lines, and all hope of blockading Syracuse except by storming the counter-wall faded finally away. But Nikias still had it in his power to guard the entrances to the slopes of Epipolai, and thus to keep the ground open for the work which the new force to be presently summoned from Athens must inevitably have to do. Again the opportunity was allowed to slip, and the Syracusans were suffered to raise the further works without which Gylippos saw that the city could not be safe, if an army of sufficient strength should occupy the heights under Euryelos. These works consisted of a strong fort (seemingly not far from Labdalon) joined with the third counterwork by a single wall. On the north side of this long wall were built three forts, to serve as guard posts in the event of an attack on the long wall. So passed away the precious days, while the idleness of Nikias added to the colossal burden under which even the genius of Demosthenes broke down. While Gylippos was thus bestirring himself on behalf of Syracuse, a messenger was bearing to Athens a letter in which Nikias professed to give a plain unvarnished report of all that had thus far befallen the fleet and army. He told them in substance that at first they had been uniformly victorious and that they had finished their besieging walls, when Gylippos came with an army from Peloponnesos and from some towns in Sicily; but he never told them that common care would have made his entrance impossible. He told them of the Syracusan counter-walls which had crossed his own, forgetting that he was thus contradicting his previous assertion that his own wall had been finished, and that the success of the Syracusans with this counterwork was his own fault. He told them that not merely the splendid appearance but the usefulness of their ships was wretchedly impaired, forgetting that only through his own resistance to the counsels of Lamachos they had failed to do and to finish their work long ago. He told them that either the present army must be withdrawn, or another army of equal strength sent to reinforce it, adding the expression of his own wish to be relieved from his command, for which he was now incapacitated by a painful internal disease. He had always been incapacitated for it; but although for his unconsciousness of this fact he must not perhaps be too severely judged, yet it would be hard to count up the many benefits which, as he said, the Athenians had derived from his general ship. In their infatuation they thought that they would derive more still. The resignation of Nikias was not received; but two of his officers were appointed his colleagues, until the generals should arrive with reinforcements from Athens. The disaster of Sphakteria had convinced the Spartans that they and their allies were under divine displeasure for the way in which they had brought about the war, and they acknowledged that in the crisis which preceded the outbreak of the struggle the Athenians were in the right and themselves wholly in the wrong. Hence they were especially anxious that the blame of renewing the strife should attach distinctly to the Athenians; and such a manifest breach of the peace seemed to be furnished by the mission of an Athenian fleet which about the time when Gylippos departed for Sicily was sent to aid the Argives. In the early spring, therefore, a Spartan army, marching to Dekeleia, renewed a war only nominally interrupted, and without any opposition on the part of the Athenians built the fortress which gave its name to the ten years' struggle which followed its erection. (413 B.C.) Meanwhile at Syracuse Gylippos was urging the people to attack the Athenians on the element which they regarded as their own. His great object was to obtain possession of the entrance to the great harbour. He therefore arranged a simultaneous attack on the Athenian fleet and the naval station at Plemmyrion, which should distract attention from an assault on the forts to be made at the same time by the land forces. Both on the harbour and at the naval station the Syracusans were victorious, until the Syracusan fleet becoming disordered from their own success furnished the Athenians with an opportunity for the employment of a tactic in which they were unrivalled. With a loss of three triremes they sunk eleven ships of the enemy. But a victory which might otherwise have at least insured the ultimate safety of the besiegers was rendered worthless by the loss of Plemmyrion. With an imprudence against which it was the business of Nikias to guard, the garrison of the three forts on the cape went down to witness the sea-fight from the shore, where they could do no good, leaving only a few of their number to keep watch at their post. On these Gylippos fell with overpowering force. After a short and sharp conflict he was master of the forts; but when these had been taken the fortune of the day had changed on the sea. It mattered little. Gylippos had taken not only the Athenian forts with the vast quantities of corn and money, some belonging to the military chest, some to private merchants, which had been placed there for safety, but three triremes, and the sails and tackle of not less than forty ships. Worse than this, the Athenians saw two of their forts permanently occupied by their enemies, while the Syracusan fleet kept guard off Plemmyrion. Henceforth convoys could be introduced into the harbour only after a fight. Blow after blow fell upon the besieging force. Their treasure ships were intercepted, the timber stored for ship-building was set on fire, and it was unfortunate for Athens that the Syracusans did not succeed in their larger scheme for the destruction of the Athenian fleet before any reinforcements could reach them. The ruin of the navy of Nikias would have furnished to Demosthenes a sufficient justification for taking off the army and forthwith returning home. The attack was delayed by a disaster which befell a force of Syracusan allies. These were marching across the territory of Sikel tribes, whose chiefs had been warned by Nikias to do what they could to cut short their journey. Had he taken this step while Gylippos was on his march, the issue of the siege might have been different. As it was, eight hundred of these Syracusan allies were slain, but the remaining 1,500 reached the city. Of the Sikeliot cities Akragas alone insisted on remaining neutral: the rest felt the need of abandoning the sinking ship, and came forward to take active part with the Syracusans. In short, the Syracusans were not merely gaining strength by additions to their numbers: they were fast acquiring that power of making the best of circumstances which had marked the Athenians in their most vigorous days. The bulk and awkwardness of the Syracusan ships would tell only in their favour so long as the Athenians were debarred from using their peculiar tactics; and they had no hesitation in so arming the prows of their triremes and reducing their projection as to render them fatal to the lighter ships which under other conditions had won for Athens her command of the sea. A simultaneous attack by land and sea produced on the first day no decisive results. Two days later things were following much the same course, when a Corinthian suggested that the Syracusan crews should take their mid-day meal on the shore, and then immediately renew the struggle. Seeing their ene mies retreat about noon, the Athenians thought that their work for the day was done. They were soon undeceived. Most of them were still fasting, when the Syracusan fleet was seen again advancing in order of battle. Even thus, in spite of the disorder in which the Athenian ships were manned, neither side had any decisive advantage until the Athenians, wearied ont with hunger, determined to bring the matter to an issue and advanced rapidly against the enemy. The result instantly verified the calculations of the Syracusans, who were counting on the complete destruction of the fleet and army of Nikias, when seventy-three Athenian triremes swept into the great harbour. The feeling first excited in the minds of the Syracusans was one of consternation; but Demosthenes, who commanded this reinforcement, saw at a glance that the temporary advantage gained by his coming must go for nothing, unless some decisive success should justify a continuance of the siege. The forces of Nikias were in part demoralised, in part worn out by marsh fever; nor was it of the least use to prolong operations near the sea unless the position of the Syracusans could be turned on the northern side of Epipolai. But it was soon evident that attacks by day had little chance of success; and with the consent of his colleagues Demosthenes resolved on a night assault. With the whole disposable force of the camp Demosthenes with Menandros and Euthydemos set out on a moonlight night for their march to Euryelos. His men, in spite of all previous sufferings, were full of hope and even of confidence. They were now acting under a general whose sagacity in council and energy in the field had won him the highest reputation. They were carrying with them everything which might be reasonably expected to insure a successful surprise. At first all went well. Not only did the Athenians make their way along Euryelos, but the cross wall itself was taken before any alarm could be given. The Athenian generals now led on a large proportion of their forces to the counter wall, while others began the task of demolishing the cross wall. In fact the work of Demosthenes was already done, if he could only maintain his present position. But he was anxious to push the Syracusans at once as far back as possible; and success had excited in his army a confidence which with Greek troops generally led to a dangerous neglect of discipline. The Athenians in front were already in some Р |