of the Phrygian satrap Ariobarzanes appeared at Delphoi to insist on the maintenance of the Peace of Antalkidas. The Spartans at once made their submission to this proposal dependent wholly on the surrender of the Messenians: their indignation was heightened when in the Olympic festival from which they were excluded a Messenian youth was registered as conqueror in the footrace for boys. But the feeling of humiliation was suddenly changed for that of deep and overpowering joy when the tidings were brought to Sparta that Archidamos had without the loss of a man slain ten thousand Arkadians at Midea. The Spartans might well call the fight the Tearless Battle, and feel that the bitterness of Leuktra had in some measure passed away. (368 B.C.)

Nor was the chastisement thus dealt out to the Arkadians altogether irritating to the Thebans. These saw in the event not merely a wholesome lesson for Arkadian arrogance but a proof that their own presence was needed again in the Peloponnesos. Once more crossing the Corinthian isthmus, Epameinondas appeared on the scene of his former exploits, and added the Achaian cities to the Theban confederacy. (367 B.C.) But the Thebans insisted on setting up democracies in all of them, the oligarchic citizens thus driven into exile found themselves strong enough to effect their restoration by force, and the Achaians again became allies of Sparta.

On all sides feelings of ill-will were growing apace. The Athenian town of Oropos, seized by some exiles, was handed over to the Thebans; and the anger of the Athenians was followed by their allying themselves with the Arkadians, and by an ineffectual attempt to seize the friendly city of Corinth. (366 B.C.) The only result of this faithless act was to excite in the Corinthians a desire for peace. Others besides the Corinthians were weary of the contest, and these all signed at Thebes the peace which ensured to the Messenians their freedom and to which therefore Sparta could be no party.

Amidst the complications which could not fail to arise from the conflicting interests of independent cities the recovery or conquest of Samos by Timotheos seemed to afford a better promise for the permanent revival of Athenian empire. (365 B.C.) But like all other advantages gained by the Athenians after the establishment of Spartan supremacy, it came too late. The victory of Timotheos was followed by the expulsion or flight of

many citizens of the oligarchical party, into whose lands the Athenians, forgetting or breaking their recent pledges to the contrary, introduced a large body of Klerouchoi or settlers. Nor was it in Samos only that Athenian citizens found a home. By the help of the satrap Ariobarzanes Athens had again obtained a hold on the Thrakian Chersonesos, and the possession of Sestos went near to placing in her hands the key to the corn-growing lands of the Euxine.

While Timotheos was striving to extend the maritime influence of Athens and making vain efforts to recover Amphipolis, the Thebans by the urgent advice of Epameinondas were building a fleet which should contest the mastery of the sea with the Athenian navy. That fleet actually appeared in the Hellespont, and might have appeared again to better purpose had not the great Theban leader been summoned away to his old field of action in the west. Thither his friend Pelopidas was not to acccmpany him. This brave and upright citizen, who had been sent to punish the cruel tyrant of Pherai, had fallen at Kynoskephalai (the Hound's Heads), at the moment when his forces were already winning the victory. By his death Thebes lost her left hand: she was soon to lose her right. But in the meanwhile a larger army avenged his death, and for the moment Thebes was supreme in Thessaly as well as in Boiotia.

In Peloponnesos the antagonistic interests of hostile states or cities were producing their natural results. The old evils had but imperfectly yielded to the grand effort of Epaminondas to raise up against Sparta a permanent bulwark to the north and to the west. Instead of the union which he had hoped to see among the men of Tegea, Mantineia, and Megalopolis, he had found little more than jealousy of Theban ascendancy, and the alienation of the Achaians by measures in complete discordance with his own. This was the reward of the Thebans for entering the Peloponnesos five years ago at the intreaty of the Arkadians themselves to free them from a bondage which they declared to be intolerable. 'Well may we call such conduct treachery,' was the indignant reply of Epameinondas to the envoys of the Ten Thousand; 'you may be sure that we shall come again, and with the aid of our friends carry on the war in your land.'

With the full purpose of striking a blow as severe as that which he had dealt on the enemies of Thebes at Leuktra,

