a person, for whom we are particularly interested, and when this misconduct endangers his welfare, the very principle of benevolence converts our complacency into its contrary. In this case, being such an expressive indication of our displeasure as to inspire terror, it is admirably calculated to strike the offender with awe, and reclaim his conduct. As soon as passion is able to attend to the united voices of reason and affection, they will frequently join to palliate the offence, by ascribing it to some incidental cause; to the common frailties of our nature, to the strong impulse of particular circumstances, &c. and the offender becomes reinstated in our favourable regards. But reiterated provocations being indubitable marks of culpable inattention, disrespect, or depravity of disposition, will entirely change our opinion of character, and inspire us with indifference or permanent displeasure against the cause. Rage has been described as the madness of anger. Revenge is an insatiable desire to sacrifice every consideration of pity and humanity, to the principle of vindictive justice. It renders the demands of that terrific giant paramount to every other claim. It is a propensity to retaliate evil, too fervent to be cooled by time, too deep and inveterate to be obliterated by concessions and entreaties. It anticipates joy in the contemplation of sighs and groans, and the only moment of transport is the instant of inflicting misery. We see that this disposition approaches very near to permanent malevolence, of the most despicable character. The abstract idea of justice, however, forms a partition between them; for to this malevolence has no rightful claim. But its more honourable distinction consists in that repentance, which humanity excites in the mind that is not totally obdurate, after the gratification of this dreadful passion. The avenger feels, too late, that he has sacrificed realities to a phantom; and that to inflict misery is in no case, the path to happiness. Wrath is a deep and irritating sense of an injury. It is deliberate anger; being chiefly inspired by the contemplation of various aggravating circumstances attendant upon the of fence. The desire of retaliation is not a consti tuent part of it; by this it is distinguished from revenge. But it occasions a ferment in the spirits incompatible with the indulgence complacency. Resentment. This affection has been described to be a deep reflective displeasure, against the conduct of an offender. We may now observe, that resentment is chiefly excited by some personal offence, committed against the laws of social intercourse, of friendship, or of gratitude;-by some affront, that wounds our self-love, it may be, our pride;-by some reprehensible inattention to our minuter claims;-or by the want of respect and affection, to which we imagine that the tenour of our conduct towards the object, has given us an undoubted right. It may terminate in indifference, and, in weak minds, in malice; but it is generally appeased by concessions and acknowledgments. Suspicion. This is a comfortless state of doubt concerning the conduct and character of another. The mind is greatly embarrassed respecting the degree of esteem, cordiality, or friendship, which is due to the object. Suspicion may be excited by some kind of accusation, not supported by evidence sufficient for conviction, but sufficient to trouble the repose of confidence. When exercised towards Intimates, it is an anxious suspension of mind between complacency and displacency; between that respect we were accustomed to entertain for them, and the painful apprehension that they no longer deserve it. We feel an incipient anger and resentment, which we dare not to indulge, and cannot suppress. Jealousy is a species of suspicion that relates to conduct, which still more intimately concerns ourselves. It is a painful apprehension of rivalship, in cases that are peculiarly interesting to us. It will of consequence increase in strength, according to the value we place upon the object, and to the degrees of danger to which we imagine it may be exposed. It is the inseparable companion of the ambitious, who view every competitor, and every one capable of becoming a competitor, with a jealous eye. It is sometimes engrafted upon pride, which is deeply wounded by appearances of neglect. It is a frequent attendant upon love; and in a milder sense of the term, it may be considered as an anxious solicitude least we should be supplanted in the affections of those we most highly esteem. The passion is sometimes excited in weak minds, by the very excess of affection; for this excess is prone to be perpetually upon the watch, and torments itself with groundless fears. Jealousy, in the extreme, contains a complication of the most tremendous passions which can agitate the human breast. Though it has love for its basis, yet it suffers the united torments of every painful emotion. It finds equal : danger in the most opposite appearances. Every token of innocence is interpreted into a proof of guilt; and every instance of affection, as a mark of insulting hypocrisy. It is a green-ey'd monster, which doth make -Trifles light as air Are to the jealous, confirmations strong As proofs of holy writ. SHAKESPEAR'S OTHELLO. Under the influence of this baneful passion the mind becomes, at intervals, the sport of transporting hope, and wild despair; is alternately tormented, by fits of rage and the depth of contrition, for excesses committed in its transports. In a word, uniting the extremes of dreadful hatred and passionate fondness, it entertains most cruel suspicions of the object it most adores; and is tempted to destroy that which it dreads to lose! The class of evil passions under permanent Malevolence, are indications of the depraved character and dispositions of their subject, in whom they are seated, not having any immediate reference to the character of their object. Those which are now described as the modifications of anger, N |