tral ideas, and, if we do not greatly mistake, shall show that the term "infidel philosophy" was not misapplied.

But one word, first, on the recent Letter of Professor Lewis written in reply to our review. The author implies in this letter, that we have mistaken him on many points. Unfortunately, the quotations he himself makes from his "Scriptural Cosmology," leave the reader's mind in a quandary as to the actual opinions held, the assertions looking one way and the quotations another. We will give the work another chance to express its views, as they stand, by farther citations. As to its obvious teachings, we believe we were right; and, if our readers would peruse the volume, we should have no occasion to add to our remarks. One point in his theory of nature we passed over without giving it a paragraph; we will try to do it justice beyond. Before taking up these subjects, we may mention an example or two of the mode of argument in the Letter.

In our review we observed that, in the scriptural cosmology of Moses, there was, on the sixth day, the creation of "cattle, creeping things, and beasts of the earth," as well as of man; while in the "Scriptural Cosmology" of Professor Lewis, only the creation of man is alluded to, when considering the same day. The author replies, that his object "was not to talk about mammalia," but to explain the use of the word day, - an explanation of his state of mind, but no good reason for departing so widely from Moses, in an exegetical work. Substitute for "mammalia" its signification "cattle, creeping thing, and beast of the earth," and the scope of the sentence will be appreciated, while it will have lost its point.

Again, he says, speaking of the creation of man: "The general expressions of formation, as also the word Adam, it is well known, have been interpreted (and by authority which Professor Dana eulogizes) of the creation of man generally, or of races, or of many individuals under one general classification, instead of one single pair, made to be one centre of life for all humanity." The sentence seems to imply that Professor Dana eulogized the authority spoken of,

on the particular point referred to; which is not, in any way or sense, true. This may be deemed an ingenious mode of reply; but is it ingenuous?

We pass on without further interruption of our course of argument.

The erroneous notions respecting science in both the warp and woof of the volume, were illustrated in our former Article. But that they may be distinctly in mind, we again refer to some of the author's statements. We thus read: "What is it, after all, that she [Science] has given us, but a knowledge of phenomena, of appearances? What are her boasted laws, but generalizations of such phenomena, ever resolving themselves into some one great fact that seems to be an original energy, whilst evermore the application of a stronger lens to our analytical telescope, resolves such seeming primal force into an appearance," etc. (p. 107). "Science may boast as she pleases; but, according to her own most vaunted law, she can only trace the footsteps of a present or once passing causation " (p. 220). "Science is ever showing not only its phenomenal character, but its utter deficiency, when we would make its conceptions identical with, instead of representative of, the fact or facts" (p. 120).

This language is sweeping; and if the author, as may be alleged, had reference only to effective causes, the least we can say is, that, in his ignorance of science, he was not aware that there were any stable laws. In his P P, P, P3 P4......P........ X, representing error succeeding to error as a necessary result of research, and in his denunciations of the "boasted laws," he evidently aims to shake down the whole fabric of science, deeming it the best way to get rid of its " infidelity."

But, regarding only effective causes, what is there under the terms Heat, Electricity, Crystallization, that is to fall to pieces or vanish away? What is the law, or cause, that is to turn out an "elephant?" The precise nature of Heat, Electricity, Attraction? Suppose a change on such a point, how much of these sciences, that is, of their recognized

laws, would be disturbed or unsettled by the catastrophe, or become an "appearance?"

When an error is discovered in any deduction, science does not name it an appearance, a phenomenon, but honestly proclaims it an error. The conceptions of "phlogiston and "vortices" were, from the first, false conceptions, and never represented appearances or phenomena. It is true that there were certain appearances, supposed to correspond to the notion of phlogiston; but even the appearances turned against the conception, and it dropped from the world as a blunder engendered through the "elephant" philosophy. The old "elephant" was a false conception, a product of the human mind laboring with itself; and so it was to the end. "Crystallization" is a term standing for the process by which such appearances as crystals are produced, or for the phenomena of the forming of crystals. But the threatened transformation of crystallization, at some future period, into an "appearance" or "phenomenon" is to us unintelligible.

These terms, "appearance," "phenomenon," "conception," in the author's lexicon, mean anything or nothing: appearance stands, in fact, for an actual or a false appearance, or anything the mind has conceived to have been, or to have represented, an appearance, senses which it can be admitted to have only in a system of philosophy profoundly sceptical.