Epameinondas entered the Peloponnesos at the head of all the Boiotian and Euboian contingents. (362 B.C.) He had hoped to cut off at Nemea the Athenian troops which were going to join his enemies; but these came not, and the tidings that they had given up the idea of the land march and were going round by sea determined him to hasten to Tegea. Ready and eager for the great encounter, Epameinondas yet knew that a bloodless triumph won by skill was far more glorious than victory won through the carnage of the battle-field. The whole army of Sparta under Agesilaos, now 80 years old, was hurrying northwards by a circuitous route, while Tegea was on the direct road to the once imperial city. That city, in the words of the philo-Lakonian Xenophon, was now left like a mere nest of fledglings abandoned by the parent birds: and thither Epameinondas led his men with a speed which must have insured its destruction had not a Kretan runner, exerting his utmost strength, warned Agesilaos of the imminent ruin. The return of the Spartans averted the catastrophe. No one had ever impugned their bravery, and it was no part of the Theban leader's plan to waste time and toil on a task in which success would bring result in no proportion to its risks. But in fact there was no more work for Epameinondas to do at Sparta; and with a rapidity equal to that of his southward march he hurried back to Tegea. His men needed rest, and under ordinary leaders they would all have insisted on having it. But Epameinondas saw that for his horsemen there could at Tegea be no repose. He told them that Mantineia was now practically undefended, and that by a sudden onset they might not only occupy the city but seize on the free people who with the slaves and property would still be in the open country. At the bidding of no other man would they have set out, wearied themselves and with tired horses, on a ten miles march; but at his command they went cheerfully, believing as he believed that they would meet with no resistance. He had every reason for so thinking; but as it so happened, the Athenian cavalry had just been admitted within the walls of the town. At the intreaty of the Mantineians the Athenians mounted their horses and sallied forth. Tired though they may have been, they encountered men even more fatigued than themselves, and drove them back. Thus was foiled the second of two admirably laid plans, either of which, if successful, would have decided the issue of the struggle, but of which the failure

left Epameinondas simply where he was when he crossed the Corinthian isthmus. His resolution was for immediate battle, and it was made known to men who were as eager for it as himself.

At a distance nearly midway between the cities of Tegea on the south and of Mantineia on the north the great plain (now known by the name of Tripolitza), shut in on all sides by mountains and reaching in its broadest part a width of eight miles, narrows until it leaves a passage barely a mile wide. A little to the north of this pass and about five miles to the south of Mantineia were drawn up the Spartans with their allies. Issuing from the northern gate of Tegea, Epameinondas advanced straight towards this narrow neck; but the impression on the mind of the enemy that he meant to close with them at once was weakened when they saw him turn up the slopes of the Mainalian range to the left. From that point they watched him move onwards until the form of the ground brought him very near their right flank; but the order issued to the Thebans to ground their arms and perhaps some simulated signs of encampment effectually blinded the eyes of the Spartans to his real design. They broke up their army and laid aside their weapons, while the cavalry took the saddles and bridles off from their horses. In the midst of this disorder in the enemy's camp the mighty mass of the Theban phalanx was set in motion. During the few minutes which passed before the clash of battle, the Peloponnesians hastened as best as they could to resume their fighting order. The Mantineians and Spartans on the right stood their ground with a firmness never surpassed in the palmiest days of their history. But the Theban wedge came on, as the historian puts it, with the impetus of a trireme, and once more even Spartan valour gave way before it. Retreat was fast becoming flight, and the memory of the Spartan victory in this same valley in the days of Alkibiades (p. 186), seemed likely to be clouded by a catastrophe as terrible as that of Leuktra, when Epameinondas, cheering on his men to pursuit, was struck by a spear, the head of which broke off and remained in his breast. The wound was mortal; and the tidings that Epameinondas had seen his last fight ran like fire through the whole army, producing everywhere an absolute prostration of strength and will. Had he lived, even his influence would at this instant of decisive victory scarcely have restrained them

from the fury of pursuit; yet the mere knowledge that their general must die so paralysed their arms that almost in strictness of speech not another blow was struck, nor a single effort made to complete the work which lay nearest to their leader's heart. In a moment the exultation of victory was exchanged for bitter but unavailing sorrow for the dying chief, whose life must end, so the surgeons said, with the drawing of the spearhead from the wound. Three questions only he asked. The first was about his shield, which his shield-bearer held up before his eyes; then he desired to know how the day was going; and, when he learnt that the Boiotians were the conquerors, he asked lastly for Iolaidas and Daiphantos, adding a wish to see them. He was told that they were both slain. Then you must make peace with the enemy,' he said, and ordering the spearhead to be drawn from his breast, died with the serenity of a brave man who has done his duty.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE DEATH OF EPAMEINONDAS TO THE

BATTLE OF CHAIRONEIA.

A REVIEW of the events which during the three years immediately following the battle of Mantineia tended to restore to Athens the appearance rather than the reality of a maritime empire involves little interest except of a painful or repulsive kind. We find Sparta, seemingly in disgust at the position of affairs nearer home, sending Agesilaos to receive the wages of a mercenary leader from one or other of the Egyptian princes in revolt against the Persian king. In the distant land of the Nile her power seems to be so far felt as to enable the man whose cause she espouses to win a victory over his rival. The gratitude of Nektanebis was testified by the gift of 230 talents to the Spartan people; but Agesilaos did not live to carry the splendid present home. Weighed down with the toils of more than eighty years he died on the road to Kyrênê (361 B.C.), and his body embalmed in wax was taken to Sparta for the solemn ceremonies which the Lykourgean system assigned for the funerals of Spartan kings.

When from Sparta we turn to Athens, we see her sending