ROMANS ii. 14, 15.

Thefe, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conScience alfo bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accufing, or elfe excufing one another.

T

HE Apoftle here affirms of the Gentiles, that, though they were ftrangers to the written or revealed will of God, they had yet a law to conduct themselves by, a law written in their hearts; their confcience with the right of a legislator dictating their duty, and their reason as a judge acquitting or condemning them.

It is a general truth implied in this, that all intelligent beings are a law to themselves; that reafon implies duty and obligation; and that whoever by this light

can discern betwixt good and evil, must at the fame time fee that he is bound to purfue the one, and avoid the other. A careful attention to this great truth will clear up much of the difficulty that has been found in fettling the firft principles and foundation of morality, and in particular will, I think, lead us to the juftest notions of the nature and obligation of virtue; a fubject which, though much controverted, feems ftill to lie open for inquiry.

It is granted, that in life and conduct, in judging of manners and characters, men are generally agreed, and have nearly the fame fentiments: and 'tis therefore lefs to be lamented, though the more to be wondered, that in the theory and fpeculation they fo widely differ. Much of this difference, it is natural to think, may lie in the use of words, to which men affign different ideas, when in the things themfelves they are agreed. It would, however, be easy to point out many dangerous confequences, that may arise from the principles fometimes laid down by writers on this fubject, if their fyftems were adopted in practice; and will therefore be matter, not of curiofity only, but of great use, if we

can

can learn to form just conceptions, and to express ourselves clearly and distinctly, on a fubject confeffedly of the greatest importance, and indeed fundamental to all religion, natural and revealed.

The mind of man is formed for contemplation and action: reason is his guide in both. In contemplating the beauty, order, and proportion of outward objects, we are obliged to use the inftrumentality of our fenfes and therefore, whether thefe are characters in the object of a fixed and pofitive kind, or depend in part on the senses, and are therefore fo far arbitrary and factitious, we cannot perhaps determine. It may be poffible, that what is now beauty to the eye, or harmony to the ear, might by a different formation of the organ have been made to appear deformity and difcord.

But there is another field of contemplation, that is purely intellectual. Truth and virtue, which we difcover by comparing the abstracted ideas of the mind, and contemplating the actions and characters of men, these are the province and peculiar of reafon; which lie open in fome degree to the loweft of rational beings, but are

far

i

A

far above the level of instinct, fenfe, or paffion. Of these we may fafely affert, that they are as fixed and unchangeable as reafon itself. While reafon continues what it is, truth and virtue will appear to it the fame. The constancy and immutability of the former is plainly acknowledged and proved in the whole intercourse of men with each other: why elfe do we demand the affent of men to the most evident and demonftrated truths, if we were not certain that truth múst appear the fame, as far as it is understood, to all intelligent beings? Objects themselves may be changed or destroyed: but our reasonings concerning them will be equally true, whether they have any real, or only a possible exiftence. The faculty of perceiving truth may be destroyed, or reafon may be taken from us but, while this remains, truth will appear always the fame. We may without arrogance affirm, that it is not in the power of the fupreme Being to alter it's nature: it is immutable and necessary, the fame yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

In like manner, in contemplating actions and characters, right and wrong appear to the mind as certainly and as neceffarily dif

tinct

tinct from each other, as fixed and invariable in their nature. We are as certain that they must appear the fame to all beings that have reafon and understanding to receive the ideas, that they are the same in all climates, in all ages, in all worlds. As every true propofition is univerfally true, fo every right action, the fame circumstances fuppofed, is univerfally right. It is not in the power of omnipotence itself to alter or invert it's nature, to tranfmute the character of right into wrong, or to make treachery, falfehood, and ingratitude appear in the same light with honesty, fidelity, and gratitude.

If it be asked, what it is that conftitutes right, by what rule or ftandard it is to be measured and tried; the fame may be eequally queftioned concerning truth. And, in answer to both, we may as well afk, by what criterion does the eye distinguish colours? The object is prefented, and it's properties and qualities appear with it: the ideas of colour, fhape, and proportion, that belong to it, neceffarily arise in the mind. Actions are as plainly an object to the understanding; and, when furveyed or contemplated, their characters appear with

them.