NEO-SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

'That there are men of remarkable ability still cultivating Philosophy in England we are assured; they publish little, because there is no public. And why is there no public?-In one word, the gros bon sensthe plain practical reasoning of the English public pronounces Philosophy unworthy of study; and neglects it. Let steady progress in Positive Science be our glory; Metaphysical speculation let us leave to others.'

'I have been prompted by the one steady aim which gives this book its unity, viz.: That of showing by Argument, what History shows by factsthat to attempt to construct a science of Metaphysics is to attempt an impossibility.

TH

HESE passages occur in a well-known history of Philosophy by George H. Lewes. Scholastic Philosophy has no place in his history, being, in his opinion, unworthy of the name of Philosophy. Consequently what he says about the impossibility of Philosophy refers directly to all other systems, whether ancient or modern. Indirectly it refers to Scholastic Philosophy, inasmuch as he has not excepted from his sweeping condemnation Aristotle, whose system is the foundation of Scholasticism. We agree with him in finding modern Philosophy futile and unreal; we are convinced that the late Pope Leo XIII. made no false step when he recalled Catholic students to the principles of Aristotle and the Schoolmen; and we believe that on these principles alone is it possible to build a satisfactory system of Philosophy. And if it is unworthy of the gros bon sens of any people to devote themselves to an unreal Philosophy, we hold that, given a real Philosophy, a Philosophy which affords certitude and which will bear being pushed to its ultimate conclusions without ending either in Scepticism or Pantheism, there is no higher study

FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XVI.-SEPTEMBER 1904

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no study more elevating, more deserving of the attention of the student.

In the fifteenth century numerous Greeks, fleeing from Constantinople, found a refuge in Florence. There, under the patronage of the Medici, the study of the literature and philosophy of Greece began to flourish. Plethon, Bessarion and Marsilio Ficino interpreted and translated the great masterpieces of Greece, and soon an extravagant pursuit of Hellenic form and ideals engaged the scholars of the Italian cities. The works of Plato were diffused, and his philosophy began to have the vogue. The German humanists, notably Reuchlin, Erasmus and Melancthon, imitated the Florentines. The authority of Aristotle waned, and already the influences which culminated in the Reformation were beginning to be felt. The Reformation itself, and the progress made in positive science during the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, further contributed to prepare the way for the birth of modern Philosophy. The Metaphysics of the Schoolmen were set aside as mere chimeras, unworthy of the attention of the learned. Ontology, Logic, Psychology, were neglected and Philosophy tended to become mere Empiricism. Descartes, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, found contemporary Philosophy in a desperate tangle. The spirit of the age rejected the ancient doctrines and he set himself to excogitate a new method. Beginning with universal doubt he settled on the famous Cogito, ergo sum as a first principle, certain and evident, making consciousness the basis of all truth. We know how Spinoza developed the principles of Descartes, and how they led him to Pantheism. Hobbes and Locke went back again to the investigation of the foundations of knowledge, limiting all our ideas to sensations and paving the way for Idealism and Scepticism. According to Locke the existence of substance might be inferred from our experience. Berkeley denied that substance existed at all, and Hume went further by denying the existence of mind. Reid's appeal to common sense failed to settle the dispute, and it remained for Kant to try once

more to analyze the powers of the soul and to set Philosophy on a firm foundation.

The Kritik der reinen Vernunft was in its teaching a plea for subjectivism, and it led Fichte to subjective, and Schelling to objective Idealism. Finally Hegel's absolute Idealism followed as the crown of all previous absurdities. To Kant may be traced too the mixed Idealism of Herbart, Benecke, Fechner and Lotze, and the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. The Materialism of Vogt, Büchner, and Haeckel; the Posivitism of Comte; the Eclecticism of Cousin; Empiricism and Evolutionism, have since had their vogue. And it would seem as if, after all have been found insufficient, we are nearer, at the close of Spencer's life, to a return to the old principles of Scholastic Philosophy than at any time during the past three centuries. Reading a History of Philosophy by any writer of the modern schools of thought would lead one to think that the old Philosophy had occupied no place in men's minds all these years. The names of Melchior Canus, Soto, Velasquez, Medina, Suarez, Tournely, Billuart, Sattler and others sufficiently prove that it flourished in Europe during the past three centuries, and that men of keenest intelligence found it far more deserving of their study than any system which had its day in that time. The effects of German and English Philosophy were perceptible in Italy too. Galuppi, Groberti, Rosmini, Mamiani, were all influenced by modern thought and led to many of its erroneous conclusions. Contemporary with them, Liberatore, Signorelli, Taparelli, and many others held fast by the Scholastic doctrines, and by their writings opened the way for the great revival which Leo XIII. was to initiate.

