long ago preached. And again, as what a wicked man doeth. is a sin, because not proceeding from faith, so it is a sin also in that it is not directed to a right end. For a bad intention always makes even a good action bad, though a good intention can never make a bad action good. Now, that all wicked men have wicked ends in all their actions is manifest, in that they are wicked men, men without the true knowledge of God, and men without sincere love unto God. Now, all such as do not truly know God, can never sincerely aim at the glory of God in what they do. For what I do not know I cannot love; what I do not love I cannot desire; what I do not desire I can never intend. And therefore if I do not know God, I can never intend his glory in my actions. And if I do not intend his glory in my actions, I sin upon that very account, because I do not intend his glory. For I then transgress the command quædam inflatio et tumor inanis. Bernard. Serm. 4. de Ascens. Gaudeo quòd de fide vera sine ullo perfidiæ vitio custodienda sollicitudinem geris, sine qua nulla prodesse imò nec esse conversio. Apostolica quippe dicit autoritas, quia sine fide impossibile est placere Deo.' Fides namque est bonorum omnium fundamentum. - Fulgent. al. Aug. Prol. de Fide ad Petrum Diaconum. Extra ecclesiam catholicam nihil est integrum, nihil castum, dicente apostolo, ' Omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est.'-Leo. Serm. 2. de Jejun. Pentecostes. Non ergo irrationabiliter à quibusdam astruitur, quòd omnes actiones et voluntates hominis siue fide malæ sunt, quæ fide habitâ bonæ existunt. Unde apostolus ait, Omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est;' quod exponens, Augustinus ait, Omnis vita infidelium peccatum est, et nihil bonum est sine summo bono. Ubi deest agnitio æternæ veritatis, falsa virtus est etiam in optimis moribus: et Jacobus in sua epistola canonica ait, 'Qui offendit in uno,' scilicet in caritate,' factus est omnium reus.' Qui ergo fidem et caritatem non habet, omnis ejus actio peccatum est, quòd ad caritatem non refertur.-Lomb. lib. ii. Sent. Dist. 41.

Noveris itaque quod non officiis, sed finibus, à vitiis discernendas esse virtutes. Officium est autem quod faciendum est, finis verò propter quod faciendum est. Cùm itaque facit homo aliquid ubi peccare non videtur, si non propter hoc facit, propter quod facere debet, peccare convincitur.Aug. contra Julian. Pelag. lib. iv. cap. 3. Sunt opera quæ videntur bona sine fide Christi; et non sunt bona quia non referuntur ad eum finem ex quo sunt bona.—Id. in Joh. Tract. 25. Veræ quippe virtutes Deo serviunt in hominibus, à quo donantur hominibus; Deo serviunt in angelis à quo donantur et angelis. Quicquid autem boni fit ab homine, et non propter hoc fit, propter quod fieri debere vera sapientia percipit, etsi officio videatur bonum, io non recto fine peccatum est.-Id. contra Jul. Pelag. lib. iv. cap. 3.

wherein he enjoins me, that " whether I eat or drink, or whatsoever I do, I should do all to his glory," 1 Cor. x. 30.

But I needed not to have gone so far to have proved, that a wicked man cannot do a good work. For there is nothing good without the chiefest good; neither can any one please God but by the assistance of God himself. For I cannot see how God can be pleased with any thing but himself, considering how he was infinitely pleased with himself, before there was any thing else for him to be pleased with but himself, and therefore cannot be more pleased now there are other things made by himself; and by consequence whatsoever thing he is pleased with, it is not the thing itself, but himself in the thing, that is pleasing to him. And the more of himself is in any thing, the more is himself pleased with it: and so the less of himself is in any thing, the less is that thing pleasing to himself. Now it is plain a wicked man is " without God in the world," Eph. ii. 12. and by consequence God not within him. For if he was in God and God in him, it would be impossible he should be a wicked man. And seeing there is nothing of God implanted in him, there can be nothing pleasing unto God performed by him. And whatsoever is not pleasing unto God, cannot be good, it being impossible for him not to be pleased with what is truly good, seeing himself is the chiefest good. And therefore every thing that is good must needs proceed from himself, whom he cannot but be infinitely pleased withal. And therefore we cannot but in reason also acknowledge, that a man before he hath received grace from God can do nothing pleasing to him, yea, nothing but displeasing to him, nothing but sin.

