using the twofold nature of Christ developed in his office of mediator, as a ready subterfuge by which to evade any arguments that may be brought against them. What Scripture says of the Son generally, they apply, as suits their purpose, in a partial and restricted sense; at one time to the Son of God, at another to the Son of Man,-now to the Mediator in his divine, now in his human capacity, and now again in his union of both natures. But the Son himself says expressly, the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand,' John iii. 35.-namely, because he loveth him, not because he hath begotten him—and he hath given all things to him as the Son, not as Mediator only. If the words had been meant to convey the sense attributed to them by my opponents, it would have been more satisfactory and intelligible to have said, 'the Father loveth Christ,' or 'the Mediator,' or 'the Son of Man.' None of these modes of expression are adopted, but it is simply said, 'the Father loveth the Son;' that is, whatever is comprehended under the name of the Son. The same question may also be repeated which was asked before, whether from the time that he became the Mediator, his Deity, in their opinion, remained what it had previously been, or not? If it remained the same, why does he ask and receive every thing from the Father, and not from himself? If all things come

close about him, and pinch his activity.' Tetrachordon, Prose Works, II. 201. Vertit rationes et "annon rex cum optimatibus plus potestatis habeat" quærit; iterum nego, Vertumne, si pro optimatibus proceres intelligas, quoniam accidere potest ut nemo inter eos optimatis nomine sit dignus.' Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio, Prose Works,

V. 149.

from the Father, why is it necessary (as they maintain it to be) for the mediatorial office, that he should be the true and supreme God; since he has received from the Father whatever belongs to him, not only in his mediatorial, but in his filial character? If his Deity be not the same as before, he was never the Supreme God. From hence may be understood John xvi. 15. all things that the Father hath are mine'that is, by the Father's gift. And xvii. 9, 10. 'them which thou hast given me, for they are thine; and all mine are thine, and thine are mine.'

In the first place, then, it is most evident that he receives his name from the Father. Isai. ix. 6. ' his name shall be called Wonderful,' &c. ' the everlasting Father;'* if indeed this elliptical passage be rightly understood; for, strictly speaking, the Son is not the Father, and cannot properly bear the name, nor is it elsewhere ascribed to him, even if we should allow that in some sense or other it is applied to him in the passage before us. The last clause, however, is generally translated not the everlasting Father,' but 'the Father of the age to come,'t—that is, its teacher, the name of father being often attributed to a teacher. Philipp. ii. 9. wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and hath given him (xaì έzagíoato) a name which is above every name.' Heb. i. 4. 'being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name

* Milton follows the version of Tremellius, who translates the passage thus- Cujus nomen vocat Jehova, admirabilem,' &c.

† Пarng μíλλovros aivos. Septuag. Pater futuri sæculi.' Vulg. The Father of the everlasting age.' Lowth. 'The Father of the world to come.' Douay Bible.

than they.' Eph. i. 20, 21. when he set him at his own right hand.....far above all principality,' &c. and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come.' There is no reason why that name should not be Jehovah, or any other name pertaining to the Deity, if there be any still higher but the imposition of a name is allowed to be uniformly the privilege of the greater personage, whether father or lord.

We need be under no concern, however, respecting the name, seeing that the Son receives his very being in like manner from the Father. John vii. 29. I am from him.' The same thing is implied John i. 1. ' in the beginning.' For the notion of his eternity is here excluded not only by the decree, as has been stated before, but by the name of Son, and by the phrases this day have I begotten thee,' and, 'I will be to him a father.' Besides, the word 'beginning,' can only here mean before the foundation of the world,' according to John xvii. 5. as is evident from Col. i. 15-17. the first born of every creature for by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth,' &c. and he is before all things, and by him all things consist.' Here the Son, not in his human or mediatorial character, but in his capacity of creator, is himself called the first born of every creature. So too, Heb. ii. 11. for both he that sanctifieth, and they that are sanctified, are all of one;' and iii. 2. faithful to him that appointed him.' Him who was begotten from all eternity the Father cannot have begotten, for what was made from all eternity was never in the act of being made; him whom the Father begat from all eternity

he still begets; he whom he still begets is not yet begotten, and therefore is not yet a son; for an action which has no beginning can have no completion. Besides, it seems to be altogether impossible that the Son should be either begotten or born from all eternity. If he is the Son, either he must have been originally in the Father, and have proceeded from him, or he must always have been as he is now, separate from the Father, self-existent and independent. If he was originally in the Father, but now exists separately, he has undergone a certain change at some time or other, and is therefore mutable. If he always existed separately from, and independently of, the Father, how is he from the Father, how begotten, how the Son, how separate in subsistence, unless he be also separate in essence? since (laying aside metaphysical trifling) a substantial essence and a subsistence are the same thing. However this may be, it will be universally acknowledged that the Son now at least differs numerically from the Father; but that those who differ numerically must differ also in their proper essences, as the logicians express it, is too clear to be denied by any one possessed of common reason. Hence it follows that the Father and the Son differ in essence.

That this is the true doctrine, reason shows on every view of the subject; that it is contrary to Scripture, which my opponents persist in maintaining, remains to be proved by those who make the assertion. Nor does the type of Melchisedec, on which so much reliance is placed, involve any difficulty. Heb. vii. 3. without father, without mother, without descent; having neither beginning of days, nor end

of life; but made like unto the Son of God.' For inasmuch as the Son was without any earthly father, he is in one sense said to have had no beginning of days; but it no more appears that he had no beginning of days from all eternity, than that he had no Father, or was not a Son. If however he derived his essence from the Father, let it be shown how that essence can have been supremely divine, that is, identically the same with the essence of the Father ; since the divine essence, whose property it is to be always one, cannot possibly generate the same essence by which it is generated, nor can a subsistence or person become an agent or patient under either of the circumstances supposed, unless the entire essence be simultaneously agent or patient in the same manner also. Now as the effect of generation is to produce something which shall exist independently of the generator, it follows that God cannot beget a coequal Deity, because unity and infinity are two of his essential attributes. Since therefore the Son derives his essence from the Father, he is posterior to the Father not merely in rank (a distinction unauthorized by Scripture, and by which many are deceived).but also in essence; and the filial character itself, on the strength of which they are chiefly wont to build his claim to supreme divinity, affords the best refutation of their opinion. For the supreme God is self-existent; but he who is not self-existent, who did not beget, but was begotten, is not the first cause, but the effect, and therefore is not the supreme God. He who was begotten from all eternity, must have been from all eternity; but if he can have been begotten who was from all eternity, there