lefs it be, that thefe events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and "there is required a violation of these laws,

or, in other words, a miracle, to prevent "them? Nothing is efteemed a miracle, "if it ever happens in the common courfe "of nature. "Tis no miracle, that a man **in feeming good health should die of a fudden; because fuch a kind of death, tho' more unusual than any other, has yet "been frequently obferved to happen: but "'tis a miracle, that a dead man fhould "come to life; because that hath never been "observed in any age or country. There

+

muft, therefore, be an uniform experi

ence against every miraculous event, o"therwise the event would not merit the appellation. And, as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is "here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence " of any miracle: nor can fuch a proof

"be destroyed, or the miracle render'd credible, but by an oppofite proof that is fuperior *"

I have endeavoured to preserve the ftrength of this argument entire, by collecting

1

lecting every thing that is of any import to it in the obfervations that precede it: and, that the reader may fee it in its ftrongeft light, I fhall here repeat it, as it is again fummed up by the author at the end of his Effay:

"It appears, that no testimony for any "kind of miracle can ever amount to a "probability, much lefs to a proof; and

that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, 'twould be oppofed by another proof, derived from the very nature of the "fact which it would endeavour to estab"lish. "Tis experience alone which gives

authority to human teftimony; and 'tis "the fame experience which affures us of "the laws of nature. When, therefore, "these two kinds of experience are contra

ry, we have nothing to do but fubtract "the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on the one fide or the other, with that affurance which arifes from "the remainder. But, according to the principle here explained, this fubtraction, "with regard to all popular religions, a

mounts to an entire annihilation: and "therefore we may establish it as a maxim, "that no human teftimony can have fuch

"force

દ

"force as to prove a miracle, and make it a juft foundation for any fuch fyftem of હૈદ religion *."

This is the author's great discovery. The whole fecret is out.

And here one cannot

but wonder to see a position, which is laid down by all that write in defence of miracles, pleaded as a decifive argument against them, and to find the experience of all mankind brought in evidence against all the religions of the world. An experienced uniformity in the courfe of nature hath been always thought neceffary to the belief and ufe of miracles. These are indeed relative ideas. There must be an ordinary regular course of nature, before there can be any thing extraordinary. A river must flow, before it's ftream can be interrupted. It is strange, therefore, that this uniformity, which is implied in the nature of a miracle, fhould at the fame time be inconsistent with it. This is to suppose, that the existence of a miracle is a contradiction in terms; and as fuch indeed the author feems to treat it : "A miracle fupported by any human testi"mony is more properly a fubject of derifi

• P. 198.

46 on

"on than of argument *:'

And again,

"What have we to oppose to such a cloud of "witnesses, but the abfolute impoffibility or "miraculous nature of events?" A modeft reader can scarce look fuch affurance as this in the face: he will be apt to mistrust his own apprehenfion, and think there is more in these big words than he readily fees. The first reading gave me fufpicions, of this kind; but, having recovered myself, and taken courage to review it, I fear not to affert, that all the experience the author can bring will amount to neither proof nor ar gument against the belief of miracles. Let him, if he pleases, plead his own experience that he has never feen or been witness to

any

miracle that he has always found the courfe of nature to be the fame and unchanged: but does this experience teach him, that the laws of nature are neceffary and immutable that there is no power in being fufficient to suspend or alter them or that there can be no reafons to induce fuch a power to act? "Till one or other of these can be proved from experience, it is no evidence in the present case, and instead of deciding the matter in queftion, is wholly impertinent and foreign to it.

Can the

fouthern

fouthern climates experience that there is no frost in the north? Or, can Mr. Hume experience that I have never seen fire kindled by a touch from ice? This negative evidence, tho' multiplied infinitely, would ftill be negative: and the fact laft mentioned might be true, and capable of very easy proof from teftimony, as I fhall presently fhew, though all the world fhould agree that they had never feen the like.

The uniformity of nature is no way impeached or brought in question by the fuppofition of miracles. The concurring teftimony of mankind to the course of nature is not contradicted by those who have experienced. contrary appearances in a few inftances. The idea of a miracle unites and reconciles thefe feeming differences. By fuppofing the facts in question to be miraculous, the uniformity of nature is preferved, and the facts are accounted for upon another principle entirely confiftent with it. Thus, experience teaches us that lead and iron are heavier than water: but a man, by projecting these heavy bodies, may make them. fwim in water, or fly in air. Should the fame be done by any invifible power, would be a miracle. But the uniformity of C

it

nature