vellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this "kind:" And again, in the place above cited, "Should a miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men in all ages have been fo much imposed on by ridiculous ftories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be fuffici"ent, with all men of fenfe, not only to "make them reject the fact, but even re

ject it without farther examination +." As this is one of the most fpecious and prevailing arguments against the miracles of religion, it will deferve a distinct anfwer.

To the first confequence, then, which the author here draws from the credulity of men, I readily agree That miracles and facts of an extraordinary nature may be justly fufpected, 'till fufficient evidence of their reality is produced, and ought never to be received, 'till after a previous examination had into this evidence. But, that all miracles fhould be rejected without examination, because a great number have been forged, is, fure, a moft illogical conclufion.

The

*P. 186.

† P. 200.

The truth of the Gospel miracles does not imply that all the miracles upon record are true: how then does the falfehood of other miracles affect the truth of thefe? If fome men are cheats and impoftors, is there no truth in the world? If fome have believed upon too flight evidence, muft we, therefore, reject all teftimony, and disbelieve or doubt about every thing? Is the currency of bad coin a proof that there is none good? The teft and affay will always diftinguish the true from the falfe and it is our own fault, if we are impofed upon by counterfeits. God hath given us reafon and understanding to know good and evil, truth and falsehood, and in all things pertaining to life or duty, hath made the difference between them fufficiently clear and difcernible. If he speaks to us by miracles, he will, doubtlefs, caufe his voice to be known, and give full evidence of his authority. To thofe, who are not prefent witneffes of his power, this evidence will be transmitted with fuch teftimony as cannot be impeached-fuch as will ftand every fair and equitable trial. With fuch teftimony, we affert, the Scripture miracles are delivered down to us. Let them be brought to the trial, and, if they are found want

ing, be rejected; but not be condemned, as this fupercilious writer would have them, unheard.

I obferve, that this author, in common with many others, feems to think every proof of the credulity of mankind a fort of argument against the evidence of the Gofpel: they think this fufficient to account for the belief of all miracles, and that it is, therefore, needlefs and folly to look for any evidence in their favour: "When fuch "reports fly about, the folution of the

phænomenon is obvious; and we judge "in conformity to experience and observa

tion, when we account for it by the "known principles of credulity and delu"fion. And fhall we, rather than have "recourfe to fo natural a folution, allow "of a miraculous violation of the most "known and most established laws of na"ture?" But I must deny that there is any fuch cause or principle in human nature as credulity. If fome are more credulous than others - if the fame perfon be more credulous in some points than others this depends upon other principles: it

is

* P. 197.

is a natural effect, and always to be accounted for from natural caufes. Intereft, when it is oppofed by truth, will bias the mind to error: ignorance and indolence will difpofe men, the one of neceffity, the other of choice, to follow the judgment of others, and to believe as the world about them does a deference to authority, whether publick or private -a prejudice to opinions in which we have been educated, or which we have long entertained has the

like effect where men are, as is frequent, divided into parties by opinion, this prejudice will be heightened by pride and refentment; they will hearken greedily to every thing that favours their fyftem, and be obftinately deaf to every thing that oppofes it. These are principles in human nature of great force and extent; and, where they induce to the belief of any thing, there we may fufpect credulity, and that men will be prepared to believe, without evidence, even things the most difficult of belief. If, in these circumstances, it happens, that not the fact itself, but the miraculous nature of it only, is the point that gratifies our wishes, there, the greater the miracle is, the greater are thefe corrupt reasons for believing it, and, the more ftrange and

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incredible it is, the more eafily fometimes will it obtain belief: as a stone, the heavier it is, and the more unapt to motion, will defcend the swifter, if the plane be fufficiently inclined, upon which it moves.

But, on the other hand, where these or fuch-like principles have no influence, truth will be fairly heard, and the faith of men will be generally proportioned to the evidence that appears and, where men believe and maintain opinions contrary to the influence of these principles, it is a fair prefumption that their faith is well grounded, and that their affent is extorted by the force of truth. The principles, therefore, of credulity will by no means account for all belief alike. Tho' a ftone will defcend by it's own weight, it does not follow that it can move itself upon even ground; and, if it be feen, contrary to it's natural gravity, to afcend a fteep acclivity, we are fure that there must be fome competent power to impell it. Where miracles are wifhed for or wanted, the ftrangest and most unfupported may be believed: but, in other circumftances, the miraculous nature of the fact will hang as a weight upon it, and retard it's progrefs; and, if it make it's way,

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