propriety will be manifest from the consideration that every instance of malevolence is an indication of Displacency to a high degree, although the latter is not at all times an indication of the former.

The reader will not be disposed to censure as superfluous these minute investigations, respecting the signification of terms, when he recollects that the want of precision has been the grand source of confusion of ideas, even among philosophers. The least difference in our conceptions, respecting the force of words, may direct to very different conclusions. The smallest deviation from the requisite point of the compass, will in a short time steer the vessel into an improper latitude.

In the prosecution of our Analysis under this Second Class, or in tracing the Passions and Affections which belong to the social Principle, I shall, according to the plan proposed, divide the subject into two Orders; the first belonging to the principle of Benevolence, in which the idea of Good is the more immediate and predominant idea; and the second to Displacency, in which the idea of Evil prevails.

The benevolent Principle may refer to good Desires and Dispositions, and to good Opinions:

which form two distinct kinds or genera. Displacency may also be divided into two kinds, Malevolence, properly so called; and disfavourable Opinion, or Displacency, according to its usual signification.

ORDER I..

Passions and Affections excited by Benevolence, in which GOOD is the predominant Idea.

I. Those which respect Benevolent Desires and Dispositions.

In our general remarks concerning Love as a Principle, we inevitably anticipated some things which properly belong to this branch of our Subject. It was then hinted, that our benevolent dispositions may be directed towards those who are connected with us, in various degrees of relation or intimacy;-to the whole human race indiscriminately, in which it is termed Philanthropy; and to all Beings rendered capable of any portion of enjoyment; or universal benevolence, according to the most extensive sense of the expression.

It will not be necessary, in the process of

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our investigation, to have the distinction be tween the rational and irrational creation, always in our view. The dispositions towards each are similar; though rational Beings, from their superior importance, are the most interesting, and the diversity of their situations admits of a greater variety of correspondent affections. Both may be comprehended under the title of general benevolence.

It will however be proper to remark, that the benevolence which respects our most intimate connections, approximates very closely to the principle of Self-love. It considers every thing belonging to its immediate objects, as belonging also to ourselves, and thus constitutes one common interest. Of this kind are all those connections. which form the intimate relations of life, and create so large a portion of its happiness or its misery. Such are the conjugal, parental, filial, fraternal relations, various degrees of consanguinity, and particular friendships. Here the habitual attachments, and benignant dispositions which the mind experiences, assume the character of affections, by way of pre-eminence. For it is in these relations that the kindly affections manifest the greatest warmth and constancy. The general objects of our philanthropy may

possess a portion of our good-will, without particular interest being habitually taken in their welfare. The operation of this principle is confined to particular cases and situations, in which they may be incidentally placed. Those animals to which we are the most strongly attached, or which we may have appropriated to ourselves, are considered as sustaining an occasional, and accidental connection; and when they are the most requisite for our use and comfort, we chiefly value them as the instruments and means of our convenience and pleasure. Their influence is chiefly temporary. They are transferred with little regret. The mind may become versatile and changeable towards them, without the imputation of cruelty or injustice. But in the social relation, the kindly affections dwell with the well-disposed mind, and are perpetually operative.

These social affections may arise from various causes, which give them their distinguishing characteristics; and they may possess various degrees of strength; which, in most cases, is regulated by the degrees of their utility. Some are deemed instinctive; that is, originally implanted in the breast, without the conscious aid of reason or reflection. The love of Parents for their offspring is adduced as an evidence

They still retain a soli

of instinctive affection. This is observable in persons who seem to have eradicated every other social affection. citude for their young, after they have rendered themselves strangers to to every other virtue; and indulge a fondness here, amidst the greatest animosities against those around them. But whatever ideas we may affix to the word instinct, self-love seems to form its basis. Parents manifestly contemplate their children as scions from the stem; and the selfish affections accompany them, not only as being their appointed representatives, but as second selves. The superior strength of affection natural to the female breast, which receives a daily increase by unremitted habits of care and attention, gives the appearance of a much stronger instinct 'to the maternal, than to the paternal affections.

Some of the social affections arise from the perception, or the persuasion of amiable qualities, personal or mental, for which a strong predilection is formed; as in the conjugal relation. This predilection having also a sexual influence, may become a passion, the most impetuous and ungovernable. The sexual passion is rendered remarkable for its contrarieties. It may be considered as the most generous and the most selfish; at once the most interested, and the