action of water applied with certain words to the body, the soul is cleansed and purged from sin, and placed in a state of grace before God? It is manifest, on the contrary, that all our experience would lead us to conclude that such a thing could not be. But has not God, in this case, modified the law of nature? Has he not allowed a moral influence to an outward act, performed under certain circumstances? Has he not been pleased to sanction that act, to such an extent, that the moment that act is performed its spiritual consequences follow from it, as necessarily, as naturally, as the consequences of any act must succeed to that act? Is it not that he has bound himself by a covenant, that when certain causes are brought into action, he holds himself bound to give them their supernatural effect? And is it not the same here? If God institute a sacrament like this, and if he, who has instituted the laws of nature, chooses to make this a modification of them, it no more runs in opposition to them than the other did, because the two only stand in opposition to experimental laws, and both precisely with the same degree of strength.

In fact, my brethren, this seems so obvious, that several writers, and writers not of our religion, agree, that upon this point it is impossible to assail us. One of them observes, that this doctrine-Transubstantiation-does not, as vulgarly supposed, contradict the senses. But the one, who has entered most scientifically into the subject, is the celebrated Leibnitz. He left behind him A System of Theology, which was deposited in a public library in Germany, and was not brought before the public until six or seven years ago. It was then procured by the late King of France from the library, and published. Leibnitz, in this work, examines the Catholic doctrine on every point, and compares it with the Protestant; and on this matter in particular, enters into very subtle and metaphysical reasoning, and the conclusion to which he comes is, that in the Catholic doctrine there is not the smallest point which can be assailed on any philosophical principle; that there is no contradiction which makes it necessary, upon grounds of mere philosophy, to depart from the Catholic interpretation of the words. This is a high authority. But independent of all this, 1 consider the reasoning which I have followed to show, that we cannot depart from the literal interpretation of the words of institution, quite sufficient to repel completely this objection.

Thus, therefore, it would appear, that the ground on which it is maintained that we must depart from‍ the literal sense is untenable; untenable both on philosophical grounds, and still more on grounds of biblical interpretation. But besides this mere confutation of the grounds on which the literal interpretation is assailed, we have ourselves also, strong positive considerations in favour of the literal sense. 1. In the first place, the very words themselves, in which the pro

noun is put in its vague form, are a strong confirmation of our position. Had our Saviour said, "This bread is my body, this wine is my blood," we might have said, that is a contradiction, wine cannot be blood, and bread cannot be a body; when our Saviour says, "This," which has no definite meaning, except what we find is predicated of it in the sentence; when we find, that in the Greek there is a discrepancy of gender between that pronoun and the word "bread;" it is evident that our Saviour wished to define, in these words, what he held in his hand, and which he gives to us, that it is his body and his blood.

2. But this is still further confirmed by the epithets which he adds to it; for a person using symbolical language, will be careful to avoid expressions which seem to identify the figurative objects with the real. Now our Saviour says, that that is the body which is to be broken or delivered for you, and that is the blood which is to be shed. By the addition of those adjuncts to the thing; by uniting to those words what could only be said of his real body and blood, it would appear still more, that he wanted to define and identify the objects pointed out.

3. There are considerations also drawn, from the circumstances in which our blessed Saviour was placed. When you conceive any one of yourselves, with the certain prophetic assurance, that in a few hours you were to be taken from your family, when you called them around you to explain to them your last bequests, to explain to them that which you wished performed by them in remembrance of yourself, would you make use of such extraordinary symbolical, figurative phrases, which, as I have shown you, have no parallel in any other passages of Scripture? Can you suppose that you would make use of words, in themselves obviously leading to a totally different meaning from that which you had in your mind, and wished to convey to them? And supposing that you were at that moment gifted with a still greater degree of foresight, and that you knew, that the result of your using these words would be, that far the greater part of your children would take your words literally, and by that completely defeat your wishes, and that there would be a very small number that would divine, that you only spoke figuratively: do you think that, under such circumstances, you would choose that phraseology, when it was as easy to you to convey the exact and definite meaning which you wished them to receive?

4. Again, our Saviour himself seems, on this night, to have determined to make his words as plain and simple as possible. It is impossible to read his last conversation with his apostles, as related by St. John, and not observe how often he was interrupted by them, and how often he most meekly, and gently, and lovingly, explained himself to them. And not so satisfied, he himself tells them, that he would no longer speak to them in parables; that the time was come when they

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must consider him as speaking to them no longer as their master, but as their friend; so that they themselves said, "Behold, now thou speakest to us plainly, and speakest no proverb." Under these circumstances, can we conceive that he would have made use of those exceedingly obscure words, when instituting the last and most beautiful mystery of love, as a commemoration of that their last meeting here upon earth? These circumstances are all strong corroborations; they all go to lead us to prefer the literal meaning, as the only one reconcileable with the peculiar circumstances in which the words were uttered.

But, my brethren, there are two other passages of Scripture which must not be passed over, although it will not be necessary to dwell very long upon them. They are two passages in the first Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, the one which I chose as my text; but the other is still more remarkable. In this one St. Paul asks the question, "The cup of benediction which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking of the body of the Lord ?" In these words St Paul is contrasting the Jewish and heathenish sacrifices and rites with those of the Christian; consequently, when he speaks of their actions and sacrifices, it is of the eating as a real eating, and of the drinking as a real drinking, he is speaking of realities throughout on one side. When, therefore, he contrasts with them the Christian institutions, and when he asks them, whether they have not something infinitely more worthy, than what the Jews enjoyed, because their " cup was the communion of the blood of Christ, and their bread the partaking of the body of the Lord: do not these words imply, that there was a real contrast between the two? that, as the one were partaken as described, so also were the other? that if their victims were truly eaten, here, that which is opposed to the victim, Christ's body, is no less received.