3. Confirmation from the FATHERS.And this was the doctrine delivered by the primitive church. Basil propounds the question', whether it be possible, and a thing pleasing

* Omnis infidelium vita peccatum est, et nihil est bonum sine summo bono.-Aug. de Vera Innocent. cap. 106. where he seemeth to make this an argument too of the sinfulness of an infidel's actions. Therefore is ' omnis infidelium vita peccatum,' because' nihil bonum sine summo bono.'

1 Ει δυνατόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐυάρεστον, ἤ ἐυπρόσδεκτον Θεῷ, τὸν ἁμαρτίᾳ δουλεύοντα ποιεῖν δικαίωμα κατὰ τὸν τῆς θεοσέβείας τῶν ἁγίων κάνονα. -Basil. de Baptismo, lib. ii. quæst. 7.

and acceptable unto God, for one that is the servant of sin to perform righteousness, according to the rule of the saints' piety; and he determines it from several places of Scripture, that it is not, concluding thus", It is clear that it is altogether impossible and displeasing unto God, and dangerous to him that dares to do it. Wherefore I exhort, as the Lord teacheth, "Let us first make the tree good, and then the fruit will be good ;" and let us "first make clean the inside of the cup or platter," and then the outside will be wholly clean. And being taught by the apostle, "Let us purify ourselves from all pollutions both of flesh and spirit, and then we shall perfect holiness in the love of Christ, that we may be well-pleasing to God and acceptable to the Lord unto the kingdom of heaven."" Clearly showing that until we first be good we can never do good.

This was the doctrine that Augustine" defended: 'Be it far from us,' saith he, to think that true virtue should be in any one, unless he be a righteous man. And let it be as far from us to think that any one is truly just, unless he live by faith; "for the just shall live by faith." And who of those who would be accounted Christians, unless it be the Pelagians, and amongst them perhaps thyself, Julian, only, will say that an infidel is just, will say that a wicked man is just, will say that a man enslaved to the devil is just? Yea, though he were Fabricius, though he were Fabius, though he were Scipio, though he were Regulus, with whose names thou thinkest to terrify me, as if we were talking in the old Roman court.' And elsewhere he tells us : All the

και Τὸ παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἀπαρέσκον Θεῷ, καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον τῷ τολμοῦντι δεδήλωται διόπερ παρακαλῶ, ὡς διδάσκει ὁ Κύριος, ποιήσωμεν τὸ δενδρὸν καλὸν, καὶ τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῦ καλὸν, καὶ καθαρίσωμεν πρῶτον ἐντὸς τοῦ ποτηρίου καὶ τῆς παροψίδος, καὶ τότε τὸ ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ ἔσται καθαρὸν ὅλον· καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀποστόλου παιδευθέντος, καθαρίσωμεν ἑαυτοῦς ἀπὸ παντὸς μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος, καὶ τότε ἐπιτελῶμεν ἁγιωσύνην ἐν ἀγάπῃ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα ἐυάρεστοι Θεῶ, καὶ ἐυπρόσδεκτοι τῷ Κυρίω, γινώμεθα εἰς Thv Bacıkelav Tãv oigarav. — Basil. de Baptismo, lib. ii. q. 7.

n Sed absit ut sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit justus: absit autem ut sit justus verè nisi vivat ex fide, 'justus enim ex fide vivit.' Quis porro eorum qui se Christianos haberi volunt, nisi soli Pelagiani, aut in ipsis etiam fortè tu solus, justum dixerit infidelem; justum dixerit impium; justum dixerit diabolo mancipatum? Sit licèt ille Fabricius; sit licèt Fabius; sit licèt Scipio; sit licèt Regulus; quorum me nominibus, tanquam in antiquâ

life of unbelievers is sin, and there is nothing good without the chiefest good: for where the knowledge of the eternal and unchangeable truth is wanting, there is but false virtue even in the best manners".' And again", The man is first to be changed, that his works may be changed; for if a man remain in that estate that he is evil, he cannot have good works.'