We have already noticed that the late Pope directed Catholic schools to abide by the principles of the Scholastics. In the Encyclical Aeterni Patris' we have his authoritative pronouncement. He believed that only by following in the footsteps of Aristotle and Thomas of Aquin could the perplexities and inconsistencies which attend modern speculation be evaded, that their principles

were the sanest and surest, and their method the safest and most satisfactory. Yet, let it be observed, he did not advocate nor intend that we should neglect altogether the works of modern thinkers. To suppose that St. Thomas has said the last word on the problems of Criteriology, Ontology, and Psychology is a manifest absurdity. Bacon and Kant and Mill and Spencer have not been merely beating the air; and the wonderful development of positive science in recent years has shed new light on many points discussed by the schoolmen. I know that there are men narrow enough in their views to look with disfavour on anything coming from those who disagree with their principles, men who will slavishly follow the cosmology of Aquinas, who imagine that Psychology can be taught without reference to the researches of the biologists and naturalists of our day. Such a method of teaching is not in accordance with the intentions of Leo XIII.; it is not worthy of a philosopher. I have heard a professor of this type go so far as to insist that an exact knowledge of positive science was not at all necessary for the student of Metaphysics, and with all his zeal for the doctrines of Aristotle and St. Thomas I could not help thinking that such a statement was completely at variance with their notions of Philosophy. Whatever could be known in the domains of positive science in their day they knew it; and their readiness to embrace such knowledge and their adherence to the realities of things, are at the root of their Philosophy. Only a Philosophy founded upon and safeguarded by experience, can be coherent and stable, and the superiority of Scholastic Philosophy is due to the fact that it was based on reality and that its ultimate criterion of truth was that objective evidence which necessitates assent.

Descartes imagined that he could doubt of the truth of such evident propositions as, Two and two make four, and not even trusting to the veracity of the senses regarding their proper objects, he passed, illogically enough, from universal, methodic doubt to his Cogito, ergo sum as to an undeniable certainty. Later on he was driven to the hypothesis of innate ideas to save himself from the logical

consequences of his principles, and ultimately his system ended in Scepticism. Kant denied that we can have certitude regarding the objects of the exterior world, and invented his a priori synthetic judgments to give his system a foundation. As a result we find him compelled to demand the existence of God and the immortality of the soul as postulates in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Incoherent and unstable, the modern systems continually change with time. They do not work out in practice, and time brings their strongest refutation.

In such a maze of speculations, among so many contradictions of theories and of facts, and so many theses repugnant to that gros bon sens which is certainly a reliable criterion in most cases, George Lewes wrote his verdict that Philosophy was a failure. That this is true of modern Philosophy we admit. Only the Philosophy of the scholastics, which he judged to be beneath his consideration, is coherent throughout; it alone can stand the test of time and find in the discoveries of modern scientific research a vindication of its principles. This is its most eloquent commendation, its amplest justification. If the laws of science, not mere temporary hypotheses, but verified and universally recognised truths-were contradictory to its principles and their logical conclusions, we could not reasonably assert its superiority. But that no such contradiction exists, that the progress of the experimental sciences is nowise detrimental to the philosophical principles of St. Thomas, is a clear proof that Scholastic Philosophy is superior to the modern systems invented to replace it. Those who approach the writings of St. Thomas with prejudiced minds and those who have never seriously studied his works at all, can discount their value; but anyone who has the love of truth at heart, and who takes the trouble to follow this master, cannot fail to appreciate his broad views and his cogent reasoning, and to recognise how admirably his principles adapt themselves to the results of scientific investigation at the present day. So far as I am aware this is best seen in the works of Mercier and his colleagues in Louvain. Take, as an instance, the pages