But, on the other text there is a great deal more to remark. In the following chapter, St. Paul enters at length into the institution of the last supper; he there describes our Saviour's conduct, in instituting the blessed Eucharist, precisely as St. Matthew, St. Mark, and St. Luke, had done it before him, making use of precisely the same simple and obvious words. But then he goes on to draw consequences from this doctrine; he lays the narrative down as premises for the reasoning; and when a man does that, assuredly he lays them down in the terms in which the reasoning is to be deduced; and if the reasoning preserves precisely the same form, and the two give the same meaning, what right have we to depart from that as the true signification? Now how does he write? He says there, that the consequence is, "that whosoever receives this sacrament unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord ;" and, in the second place,

"That whoever shall eat this bread, or drink of the chalice of the Lord unworthily, is guilty of the body and blood of the Lord." Here are two denunciations, deduced by St. Paul, from the institution of the Lord's supper: the first is, that whosoever receives it unworthily, "eateth and drinketh damnation to himself," because he does not "discern the body" of Christ. What is the meaning of “ discerning the body" of Christ? Is it not to distinguish it from other food? to make a difference between it and other things? But if the body of Christ be not really there, how can the offence be considered as directed against the body of Christ? It may be against the dignity or goodness of Christ, but certainly it could not be an offence against his body. But, passing to the second place, it is curious to observe, that, in the whole of Scripture, the same form of expression only occurs once; it is in St. James, where it is said, that "whoever transgresses one commandment is guilty of all;" that is, guilty of a violation or transgression of all the commandments. It is the only passage parallel to this, where the unworthy communicant is not said to be guilty of the crime, but guilty of the thing against which the crime is committed; that is, "he is guilty of the body and blood of the Lord." It is explained by a similar form in the Roman law, in which a person, guilty of treason against majesty, is said to be "guilty of the majesty," that is, guilty of an offence against the majesty. But, in that case, if the majesty were not there in truth, that crime could not be committed; so here, if the body were not really there, it cannot be said that the offence is committed against the body. Not only can it not be said, but it is absolutely weak and unsatisfactory reasoning; because, to say that a person offends against Christ himself, that he offends against God, is a much greater denunciation of guilt, than to say, that he offends against the body of Christ, except in the case of a violent outrage, or. attack, or offence, to the adorable body of Christ. Supposing the body of Christ not to be present, the offence would be weakened by calling it an offence against the body of Christ; it is an offence against his dignity, not merely against his body; and, therefore, why is the greatest of all offences that we can conceive called an offence against his body, when, in the absence of that body, it is merely weakening the offence to call it so? If that body is merely standing at the right hand of the Father, it is an offence against the merits of Christ's redemption; it is, as it were, an insulting of that rite which was to commemorate his passion; but it cannot be called a personal offence, or any offence against the body of our Saviour, and it would be a weakening of the offence to call it so; whereas St. Paul uses the phrase to convey the meaning of the enormity of the crime.

But now, looking at all the Scripture texts conjointly, there is a reflection which cannot fail to strike any considerate mind. We have

here four distinct classes of texts. We have a long conversation, held by our Saviour under particular circumstances, a considerable time before his passion. Others suppose him, throughout it, to have treated of faith, or of believing in him; yet, through a certain part of that discourse, he studiously avoids any expression, as I showed you, after the verse which I quoted, which could possibly lead his hearers to suppose, that he uses the words in a figurative sense; but he uses the expression again and again, in a way to induce his hearers to suppose, that it was necessary to eat his flesh and to drink his blood literally, to receive his body: and he allowed the crowd to murmur, and his disciples to fall away, and his apostles to remain in darkness, without explaining away their difficulties. Well, and suppose that is possible ; we will suppose that our Saviour on that occasion did so; we come to another quite different occasion; he is alone with his disciples; he no longer wishes to speak of faith with them; he wishes to institute a sacrament, commemorative of his passion; he uses precisely the same words again; he talks again of giving them something to eat and something to drink, which he calls his body and his blood: not only so, but this is related by several of the evangelists, without comment, as a matter of course, in the same words; not a hint, not an idea, that he meant to be understood figuratively.

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We come down further: St. Paul wishes to prove, in the words of my text, that this commemorative rite of Christ's passion is sufficient for Christians, and superior to that which was eaten in the tabernacle. Once more; although there is not the slightest necessity for such marked expressions, but he might have used the words "symbol," figure," or "emblem." Although writing on a totally different occasion, and addressing a different people, he falls into the same extraordinary phraseology, and makes use of the same words, and speaks as if the real body and blood of Christ were partaken of. Not only so, but he goes on to reprove the bad use of this rite, to illustrate it in a different manner, but once more he returns to the same unusual phrases, of "the body of Christ," and "the blood of Christ," being received, and speaks of those who partake of it unworthily, as being "guilty of the body," of an outrage upon that body; no one would have said, of an injury to the paschal lamb, which was an emblem of Christ; no one would have said that that was an injury to the body of Christ, though it might be to his merits. Now is it not strange, that our Saviour and his apostles should thus conspire together, to use words of this meaning, and that they should not have let one expression slip, which might be a guide or key to the true interpretation of these passages? Is it even possible, that if our Saviour, in the sixth of John, was talking of a different thing from what St. Paul was in his Epistle to the Corinthians, that they should have adopted similar, figurative,