation to him. Timon is probably the brother of that name whom Plutarch mentions, in another of his treatises, as having shown to him proofs of an uncommon fraternal affection. Olympicus is otherwise unknown to us, unless he be the individual who appears as one of the colloquists in the author's Symposion. Plutarch himself engrosses so much of the conversation, while the other speakers have so little to say, that we might entitle the performance a monologue, with quite as much propriety as a dialogue. Its interest, however, does not depend on its form. Whether we view it under the one aspect or the other, whether we call it a discussion or a colloquy, we must still regard it as a calm, studied exposition of the highest views on one of the most difficult questions of natural theology which the mind of man seems capable of attaining without the light of revelation.

It may be proper to add, that in drawing off the following summary of this remarkable treatise, I have endeavored to guard carefully against introducing any foreign ideas. The reader may feel assured that not only have the principal topics and reflections been faithfully traced, but the more striking passages have been translated out of the Greek almost as closely as the difference of idiom in the two languages would allow.

1 It is within the knowledge of the writer that the reading of this very treatise of Plutarch, which we are about to examine, had a salutary effect on the mind of Professor Tholuck, at a time when he was inclined to scepticism, and was among the providential means of leading him to embrace the Gospel of Christ. A similar fact is related of the illustrious Neander, in a biographical sketch which appeared a few years ago in the Studien und Kritiken.

Epicurus is represented as going away abruptly, at the beginning of the dialogue, leaving the company in silent astonishment at the passion and absurdity with which he had inveighed against the justice of the Deity in the government of the world.1 Timon first breaks this silence, and suggests whether, although what they had heard was so weak in itself, they ought not to take occasion from it to discuss freely the topics which had been introduced, and thus preserve themselves from any injurious effect, which even vague representation and mere invective might have upon them, if left unanswered. Brasidas, a Spartan general, having been pierced with a spear in battle, drew it forth from his body. and hurled it back against the enemy, whom he slew with the same weapon. How much more important must it be to protect ourselves against attacks on our integrity and our principles, than against those which are aimed merely against our persons! They all assent to the correctness of this view; and Patrocleas, who seems to have been more perplexed than the others by the discourse of Epicurus, proceeds then to restate some of the principal ideas which had been advanced, strengthened by some objections of his own, to the commonlyreceived doctrine of a retributive Providence. He asserts, that the long-delayed punishment of the guilty argues an unbecoming indifference, on the part of the Deity, to the deserts of crime; that it fails to restrain the commission of it, as a more speedy retribution would do; that it is often entirely useless as a reparation to those who have suffered from injustice, since they are generally dead long before their wrongs are vindicated; and finally, that it emboldens the wicked in their course by leading them to think, that because they are spared for a time, they may therefore trample on the laws of God with permanent impunity.

1 The reader may be interested to know what terms Plutarch uses to designate the idea of a Supreme Power or Ruler. He employs different expressions for this purpose, but evidently as tantamount to each other in meaning. One of the most common of them is τὸ δαιμόνιον ; another is πρόνοια; another θεός, which occurs indifferently in the singular or plural. He speaks at times, also, of Jupiter, Apollo, Minerva, and other gods, but manifestly as subordinate to a higher destiny or power, and not as sharing a divided empire over the world.

Some of these points the speaker confirms by historical illustrations.

Olympicus here interposes, and adds to these objections still others. He urges especially, that such delay in the punishment of the wicked must have a tendency to destroy the belief of men in the reality of a Divine Providence itself; and, further, that where the act and its consequences follow each other at such a distance, no useful purpose can be ac complished, as far as respects the reformation of the offender himself. Punishment delayed for a long time after the commission of the crime, instead of being referred to its proper source, is liable to be regarded as a calamity or accident. The tardy retribution, standing in no obvious relation to its cause, may annoy and distress the guilty person, but must fail to lead him to profitable reflections on his conduct and the occasion of his suffering. Hence, he says, he could never think with any patience of the maxim so often quoted by the poets: The mill-stones of the gods grind late, but they grind fine.

The theme for discussion having been thus presented, Plutarch takes upon himself chiefly the office of replying to the objections which have been stated, whether such objections originate with those who deny the truth, or with those who are simply perplexed on the subject. He begins by reminding his friends of the caution and self-distrust with which it becomes them to pursue inquiries of so intricate a character. They should take their motto from the Academic philosophers, whose reverence for the Deity was proverbial; who viewed it as impious to discourse on such subjects with a confident tone. They should recollect the necessary imperfections of human knowledge, and not be so inconsistent as to demand a full explanation of every difficulty that may be started here by an unrestrained imagination. Let those who are ignorant of the science of music, who are destitute of the power of perceiving the harmony of sounds, talk at random, if they choose, about notes and symphonies; or, let those who have never seen a battle or handled a weapon in their lives, discourse of military tactics. But let not us, who are

mortal, finite, commit such folly as that of presuming to scrutinize the plans of the Deity, and to pronounce them wise or unwise, just or unjust, according to the narrow scale of our own limited knowledge and understanding. Those who have no knowledge of medicine must find it difficult often to discover why the physician performed an operation later, and not sooner; why he ordered the bath to-day, and not yesterday. The cure and purification of the soul is, of all arts, the greatest. Hence it is the dictate alike of modesty and reason that we should leave it to Him who understands best the remedy for moral disease, to determine when and in what manner and how much each one of the wicked should be punished. Even human governments frequently adopt measures that must appear, to those unacquainted with the grounds of them, as not only unreasonable, but altogether ridiculous and absurd. Thus the Ephori at Sparta signalize their entrance upon office by proclaiming that no one should wear moustaches; the Romans, when they emancipate a slave, strike him on the back with a light rod; and when they make a will, first go through the form of selling their property to a third person, instead of the intended heir. Much more, then, should we be prepared to meet with mysteries in the Divine government, which cannot make known, always, the reasons on which it proceeds; which is planned and carried on by a wisdom too deep for our finite comprehension. But this train of thought, the speaker says, that he would suggest, not as an excuse for declining the argument, or as discouraging a proper freedom of inquiry in such matters, but as intending merely to show with what spirit they should discuss them, and as disclosing a harbor in which they might take refuge, in case the difficulties should prove to be too great for them.

Our author enters, therefore, in the next place, on a direct vindication of Providence against the charge of remissness, in treating or seeming to treat the good and the bad so much alike in the present life. The reasoning assumes that this alleged inequality, in the experience and allotments of men, is true in part, and must be admitted; but, in part, is apparent