it credible upon the slightest testimony, or even probable without any. The ferent light. He fuppofes, that we have the evidence of fenfe for the natural credibility of facts, and feems to infer, that, when we argue from hence, we go upon fører ground than when we argue from teftimony, which he represents as ever dark and doubtful, and amounting only to a reasonable prefumption, at beft: the contrary to which, in almost every particular, is, I think, the truth. As the principles laid down by this author are very general, and may be eafily mifapplied, beyond his intention, in the prefent queftion, it will not be improper to compare them with what has been faid. "The queftion concerning thefe miraculous powers depends," fays he, upon the joint credibility of the facts pretended to have been produced, and of the witnesses who atteft them: if either part be infirm, their "credit muft fink in proportion, and, if the facts efpecial"ly be incredible, muft of course fall to the ground, be"caufe no force of teftimony can alter the nature of things, "The credibility of facts lies open to the trial of our reason and fenfes but the credibility of witneffes depends on a "variety of principles wholly concealed from us; and, "tho' in many cases it may reasonably be prefumed, yet in 68 none can it certainly be known for it is common with men, out of crafty and selfish views, to diffemble and de"ceive: but plain facts cannot delude us cannot speak "any other language, or give any other information, than that of truth. The teftimony, therefore, of facts, as it "is offered to our fenfes, carries with it the surest inftruċ"tion in all cafes, which God, in the ordinary course of "his providence has thought fit to appoint for the guidance : "of The refult then is—that whatever is pof fible, or in the lowest degree credible, is cacapable "of human life." In answer to which, I fhall not deny that the credibility of facts may in many cases be tried by our fenfes; but this is generally learnt from experience, or the common teftimony of mankind: and, 2dly, this credibility, however learnt or proved, is no direct evidence of the reality or exiftence of any doubtful fact; fince the fact may be highly credible, and yet never exist may be in a great degree incredible, and yet certainly true.. What the author calls the teftimony of facts offered to our fenfes, is in this cafe only the teftimony of our fenfes, or that of other men, to the exiftence, not of the fact in question, but of other facts that are supposed analogous or fimilar to it; which, tho' in many cafes it may amount to a very high prefumption, yet is in none a direct proof of any doubtful fact: whereas, 3dly, teftimony is a direct evidence to the existence or reality, not of fimilar facts, but of the fact itself and therefore, in judging of pal or distant facts, where we cannot have the evidence of our fenfes, the teftimony of those who have this evidence is, not only the fureft, but the only method of inftruction which Providence has appointed for our guidance thro' life. All that we certainly know of fuch facts is derived from this fource. The truth of teftimony is always prefumed, where there are no particular reasons to suspect it. This prefumption alone will give more weight, as we have seen, to a single teftimony, and make it better evidence for the truth of facts, than a very high degree of prefumption drawn from analogy is against it. 4thly, This prefumption may be increased to any degree by the concurrence of other teftimony; which • Preface, p. 9. con pable of a proof from teftimony-that the ftrongest prefumption from experience is of little force against positive evidence—and that, where a caufe is affigned equal to any effect, the event is rendered credible upon common teftimony, and fometimes proba ble without any. But there are, it is granted, many cafes, which we may, from nature and experience, pronounce to be impoffible. It is impoffible that a fact or propofition fhould be true, when the cause affigned is unequal to the effect. Now, the proportion of causes to effects, the natural powers of agents, and the force of moral caufes on the mind, we know to a good degree, from experience. If we cannot precisely determine the force of natural concurrence too is itself a distinct proof of the fact attested. Lastly, the veracity of every fingle witnefs may be proved by plain and indifputable facts, as will be feen more fully hereafter. If then improbable or incredible facts require fronger evidence to fupport them, the weight of teftimony may be increased, and the proofs that fupport it multiplied, infinitely; and, confequently, whatever is not abfolutely impoffible may be thus proved. The force of teftimony cannot indeed alter the nature of things: but it can make things improbable become probable—it can give credibility, and even certainty, to things that were before incredible. natural agents, we can, in most cafes, affign limits which they cannot pass. For instance: We cannot precisely mark out the bounds of human power; but we can, in all cafes, fay to what it does not extend. If the ftrength of men, at a medium, be equal to one, that of king Auguftus* or Hercules may be equal to two; but it cannot be equal to two hundred. A phyfician may reftore a dying man to health; but he cannot restore a dead man to life. Of all fuch events, as raising the dead, calming the winds or feas, curing difeafes with a word, we may fairly pronounce, that they are impoffible to human strength, and therefore, when imputed to it, are incredible; because a force equal to two cannot produce an effect equal to two hundred. In this cafe experience decides with fufficient authority against the fact. And this, I fuppofe, the author mistook for an argument against miracles. But who ever attributed these facts to human power? Thofe who record, and thofe who believe, miracles, univerfally afcribe them to a power fuperior to man. They agree, that they far exceed all human strength, Late King of Paland. ftrength, and therefore are an argument of the concurrence and agency of fome fuperior power. Against the interpofition of fuch fuperior power, experience, as we have, feen, can determine nothing. If common experience does not atteft or acknowledge fuch interpofitions, the answer is givencommon occafions do not call for them. The common wants of nature are provided for by the common courfe of nature. Extraordinary occafions only can call for extraordinary interpofitions. Of thefe occafions we are not the proper judges: but, that fuch may arife in the government of free agents, feems obvious even to us. many If men, by a bad ufe of their liberty, fhould fink themselves into a moral incapacity of answering the ends of their creation if they should lofe fight of God and religion and all the great motives to holiness and virtue, and this evil fhould become general and past all natural hopes of recovery-it is very fuppofeable that God may interpofe, by a special act of his Providence, in restoring them to a capacity of ferving him, and of attaining that happiness for which they were created. If virtue, and that |