difficulty.(6.) PUNISHMENT and PARDON have in them manifest equity, even that Punishment which contains blinding and hardening; since God is not wont to inflict it except for the deep demerit and the almost [deploratum] desperate contumacy of his intelligent creature. (Isai. vi, 7; Rom. i; 2 Thess. ii, 9—12.)*

DISPUTATION XI.

ON THE FREE WILL OF MAN AND ITS POWERS.

Respondent, PAUL LEONARDS.

I. THE word, arbitrium, " Choice," or "Free Will," properly signifies both the faculty of the mind or understanding, by which the mind is enabled to judge about any thing proposed to it,-and the judgment itself which the mind forms according to that faculty. But it is transferred from the MIND to the WILL, on

• The subject which Arminius has discussed, with such consummate ability and nice discrimination, in this Disputation and in the preceding, is one which demands the most serious consideration on the part of those persons who, in complete ignorance of his system, have ventured to declare, that its tendency is to exclude the Providence of God from the particular management and control of mundane affairs. On the contrary, as an eminent Professor of Divinity in one of our Universities observed to me some years ago, "Were any modern Arminian to avow the sentiments which Arminius himself has here maintained, he would be instantly called a Calvinist.” When I contemplate the profound views and the admirable moderation displayed by Arminius on this and other collateral topics, I am not surprised at the report which was circulated by some of the most shallow of his contemporaries, both in Holland and in this country, that he made God to be the author of Sin. (See the note in page 37 of this volume.) Neither am I at all surprised at the sound discretion shewn in one instance at least by the Dort Synodists, who were remarkably shy about producing any thing which they accounted blame-worthy in the doctrines of Arminius; yet they found abundant employment for their polemical astuteness in the exposure of a few incautious assertions that had not been advanced by the Remonstrants as a body, but by a few individuals who had sheltered themselves under that denomination.

In the 23rd of the Thirty-one Articles, inserted in page 35 of this volume, the reader will find an able defence of these views of Arminius respecting Divine Providence. To his friend Uytenbogard, he addressed the following observations, immediately prior to the discussion of the Theses, in May, 1605:

"I now transmit you a copy of my Theses On the Efficacy of Divine Providence and the Righteousness of God concerning Evil. Peruse and weigh them, and pass your judgment upon them with severity and boldness, and inform me in what respects you think them to be defective. This is demanded by your regard for me, and especially by your strong attachment to sacred truth, for the investigation and explanation of which both you and I have consecrated these souls of ours to Christ and his Church."

On the 7th of June, 1605, soon after the Disputation had been held, he addressed the subjoined brief remarks to the same friend:

"After I had written the former part of this letter, the Disputation was finished, and satisfactorily enough to my wishes;-except that a few things were offered as objections, which, on account of their difficulty, were capable of creating some trouble

account of the very close [unionem] connection which subsists between them. LIBERTY, when attributed to the Will, is properly an affection of the Will, though it has its root in the understanding and reason. Generally considered, it is various: (1.) It is a FREEDOM from [imperio] the control or jurisdiction of one who commands, and from an obligation to render obedience. (2.) From the inspection, care, and government of a Superior. (3.) It is also a Freedom from necessity, whether this proceeds from an external cause compelling, or from a nature inwardly determining absolutely to one thing: (4.) It is a Freedom from sin and its dominion: (5.) And a Freedom from misery.