Science, as we have said, admits that about its confines there is the doubtful, the imperfectly interpreted part of the volume of nature; and is ever looking for more light. But is it true that the human mind is so made, or so adapted to nature, that it can attain only to false theories or laws? or, as regards the profounder causes, that the progress of study is tending, not, as science claims, to an elimination of error and a clearing away of doubts, but, as Professor Lewis holds, to deeper and deeper errors, in endless succession? that the Systema Naturæ which Science believes she is bringing out to view is only a rickety structure, ever tumbling to pieces? that there is no foundation for full faith in the teachings of nature, or the deductions of the human mind

therefrom? If such be actually the end of man's contemplations of the works of his Maker, he would be forced, in just indignation, to write FALSE over the whole face of nature, and to replace the word GOD with that of DEMON. The enlightened mind, perceiving the fatality under which it exists, would naturally sink into hopeless scepticism, as its own powers would be impelling it irresistibly to error. God in nature could not be recognized, and the Bible could have defenders only among the superstitious and unreasoning.

Such is the philosophy we find penetrating through and through the "Scriptural Cosmology;" and this is a second way in which the influence of Professor Lewis's work is infidel.

In our review, we explained the general points in the system of nature which Professor Lewis has espoused. We alluded to the plastic power in nature, "given originally by God," her supposed "tendency to decay," and need of revivification from the presiding Deity; her reanimation, or endowment with new powers, at intervals, by "a sudden flashing in of the extraordinary or the supernatural" (p. 98); the introduction and development of generic germs, and the elimination of "species from species." Professor Lewis would have his readers now understand that all his development theory was an if in his work. "There is much virtue in an if," and some convenience. It appears here like the cautiousness of one afraid of the judgment that might be passed upon his orthodoxy. We have looked over his work again, and find the theory staring at us in many ways, being argued out warmly and with various apologies; and assuredly the author, like many a lawyer, has presented the wrong side well, if not its real advocate. It falls into his theory of nature so nicely, that it evidently seemed to him to be very naturally a part of it, and worthy of being true if not so; indeed, no matter what science says, or how startling the idea to theologians, he obviously deems it a very good idea, and very probably true. Not one reader in a thousand would gather any other opinion than this from the work.

In his Preface, page v., he says (with truth and apparently

a little uneasiness), "What will most startle some readers, perhaps, is the manner of connecting the Platonic ideas with the unseen entities mentioned by the Apostle;" and again, on the same page, "God makes types, and nature prints them." On pages 3 to 11 he lays out his plan, and, among his heads, enumerates this (p. 11): "The Physical Origin of Man, and what is meant by his being formed from the dust of the earth." On page 40, where he says, "the great generic beginning of animal life may have had many specific beginnings accompanying and following it," the development theory is plainly alluded to; and similar hints appear, at intervals, beyond. Then, in chapters 16, 17, 18, where animal creations are considered, he pronounces "a development theory of species from species" pious enough, and shows how it may be the working of predetermined laws, like that of the "Vestiges of Creation," only originating in the Deity. He closes his explanation of the theory as follows:

"It would be the same word repeating, yet expanding itself in every ascending species, just as it is the same specific word repeating itself in every individual birth which the laws of the maternal nature are ever bringing out from the seminal energy" (p. 214).

Then, after thus expounding what science has shown to be false, he continues as follows:

"What Science would say to this, we do not clearly know, nor are we much concerned about her decisions. An immense time, as well as an immense accumulation of data are required to give them any claim upon our confidence. Neither, on the other hand, if it be most in harmony with the language of the Bible, would we be concerned about the charge of naturalism. A development theory which has no divine Word, is indeed atheism. That which acknowledges only one divine origination, and this from the logical necessity of getting a starting-point for physical speculation, is as near to atheism as it can be. It hath said in its heart, There is no God; and the only thing which prevents it from being also the conclusion of the mere scientific intellect, is this logical impediment, which God has mercifully put in its way. But a development theory, in the sense of species from species, as well as of individual from individual, may be as pious as any other. It may have as many Divine interpositions as any other. It may be regarded as a method of God's working; and that, too, as rationally and as reverently as the more limited system to which we give the name of nature in its ordinary or more limited sense. Modern theologians have been too much frightened by certain assumptions and speculations on this field" (p. 214, 215).