Hence is that of Jerome, 'Let us pronounce our sentence against those that do not believe in Christ, and yet think themselves valiant, and wise, and temperate, and just, that they may know that there is none can live without Christ, without whom all virtue lies in vice.' And therefore, saith Bernard', 'What have you philosophers to do with virtues, who are ignorant of Christ, the virtue of God?' And Gregory, If faith be not first begotten in our hearts, all the other things cannot be good, though they may seem good.'

And so Prosper', 'Though there have been some, who by their natural understanding have endeavoured to resist vices, yet they have barrenly adorned only the life of this time; but they could not attain to true virtues, and ever

Romanâ curiâ loqueremur, putâsti esse terrendum.- Aug. contra Julian. Pelag. lib. iv. c. 3.

• Omnis infidelium vita peccatum est, et nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio æternæ et incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est etiam in optimis moribus. — Id. de Verá Innoc. c. 106.

P Priùs est mutandus homo ut opera mutentur. Si enim manet homo in eo quod malus est, boua opera habere non potest.— Id. de Verbis Dom. Serm. 12.

Sententiam proferamus adversus eos qui in Christum non credentes, fortes, et sapientes, et temperantes, se putant esse, et justos; ut sciant nullum absque Christo vivere, sine quo omnis virtus in vitio est. Hieron. in Gal. c. 3.

Quid vobis philosophis cum virtutibus, qui Dei virtutem Christum ignoratis? Bernard. Serm. in Cant. 22.

• Si fides non prima in corde nostro gignitur, reliqua quæque bona esse non possunt, etiamsi bona videantur. Gregor. Moral. lib. ii. c. 25.

Etsi fuit, qui naturali intellectu conatus sit vitiis reluctari, hujus tantùm temporis vitam steriliter ornavit; ad veras autem virtutes æternamque beatitudinem non profecit. Sine cultu enim veri Dei, etiam quod virtus videtur esse peccatum est; nec placere ullus Deo sine Deo potest. Prosper. de Vocat. Gent. lib. i. c. 7.

lasting happiness. For without the worship of the true God, even that which seems to be virtue is sin; neither can any one please God without God himself." And elsewhere", 'And so it manifestly appears, that in the minds of wicked men there dwelleth no virtue, but that all their works are unclean and defiled, they having not spiritual but fleshly wisdom, not heavenly but earthly, not Christian but devilish, not from the Father of lights, but from the prince of darkness.' And therefore we may well conclude, that all the works of such as have not received grace from God to be converted to him, are not pleasing unto God, but have the nature of sin.

ARTICLE XIV.

Of Works of Supererogation.

VOLUNTARY WORKS, BESIDES OVER AND ABOVE GOD'S COMMANDMENTS, WHICH THEY CALL WORKS OF SUPEREROGATION, CANNOT BE TAUGHT WITHOUT ARROGANCY AND IMPIETY. FOR BY THEM MEN DO DECLARE, THAT THEY DO NOT ONLY RENDER UNTO GOD AS MUCH AS THEY ARE BOUND TO DO, BUT THAT THEY DO MORE FOR HIS SAKE THAN OF BOUNDEN DUTY IS REQUIRED. WHEREAS CHRIST SAITH PLAINLY, WHEN YE HAVE DONE ALL THAT ARE COMMANDED TO YOU, SAY, WE ARE UNPROFITABLE SERVANTS.

ALTHOUGH (as we have seen in the Eleventh Article) the Scripture, reason, and fathers determine, that we cannot merit any things of ourselves from God, but that we are justified by Christ's merit imputed to us, not by any works performed by ourselves; yet there are a sort of people in the world that would persuade us, that we may not only merit

Et ita manifestissimè patet, in impiorum animis nullam habitare virtutem, sed omnia opera eorum immunda esse atque polluta, habentium sapientiam non spiritualem sed animalem, non cœlestem sed terrenam, non Christianam sed diabolicam, non à Patre luminum, sed à principe teneProsper. contra Collat. c. 13.

brarum.