II. Of these five modes of Liberty, the first two appertain to God alone; to whom also on this account, auTeeσia, perfect independence, or complete freedom of action, is attributed: But these two modes cannot belong to the creatures, as being those who are subjected to the command and the Providence of God. Wherefore, when we treat of the Free Will of man, neither of these modes forms any part of our considerations on this subject. But the remaining three modes may belong to man, nay, in a certain respect they [conveniunt] agree with him: And, in truth, that which is a Freedom from necessity always agrees with him, because it is by nature situated in the will, as its proper attribute, so that there cannot be any will if it be not free. The Freedom from misery, which agreed with man when recently created and not then fallen into sin, will again be in accordance with him when he shall be translated in body and soul into celestial blessedness. But about these two modes also, of Freedom from necessity and from misery, we have here no dispute. It remains therefore for us, to discuss that which is a Freedom from sin and its dominion, and which is the principal controversy of these times.*

to the Respondents and to quicken their diligence. Caspar Junius alone occupied a considerable portion of the time, without presenting a single passage of Scripture in the form of objection. Some time or other you will see the objections which were made, and the answers returned: For J. Arnoldson, of Leyden, having noted them down with sufficient fidelity, transmitted them to Borrius."

* The Reader will perceive, from the topics excluded on this occasion, how much Arminius narrowed the discussion on the Freedom of the Will, and why he wrote familiarly to his friend Borrius what I have quoted from him, in the First Volume of this work, page 267:

"I transmit to you my Theses on Free Will, which I have composed in this [guarded] manner, because I thought that they would thus conduce to peace: I have advanced nothing which I consider at all allied to a falsity. But I have been silent upon some truths, which I might have published: For I know, that it is one thing to be silent respecting a truth, and another to utter a falsehood; the latter of which it is never lawful to do, while the former is occasionally, nay very often, expedient."

III. It is therefore asked, Is there within man a freedom of will from sin and its dominion, and how far does it extend? Or rather, What are the powers of the whole man to understand, to will, and to do that which is good? To return an appropriate answer to this question, the distinction of a good object, and the diversity of men's conditions, must both enter into our consideration. The GooD THINGS presented to man are three,-Natural, which he has in common with many other creatures ;—Animal, which belong to him as a man ;-and Spiritual, which are also deservedly called Celestial or Divine, and which are consenta neous to him as being a partaker of the Divine Nature. The STATES OF CONDITIONS are likewise three, that of Primitive Innocence, in which God placed him by creation;—that of Subsequent Corruption, into which he fell through sin when destitute of primitive innocence; and, lastly, that of Renewed Righteousness, to which state he is restored by the grace of Christ.

IV. But because it is of little importance to our present purpose to investigate what may be the powers of Free Will to understand, to will, and to do natural and animal good things; we will omit them, and enter on the consideration of spiritual good, that concerns the spiritual life of man, which he is bound to live according to godliness,-inquiring from the Scriptures what powers man possesses, while he is in the way of this animal life, to understand, to will, and to do spiritual good things, which alone are truly good and pleasing to God. In this inquiry the office of a Director will be performed by a consideration of the three states, of which we have already treated, [§ III,] varied as such consideration must be in the relation of these powers to the change of each state.

V. In the state of PRIMITIVE INNOCENCE, man had a mind endued with a clear understanding of heavenly light and truth concerning God, and his works and will, as far as was sufficient for the salvation of man and the glory of God; he had a heart imbued with "righteousness and true holiness," and with a true and saving love of good; and powers abundantly [instructas] qualified or furnished perfectly to fulfil the law which God had imposed on him. This admits easily of proof, from the description of the image of God, after which man is said to have been created, (Gen. i, 26, 27,) from the law divinely imposed on him, which had a promise and a threat appended to it, (ii, 17,) and lastly from the analogous restoration of the same image in Christ Jesus. (Ephes. iv, 24; Col. iii, 10.)

VI. But man was not so confirmed in this state of innocence, as to be incapable of being moved, [specie] by the representation presented to him of some good, (whether it was of an inferior kind and relating to this animal life, or of a superior kind and relating to spiritual life,) inordinately and unlawfully to look upon it and to desire it, and of his own spontaneous as well as free motion, and through a preposterous desire for that good, to decline from the obedience which had been prescribed to him. Nay, [aversus] having turned away from the light of his own mind and his Chief Good, which is God, or, at least, [conversus] having turned towards that Chief Good not in the manner in which he ought to have done, and besides having turned in mind and heart towards an inferior good, he transgressed the command given to him for life. By this foul deed, he precipitated himself from that noble and elevated condition into a state of the deepest infelicity, which is UNDER THE DOMINION OF SIN. For " to whom any one yields himself a servant to obey," (Rom. vi, 16,) and "of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage," and is his regularly assigned slave. (2 Pet. ii, 19.)

VII. In this state, the Free Will of man towards the True Good is not only wounded, maimed, infirm, bent, and [attenuatum] weakened; but it is also [captivatum] imprisoned, destroyed, and lost: And its powers are not only debilitated and useless unless they be assisted by grace, but it has no powers whatever except such as are excited by Divine grace: For Christ has said, "Without me ye can do nothing." St. Augustine, after having diligently meditated upon each word in this passage, speaks thus: "Christ does not say, Without me ye can do BUT LITTLE; neither does He say, Without me ye cannot do ANY ARDUOUS THING, nor Without me ye can do it with difficulty: But He says, Without me ye can do NOTHING! Nor does He say, Without me ye cannot [perficere] COMPLETE any thing; but Without me ye can do NOTHING." That this may be made more manifestly to appear, we will separately consider the Mind, the Affections or Will, and [potentiam] the Capability, as contradistinguished from them, as well as the Life itself of an unregenerate man.

VIII. 1. The Mind of man, in this state, is dark, destitute of the saving knowledge of God, and, according to the Apostle, incapable of those things which belong to the Spirit of God: For "the animal man has no perception of the things of the Spirit of God;" (1 Cor. ii, 14;) in which passage man is called

"animal," not from the animal body, but from anima, the soul itself, which is the most noble part of man, but which is so encompassed about with the clouds of ignorance, as to be distinguished by the epithets of "vain" and "foolish ;" and men themselves, thus darkened in their minds, are denominated [amentes] "mad" or foolish, or foolish, "fools," and even "darkness" itself. (Rom. i, 21, 22; Ephes. iv, 17, 18; Titus iii, 3; Ephes. v, 8.) This is true, not only when, from the truth of the law which has in some measure been inscribed on the mind, it is preparing to form conclusions by the understanding; but likewise when, by simple apprehension, it would receive the truth of the Gospel externally offered to it: For the human mind judges that to be "foolishness" which is the most excellent "Wisdom" of God. (1 Cor. i, 18, 24.) On this account, what is here said must be understood not only of practical understanding and the judgment [singularis] of particular approbation, but also of theoretical understanding and the judgment of general

estimation.

IX. 2. To this Darkness of the Mind succeeds the Perverseness of the Affections and of the Heart, according to which it hates and has an aversion to that which is truly good and pleasing to God; but it loves and pursues what is evil. The Apostle was unable to afford a more luminous description of this perverseness, than he has given in the following words: “ The carnal mind is enmity against God: For it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God" (Rom. viii, 7.) For this reason, the human heart itself is very often called deceitful and perverse, uncircumcised, hard and stony:" (Jer. xiii, 10; xvii, 9; Ezek. xxxvi, 26:) Its [figmentum] imagination is said to be "only evil from his very youth;" (Gen. vi, 5; viii, 21;) and "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries," &c. (Matt. xv, 19.)

X. 3. Exactly correspondent to this Darkness of the Mind, and Perverseness of the Heart, is [impotentia] the utter Weakness of all the Powers to perform that which is truly good, and to omit the perpetration of that which is evil, in a due mode and from a due end and cause. The subjoined sayings of Christ serve to describe this impotence: "A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit." (Matt. vii, 18.) "How can ye, being evil, speak good things?" (xii, 34.) The following relates to the good which is properly prescribed in the Gospel: "No man can come to me, except the Father draw him: " (John vi, 44:) As do likewise the following words of the Apostle: "The carnal mind is VOL. II.